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Is biotechnology a unique technology that will revolutionize life as we 
know it or simply an expedited version of natural processes that have been 
with us since the beginning of life? The answer may depend on what 
"camp" you are in or for what purpose you are defining the term.1 Those 
1. Biotechnology is not a precisely defined term, nor is it a single technology. At its most 
comprehensive, the term has been defined as the "application of biological systems and orga-
nisms to technical and industrial processes." Young & Miller, Comment: Biotechnology: A 'Sci-
entific' Term in Name Only, 6 BIOTECH. L. REP. 11 (1987). This broad definition includes such 
traditional biological methods as plant and animal breeding and fermentation. A more modern 
and narrow definition of the term would encompass the ability to effect specific genetic changes 
via such techniques as those which involve recombinant DNA (R-DNA) (i.e., joining together 
pieces of DNA from different organisms together in vitro) and cell fusion (used to create 
monoclonal antibodies-homogeneous antibodies that recognize only one kind of antigen). This 
definition was adopted by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in its publication: OF-
FICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS, 3-
4, 503 (1984). More recently recombinant RNA (RRNA) has been added to the techniques of 
biotechnology. This technique is the modification of RNA by insertion of segments of foreign 
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who would like to see biotechnology processes and products more stringently 
regulated have argued that biotechnology is a new technology with dangers 
and risks never before confronted by our society.1 Those who want to see 
fewer restrictions on biotechnology research and development have argued 
that it is really nothing new, that it poses no new risks or risks that are 
different in kind from existing biological and chemical processes. 8 The es-
sence of this debate, which is continually renewed in the scientific and regu-
latory literature, is well captured in this statement by Congressman Florio: 
The Cassandras talk clearly of Andromeda strains, of developments that 
would change the ecology of the earth in a relatively short period of time. 
The Babbitts scoff at that gloom, dismissing past mistakes as minor labo-
ratory accidents, explaining about the implications of thwarting innova-
tion and suffocating this fledgling industry in an irrational overreaction 
to extremely remote events. 4 
These divergent views about the risks and regulation of biotechnology have 
characterized the technology since its inception. As the science has 
progressed, however, the perceptions of the risks associated with the tech-
nology have changed and the regulatory system has been modified to keep 
pace with them-waxing when the risks are perceived as great and slowly 
RNA. For purposes of this paper, "biotechnology" will be used in its more narrow sense and 
will be used interchangeably with the term "genetic engineering." 
2. See, e.g., Wald, The Case Against Genetic Engineering, 16 THE SciENCES 7-8, 10-11 
(Sept.-Oct. 1976), in which Wald states that "[R]ecombinant DNA technology fills our society 
with problems unprecedented not only in the history of science, but of life on the Earth." I d. at 
7. See also Ruckelshaus, Risk, Science, and Democracy, 1 IssuEs IN Sci. TEcH. 19, 21 (Spring 
1985) (the author claims that the risks inherent in biotechnology are the largest our society has 
ever faced from advances in the natural sciences). 
3. See, e.g., Levin & Harwell, Environmental Risks and Genetically Engineered Orga-
nisms, in BIOTECHNOLOGY IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 66 (S. Panem ed. 1985) (hereinafter 
Panem] ("Many have assumed that such [genetically altered) organisms ... represent some-
thing fundamentally new and different .... This assumption is incorrect .... Genetic engi-
neering techniques can be viewed simply as a more efficient means of modification than have 
been accomplished by the more expensive, time-consuming, and less efficient conventional 
processes of mutation, selection and breeding programs."). See also THE RECOMBINANT DNA 
DEBATE 18 (D. Jackson & S. Stich eds. 1979) ("There is substantial uncertainty as to whether 
the risks associated with the careful application of recombinant DNA methods to a study of 
living organisms are any greater than those posed by conventional genetic and microbiological 
research for over 50 years."); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, INTRODUCTION OF RECOMBINANT 
DNA-ENGINEERED ORGANISMS INTO THE ENVIRONMENT: KEY IssUES 8, 22 (1987) [hereinafter NAS 
REPoRT] ("There is no evidence that unique hazards exist either in the use of RDNA tech-
niques or in the transfer of genes between unrelated organisms."); LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION § 18.02(4)(d) (S. Novick, D. Stever, & M. Mellon eds. 1987) [hereinafter Novick) 
("To date, ecologists have not identified any new adverse ecological consequences which flow 
directly from the method by which organisms were engineered . . . . Some ecologists even re-
fuse to distinguish among traditional and advanced methods of genetic engineering in discuss-
ing environmental risk."). 
4. Florio, Regulation in Biotechnology, in Panem, supra note 3, at 42. 
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waning as new information is gained and perceptions of the risks decline. 
This article traces the evolution of the regulation of biotechnology, ty-
ing it to our knowledge and perceptions of its risks and benefits. The article 
also speculates about future regulatory issues that will arise as biotechnol-
ogy continues to expand and move into new areas. Part I of the article 
briefly summarizes the current status of biotechnology and its potential ben-
efits. Part II looks at the perceived risks associated with biotechnology both 
past and present. Parts III through VIII describe the existing regulatory 
structure for biotechnology and its historical development. Although this 
section focuses on federal regulations, it also includes a discussion of state 
and local regulations and court cases regarding the regulation of biotechnol-
ogy. Part IX assesses the adequacy of the regulatory structure. Part X iden-
tifies new areas which the regulatory system may have to address in the 
coming years and ways in which the regulatory system might be improved 
and a greater consensus regarding regulatory policies achieved. 
I. BIOTECHNOLOGY-CuRRENT AND PoTENTIAL BENEFITS 
The use of biotechnology techniques is already providing a wide range 
of benefits to society.«~ Current applications have as their primary focus five 
areas: (1) development of human therapeutics; (2) animal health care and 
development; (3) plant agriculture; (4) food production; and (5) environmen-
tal management. 
In the area of human therapeutics, researchers and developers are using 
biotechnology to produce naturally occurring human drugs more efficiently 
and in greater quantities than the body itself can generate, and to produce 
new drugs and vaccines to fight such diseases as AIDS, cancer, hepatitis B, 
herpes, rabies, and influenza. 8 Biotechnology is also being used to prevent 
5. According to a recent General Accounting Office report: 
Compared with conventional processes (plant breeding or selection of randomly pro-
duced mutant microbes), [R-DNA] techniques offer a more precise means of creating 
many products. They can also dramatically shorten the time required to perform cer-
tain biological processes, such as producing new strains of plants and animals. Most 
strikingly, the new genetic engineering has made it possible to transfer genes between 
very different kinds of organisms-something not previously achievable. 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BIOTECHNOLOGY: MANAGING THE RISKS OF FiELD TEsTING GENETI-
CALLY ENGINEERED ORGANISMS 9 (1988) [hereinafter GAO REPoRT]. 
6. Some of the "commercialized fruits" of recombinant DNA and monoclonal antibody 
technology include human insulin developed using R-DNA techniques, human growth hormone, 
hepatitis B vaccine, interferon alpha (a protein which has shown promising results against can-
cer and viral diseases), veterinary vaccines, diagnostic test kits for numerous conditions, and 
tissue plasminogen activator (a blood clot dissolving protein used to treat heart attack victims). 
Currently in the clinical trial phase are such promising products as erythropoietin (EPO), a 
peptide that alleviates anemia in kidney dialysis patients; tumor necrosis factor (TNF), natural 
body factors that attack cancer; and factor VIII, an agent to promote blood clotting in 
hemophiliacs. Under study are vaccines for AIDS, herpes, and rabies; prourokinase, a clot-dis-
solving substance that may have value in treating heart disease; superoxide dismutase (SOD), a 
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diseases. For example, scientists at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
and some universities are genetically altering mosquitoes to prevent the 
spread of malaria and yellow fever. Finally, R-DNA may soon be used to 
treat genetic diseases by deliberately introducing fragments of "therapeutic" 
genes into the cells of human patients. 7 
Animal health care and breeding are also "fertile" grounds for biotech-
nology. In the area of animal drugs, some of the products already approved 
or on the market include monoclonal antibodies to prevent calf diarrhea and 
to treat a serious swine disease called pseudorabies. In the area of animal 
growth and development, products being clinically tested include porcine 
growth hormone, which stimulates growth in young pigs, and an R-ONA-
derived bovine growth hormone to speed up the growth of cattle. Under 
study are animal cloning techniques to produce animals with certain proper-
ties-such as increased milk production and disease resistance.8 
Of the numerous uses of biotechnology, agricultural applications are 
considered among the most promising. Scientists are developing crops that 
are more nutritious, bigger, and more resistant to insects, herbicides, frost, 
and disease. Agricultural companies are also focusing their attention on the 
development of genetically engineered microbial pesticides which would re-
duce our dependence on chemical pesticides. 
Biotechnology is also making its mark in the food production industry. 
The development of new and improved enzymes and the use of fermentation 
processes has put food production in the forefront of biotechnology applica-
tions. These new processes are enabling food manufacturers to raise yields 
and reduce waste and energy costs.9 
Finally, in the area of environmental management, biotechnology is be-
substance that may prevent tissue damage from heart attacks; neurotrophic growth factors, 
which may stimulate nerve growth in patients suffering from degenerative brain disorders; and 
epidermal growth factors, which speed wound healing. See Biotechnology Growing Greener at 
Last, CHEMICAL WEEK 20 (Sept. 30, 1987), for a more detailed description of recent applications 
of biotechnology in the pharmaceutical area. 
7. A preliminary proposal to begin human trials of such "human gene therapy" was sub-
mitted to the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) of the National Institutes of 
Health in the spring of 1987 for review. Telephone interview with William Gartland, Director, 
NIH Office of Recombinant DNA Activities, in Bethesda, Md. (July 5, 1988). Additional safety 
studies have been requested by the reviewers before the initiation of clinical trials. /d. See also 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1988, at B9, col. 1. 
8. The Agricultural Research Service within USDA is working on two research projects 
involving genetically engineered animals. One entails studies of sheep and swine that have been 
altered by the addition of an extra gene for growth hormone. The objective of this work is to 
improve production characteristics such as the animal's growth rate and the fat content of its 
meat. The second project entails engineering chickens to be resistant to the avian leukosis vi-
rus, which causes a serious poultry disease. See OFFICE OF TEcHNOLOGY AssESSMENT, FEDERAL 
REGULATION AND ANIMAL PATENTS (1988). See also Schneider, Better Farm Animals Duplicated 
by Cloning, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1988, at A1, col. 3. 
9. See World Food Congress: Biotech Yields Better Enzymes, Crops, and Pigs, 6 BI-
OTECH. 14 (1988). 
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ing used for the recovery of precious metals from refractory ore bodies, pol-
lution control, toxic waste degradation, and ethane and oil recovery. Natu-
rally-occurring microorganisms capable of degrading toxins like aldrin, 
DDT, and kepone have been isolated and show promise as a means of clean-
ing up hazardous waste.10 
II. THE RISKS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 
Since 1972, when the first biotechnology experiments were conducted, 
the risks associated with at least some types of biotechnology-specifically 
R-DNA-have been hotly debated. The debate, at least initially, was fueled 
by scientists themselves: unsure of the risks associated with this new tech-
nique, they engaged in a two-year self-imposed moratorium on R-DNA 
experimentation. 
Initial concerns regarding R-DNA experiments focused on two areas: (1) 
harmful effects on human health and the environment ("health and safety 
risks") and (2) deleterious effects on society ("social risks"). Environmental 
and human health risks were believed to arise from the possibility that 
"harmful man-made organisms, organisms with new treatment-resistant 
properties, or new biological life forms with superior survival characteristics 
enabling them to displace existing beneficial organisms,''11 would escape 
from the laboratory. Social risks were said to arise from our new ability to 
play God by developing new species at an increasingly rapid rate and poten-
tially by altering human beings by changing their genetic structure.12 
After the moratorium ended and scientists began to conduct R-DNA 
research and to develop experience with the technique, most researchers be-
10. See Novick, supra note 3, at § 18.01(3). 
II. Naumann, Federal Regulation of Recombinant DNA Technology: Time for Change, I 
HIGH TEcH. L.J. 61, 61 (1986) [hereinafter Naumann]. 
12. Engelhard has distinguished social risks from physical risks on the basis that social 
risks "flow from the disruptive effects of new theories and data on existing values and beliefs." 
See Capron, Prologue: Why Recombinant DNA?, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 973, 977 (1978). In an arti-
cle in MIT's Technology Review, Robert Sinsheimer summarized the bases for concerns regard-
ing social risks: 
For 3 billion years, natural changes in the number, structure, and organization of 
genes have determined the course of evolution. We have now come to the end of that 
familiar pathway .... We now possess the ability to manipulate genes, and we can 
direct the future course of evolution .... We can plan, and with computer simula-
tion ultimately anticipate the future forms and paths of life. Mutation and natural 
selection will continue, of course. But henceforth, the old ways of evolution will be 
dwarfed by the role of purposeful human intelligence. In the hands of the genetic 
engineer, life forms could become extraordinary Tinkertoys and life itself just another 
design problem. 
Regal, The Ecology of Evolution: Implications of the Individualistic Paradigm, in ENGINEERED 
ORGANISMS IN THE ENVIRONMENT: SciENTIFIC IssUEs 12 (0. Halvorson, D. Pramer & M. Rogul 
eds. 1985) (quoting Sinsheimer, Genetic Engineering: Life as a Plaything, TEcH. REv. April 
1983, at 14). 
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lieved that the initial environmental and human health risks had been 
greatly exaggerated and there developed a consensus, at least in the scien-
tific community, that R-ONA research conducted in the laboratory was a 
relatively safe activity.18 
As science has progressed and R-DNA techniques have come out of the 
laboratory and into the field for testing, attention has turned to the risks 
associated with the deliberate release of genetically altered organisms into 
the environment. 14 Although most scientists believe that the risks of such 
deliberate release experiments are overrated, many will admit that there is a 
very small probability of serious harm.11 
A. Environmental and Human Health Risks 
Concerns regarding deliberate release experiments center on the fact 
that the organisms used are designed to survive in the environment long 
enough to perform a designated task. This is in contrast to laboratory mi-
crobes which typically die outside the laboratory. Not only may such mi-
crobes survive, but also, unlike ordinary inert pollutants, they may multiply 
and spread, making them difficult to control.18 
13. See Green, Genetic Technology May Prompt New Legal Regime, Legal Times of 
Washington, Jan. 18, 1982, at 17 ("The original perception of recombinant DNA activities as 
involving special hazards has been swept away by a revisionist sentiment that has prevailed 
since 1978.") [hereinafter Green]. 
14. The first genetically engineered organism was approved for release by NIH in 1981. 
By 1985 there was a backlog of proposals to release genetically engineered organisms into the 
environment at the federal agencies charged with approving such releases. Also in that year a 
GAO study revealed that the USDA was funding at least eighty-seven projects involving the 
environmental release of genetically engineered organisms and that the majority of these re-
leases would occur in the next five years. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT, HOUSE 
COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON ISSUES IN THE FEDERAL 
REGULATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY: FROM RESEARCH TO RELEAsE (Comm. Print 1986) (hereinafter 
SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT]. In May 1986 the first authorized release of a genetically-engineered 
organism occurred in Middleton, Wisconsin, when Agracetus Corporation planted two hundred 
tobacco plant seedlings that had been genetically-altered to be resistant to a specific disease. 
See id. Since then, at least twenty other deliberate release experiments have been conducted in 
the United States. Approximately five of these involved microorganisms, including the ice-mi-
nus (Pseudomonas syringe) bacteria released by AGS, Inc., and Steven Lindow in California; 
the Pseudomonas f!uorescens marker, released by Monsanto in Modesto, N.C., the genetically 
engineered Rhizobium meliloti released by Biotechnica International to increase nitrogen fixa-
tion in alfalfa in Pepin County, Wisconsin; and Crop Genetics International's release in Belt-
sville, Maryland, of bacteria to make corn resistant to corn borers. The remaining releases have 
primarily involved genetically engineered plants. Telephone interview with Steven Witt, Presi-
dent, Center for Scientific Information, in San Francisco, California (July 5, 1988). 
15. Some have termed this a "low probability/high consequence" risk and have likened it 
to the risk associated with nuclear power plants. See, e.g., Note, The Rutabaga That Ate Pitts-
burgh, 72 VA. L. REv. 1529, 1560 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Rutabaga]. See also Gore & Owens, 
The Challenge of Biotechnology, 3 YALE L. & PoL. REv. 336, 342 (1985). 
16. See Note, Rutabaga, supra note 15, at 1534. See also Sharples, Regulation of Prod-
ucts from Biotechnology, 13 PoL'Y F. 1329 (1987). 
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These factors have raised concerns about the potential impact of delib-
erate releases of genetically engineered organisms on the public health and 
the ecosystem. In order to affect human health, any organism must: 
1. be able to survive and multiply in the environment; 
2. be of a type that could infect humans; 
3. be able to resist a wide range of host defense mechanisms; and 
4. produce a factor that can cause disease (i.e., a patliogen).17 
The concern with genetic engineering, however, is not whether it will be 
used deliberately to produce organisms that cause disease but whether it 
will exacerbate or facilitate the disease producing potential of naturally oc-
curring organisms. Since in most cases human pathogens are not going to be 
"released knowingly" into the environment, 18 concern has focused on the 
possibility that R-DNA technology might accidentally convert a 
nonpathogen to a pathogen. Such an accident is considered unlikely by most 
scientists. A recent report-Introduction of Recombinant DNA-Engineered 
Organisms into the Environment published by the National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS)-concludes that "the possibility that minor genetic modifi-
cations with R-DNA techniques will inadvertently convert a nonpathogen to 
a pathogen is ... quite remote."19 
As a result, concerns about harms caused by pathogenic organisms to 
humans and animals have moved to the back burner while concerns about 
damage to the environment and the ecosystem caused by genetically engi-
neered nonpathogens have moved to the forefront in the deliberate release 
debate. The concern in this area, however, does not appear to stem from the 
fact that the organisms are genetically engineered. In fact, scientists gener-
ally agree that "[t]he risks of [releases] arise from the way the organisms 
may interact with their environments, rather than from their having been 
genetically engineered."20 Thus, as was the case with their disease producing 
capability, the key issue is whether the genetically engineered organisms 
have acquired traits that give them "an undesirable competitive advantage 
over unaltered organisms."21 
Ecologists often cite examples of the introduction of exotic species into 
new environments, such as the "introduction to the United States of the 
Brazilian water hyacinth in the late 19th century which led to an infestation 
17. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, IMPACTS OF APPLIED GENETICS: MICRO-ORGA-
NISMS, PLANTS, AND ANIMALS 201 (1984) (hereinafter OTA, IMPACTS OF APPLIED GENETICS]. See 
also J. AREEN, P. KING, S. GoLDBERG & A. CAPRON, LAw, SciENCE & MEDICINE 114-17 (1984) 
(quoting NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON NIH 
GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING RECOMBINANT DNA MOLECULES 23-37 (Oct. 1977)). 
18. See Novick, supra note 3, at § 18.02[2]. 
19. NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 15. 
20. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 16. See, e.g., Genetic Changes in Plants May Lead to 
Fortified Weeds, Wash. Post, Oct. 3, 1988, at A3, col. 1, which states that the greatest danger 
posed by genetic engineering of plants may come from their breeding with weeds. 
21. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 16. 
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of the Southern waterways" or the "uncontrolled spread of English sparrows 
originally imported to control insects," as a basis for concern regarding the 
deliberate release of genetically engineered organisms.11 
The appropriateness of such analogies, however, is a subject of consider-
able disagreement. Some argue that genetically engineered organisms, which 
typically carry less than one percent new genes, are over ninety-nine percent 
the same as the original, and thus are "not analogous to the 'totally new' 
organisms introduced into an ecosystem."28 The NAS report states that situ-
ations in which exotic species are introduced into new environments are not 
analogous to those in which R-ONA-engineered organisms are "reintro-
duced" into the environment from which the original non-modified orga-
nisms were taken. Such analogies may be appropriate, however, for intro-
ductions involving R-ONA-engineered organisms taken from quite different 
environments or geographic locations. 24 
In the deliberate release experiments conducted to date, there have 
been no measurable harmful effects to the environment or to humans. 211 
Thus, we are left with the best estimates of researchers and scientists as to 
what we can expect in the way of risks, and, unfortunately, there is wide-
spread variation in estimation. In a 1986 report, Fiksel and Covello 
remarked: 
Scientists have expressed a number of disparate views about the poten-
tial risks of releasing genetically modified microorganisms. For example, 
one ecologist has suggested that the outcome of introducing a new spe-
cies is not predictable, since there is at present no systematic under-
standing of the natural factors that influence its success or failure in the 
environment. Another ecologist has suggested that the probabilities of 
survival and establishment are small, but that the potential conse-
quences may be significant. A contrary view, expressed ... by an Assis-
22. OTA, IMPACTS OF APPLIED GENETICS, supra note 17, at 200. Other examples of harm 
caused by the introduction of non-native microorganisms into new environments include the 
bubonic plague, the periodic appearance of foot-and-mouth disease in the United States, and 
the disappearance of our native American chestnuts due to chestnut blight. Similar disruptions 
have also resulted from the introduction of foreign insects such as gypsy moths and Japanese 
beetles and foreign animals such as starlings and mongoose. See Sharples, Spread of Organisms 
with Novel Genotypes: Thoughts from an Ecological Perspective, REcoMBINANT DNA TEcH. 
BuLL. 43, 49 (June 1983). 
23. OTA, IMPACTS OF APPLIED GENETICS, supra note 17, at 200. 
24. NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 19. See also Panem, supra note 3, at 56-64 (discussing 
the appropriateness of such analogies). 
25. But see Argentines Report Infection by Altered Farm Virus, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 
1988, at A32, col. 1. According to Argentinian scientists, farmworkers in Argentina were acci-
dentally infected by a genetically engineered anti-rabies virus when innoculating cattle with a 
vaccine against the virus. This claim is the subject of considerable dispute, however. Research-
ers from the Wistar Institute in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, who helped develop the vaccine, 
had not been given data on which to evaluate the Argentinian claims and argued that such an 
accident did not make any scientific sense. See Fox, Biotechnology Alfresco, 38 BIOSCIENCE 
533, 534 (1988) (full discussion of the debate). 
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tant Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, suggests that "nature is 
resilient," and that ecological balance cannot easily be disrupted by the 
introduction of a genetically modified microorganism. 28 
Two more recent reports-one by the NAS and the other by the U.S. Con-
gress' Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)-also provide evidence of the 
divergent views regarding the risks of biotechnology. The NAS report 
concluded: 
There is no evidence that unique hazards exist either in the use of R-
DNA techniques or in the transfer of genes between unrelated organisms 
.... [The] risks associated with the introduction of R-DNA engineered 
organisms are the same in kind as those associated with the introduction 
into the environment of unmodified organisms modified by other genetic 
techniques. 27 
The OTA report, somewhat more cautiously, concluded: 
Planned introductions of genetically engineered organisms into the envi-
ronment . . . are not . . . without potential risks. Virtually any organism 
deliberately introduced into a new environment has a small but real 
chance of surviving and multiplying. In some small subset of such cases, 
an undesirable consequence might follow. The complexity of even simple 
ecosystems makes the precise prediction of such events, and of their con-
sequences, difficult.28 
This diversity of views has made it especially difficult for regulators to de-
velop an acceptable regulatory framework for addressing the health and en-
vironmental risks of deliberate release experiments. 
Much of the disparity in views can be attributed to differences in per-
spective regarding the adequacy of data on which to base predictions of eco-
logical risk. Those who are unwilling to discount the risks of the technology 
argue that assessing ecosystem effects of genetically engineered organisms is 
a highly speculative endeavor because virtually no data exist from which 
ecologists can extrapolate to make predictions. 
Those who see the risks as minimal take a different view. The recent 
NAS report argues that "[t]here is a large body of relevant knowledge on 
the ecological consequences of biological introductions as well as on the ge-
netic modification of organisms by traditional breeding methods."29 The re-
port also points to the fact that R-DNA techniques have been in use for 
more than fifteen years "in hundreds of laboratories around the world" and 
26. Fiksel & Covello, The Suitability and Applicability of Risk Assessment Methods for 
Environmental Applications of Biotechnology, BIOTECHNOLOGY RISK AssESSMENT 2, 3 (1986). 
27. NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 6. 
28. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: FIELD 
TEsTING ENGINEERED ORGANISMS: GENETIC AND EcoLOGICAL IssUEs 3 (1988) [hereinafter OTA. 
FIELD TESTING ENGINEERED ORGANISMS]. 
29. NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 7. 
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that during that time, "thousands of different organisms have been modified 
and their characteristics studied."8° Critics of the report argue, however, 
that such data are not wholly applicable to assessing the risks of deliberate 
releases; it is argued that laboratory data are irrelevant to the effects of the 
organism in the environment. 
B. Social Risks 
The social risks of a technology derive from its ability to change our 
social fabric, beliefs, and values. In the area of biotechnology such risks 
might include changes in the way we think about life, death, conception, 
birth, disease, health, the natural environment, and the relationship of 
humans to animals. The social risks of biotechnology have been virtually 
ignored by scientists conducting research in the area. Rather, it has been the 
public at large along with ethicists and philosophers who have brought the 
social risks to light. A 1986 Harris poll on public perceptions of biotechnol-
ogy found that twenty-two percent of Americans believe that genetic engi-
neering will make life worse for them and others rather than better. 
Whether this feeling is based on concerns about social risks is unclear; how-
ever, the survey results point out that the public has nagging concerns about 
biotechnology that have not been addressed. 81 
Most of the discussion regarding the social risks of biotechnology has 
focused on the human applications of biotechnology processes rather than 
on the environmental applications. This appears to parallel public concerns. 
The 1986 Harris poll found that forty-two percent of the public believe that 
human cell manipulation via genetic engineering is morally wrong, while 
only twenty-six percent believe that genetic alteration of plants, animals, 
and bacteria is morally wrong.82 Members of the public have expressed anxi-
ety about some biotechnological procedures in large part because of their 
relationship to controversial reproductive issues, i.e., abortion of defective 
fetuses, sex selection, and human gene therapy.88 
Two types of human gene therapy-human germline and enhancement 
30. ld. at 9. Similarly, the OTA report on field testing engineered organisms states that a 
sufficiently large body of data exists, chiefly concerning microbes introduced for biocontrol and 
agricultural applications, to allow scientists to accurately predict the outcomes of small-scale 
planned releases. See OTA, FIELD TEsTING ENGINEERED ORGANISMS, supra note 28, at 16, 38-39. 
31. The poll, conducted at the request of the Office of Technology Assessment, found that 
there was actually an increase in the percentage of those who felt that genetic engineering 
would make things worse for them. In a similar poll conducted in 1982, only sixteen percent of 
the public felt that biotechnology would decrease the quality of their lives and the lives of 
others. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOL-
OGY-BACKGROUND PAPER: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 50 (1987) [hereinafter OTA, 
REPORT ON PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS). 
32. ld. at 4. 
33. See Green, supra note 13, at 17. 
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therapy-have probably provoked the greatest public concern. 8' Germline 
therapy involves the alteration of an individual's germ cells (reproductive 
cells) so that genetic alterations are passed on to one's offspring. Enhance-
ment therapy is the modification of cells to produce different character 
traits-i.e., height, hair color, eye color, intelligence-rather than medically 
therapeutic changes. Although the application of this type of therapy is de-
cades away, the possibility of its application has moved several authors to 
raise the spectre of Huxley's Brave New World and to predict predetermi-
nation of the physical traits of future generations. 811 Others have raised a 
concern that genetic engineering could become a tool of social or economic 
control.88 
More recently, significant public attention has focused on the federal 
government's undertaking to map and sequence the human genome. In the 
spring of 1988, seventy prominent national leaders announced their support 
for the creation of a congressional board and citizens' committee to address 
certain ethical issues that will arise from the Human Genome Project.87 The 
leaders expressed concern that the mapping of the human genome could 
dramatically affect the private and public life of the country and that infor-
mation gained from the project could lead to genetic discrimination and 
eugenics or could interfere with an individual's right of privacy.88 
Another set of concerns in this area has religious overtones. Some argue 
that there should be no research in this area because the ability of scientists 
to transfer DNA from one species to another or to alter one's genetic struc-
ture smacks of "playing God."39 Those in this camp further argue that there 
is something morally wrong with crossing species barriers-that there is 
34. Gene therapy is defined as "the introduction of a normal functioning gene into a cell 
in which its defective counterpart is active," and, in some cases, the excision of the defective 
gene. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BEHAV-
IORAL RESEARCH, SPLICING LIFE: THE SOCIAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES OF GENETIC ENGINEERING IN 
HUMAN BEINGS 42 (1982). 
35. Public concern was expressed in a 1982 New York Times editorial entitled "Whether 
to Make Perfect Humans." N.Y. Times, July 22, 1982, at A22, col. 1. The editorial suggested 
that the potential dangers of germline therapy were so serious that a ban on such therapy 
should be considered. "The remaking of man," said the Times, "deserves a little discussion." 
I d. 
36. See Gore & Owens, supra note 15, at 353. In fact, this has become an issue with 
regard to the use of bovine growth hormone, which is currently being used to increase milk 
production in cows. Small farmers feel that the widespread use of the hormone will give large 
farmers a significant economic advantage and push the small farmer out of business. 
37. In February 1988 the National Research Council Committee on Mapping and Se-
quencing the Human Genome found the Human Genome Project feasible and strongly urged 
that a $200 million a year effort to discover the location of every gene within human chromo-
somes begin immediately, stating that "such a special effort in the next two decades will greatly 
enhance progress in human biology and medicine." See Genome Projects Ready to Go, 7 BI-
OTECH. L. REP. 207, 208 (1988). 
38. Human Genome Policy Board Recommended, 7 BIOTECH. L. REP. 105, 115 (1988). 
39. See T. HowARD & J. RIFKIN, WHo SHOULD PLAY Goo? (1977). 
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something sacred about the genetic composition of a species.40 These con-
cerns appear to suggest that "recombinant DNA could someday surface 
means of destruction that ought not to be published. "41 As yet, there has 
been no satisfactory resolution of these issues and the legal community, like 
the scientific community, has focused little attention on them. 
Ill. REGULATORY EVOLUTION 
The regulation of biotechnology has been evolving since 1976 when the 
NIH first issued its Guidelines to regulate the potential risks of laboratory 
conducted R-DNA research. Since that time the regulatory structure has ex-
panded as a number of different federal agencies have used a variety of stat-
utes to regulate biotechnology research and product development. One of 
the most controversial issues throughout the history of biotechnology regu-
lation has been whether the regulation, on the one hand, is adequate to con-
trol the technology's risks, or, on the other hand, is unq.uly burdensome.41 
40. Although this concern focuses on genetic engineering, it could also apply to hybridiza-
tion or traditional breeding techniques which mix plants and animals of different species. 
41. Green, supra note 13, at 17. The Harris public opinion poll confirmed this observa-
tion. The poll found that thirty-five percent of those who think that genetic engineering of 
plants and animals is morally wrong believe this because they think that people have no busi-
ness tampering with nature via R-DNA techniques. OTA, REPORT ON PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS, 
supra note 31, at 58. 
42. Numerous articles have discussed this question. See, e.g., McGarity & Bayer, Federal 
Regulation of Emerging Genetic Technologies, 36 VAND. L. REv. 461, 463 (1983) [hereinafter 
McGarity & Bayer]; Korwek & de la Cruz, Federal Regulation of Environmental Releases of 
Genetically Manipulated Microorganisms, 11 RuTGERS COMPUTER & TEcH. L.J. 301 (1985); 
Karny, Regulation of Genetic Engineering: Less Concern About Frankensteins but Time for 
Action on Commercial Production, 12 U. ToL. L. REv. 815 (1981) [hereinafter Karny, Franken-
steins]; Hutt, Research on Recombinant DNA Molecules: The Regulatory Issues, 51 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 1435 (1978) [hereinafter Hutt]; McChesney & Adler, Biotechnology Released from the Lab: 
The Environmental Regulatory Framework, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,366 (1983); Naumann, supra 
note 11, at 62; Gore & Owens, supra note 15, at 336. 
On the burdensome side, some even argue that such regulation infringes on the constitu-
tional rights of scientists to conduct basic research. See, e.g., Favre & McKinnon, The New 
Prometheus: Will Scientific Inquiry Be Bound by the Chains of Government Regulation?, 19 
DuQ. L. REv. 651 (1981); Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research: A Constitutional Analy-
sis, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1203 (1978). But see Barkstrom, Recombinant DNA and the Regulation of 
Biotechnology: Reflections on the Asilomar Conference, Ten Years After, 19 AKRoN L. REv. 81, 
107-09 (1985) (argues there is no such right) [herinafter Barkstrom]; Attanasio, The Constitu-
tionality of Regulating Human Genetic Engineering: When Procreation Liberty and Equal 
Opportunity Collide, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1274 (1986) (queries the constitutionality of possible 
government regulation of the distribution of biological abilities through genetic engineering); 
Fogleman, Regulating Science: An Evaluation of the Regulation of Biotechnology Research, 17 
ENVTL. L. REP. 183, 185 (1987) (proposes regulating biotechnology research separately from 
technological products given the unique legal issues posed by the government regulation of 
science) [hereinafter Fogleman]. Most authors agree that even if there is a constitutional right 
to conduct scientific research, that right is far from absolute and can be infringed upon when 
the activity might jeopardize health, life, or property. 
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This section describes the historical development of the regulatory frame-
work from its inception to the current proposals for reform, highlighting the 
controversies that have plagued, and in some cases, continue to plague, its 
evolution. 
A. The NIH Guidelines 
The NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Mole-
cules43 were issued in 1976 by the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee 
(RAC)44 within NIH and were to be applied to all NIH funded research.46 
The purpose of the Guidelines was to protect "the laboratory worker, the 
general public, and the environment from infection by possibly hazardous 
agents that [might] result from [R-DNA] research."48 
As initially promulgated in 1976, the Guidelines reflected a cautious ap-
proach to the regulation of R-DNA.47 Experiments fell into one of three 
groups: (1) prohibited, (2) exempt, or (3) requiring containment. Five types 
of experiments were specifically prohibited, including the deliberate release 
of genetically altered organisms into the envirom:pent.48 Regulations for con-
43. Nationru Institutes of Health, Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA 
Molecules, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,906 (1976) [hereinafter Guidelines]. 
44. The RAC was established in 1974 by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare 
(now Health and Human Services) upon the recommendation of the Director of NIH. See 
Karny, Frankensteins, supra note 42, at 820. 
45. The history of the development of the NIH Guidelines is probably best described by 
Swazey, Sorenson, and Wong. They recount the events and concerns that led researchers to call 
for a moratorium on certain types of R-DNA research in 1974, the efforts made by scientists to 
develop a consensus about how R-DNA research ought to proceed by forming an NIH Advisory 
Committee and by convening an international meeting at the Asilomar Conference Center in 
Pacific Grove, California, and the development and issuance of the NIH Guidelines. Swazey, 
Sorenson & Wong, Risks and Benefits, Rights and Responsibilities: A History of the Recombi-
nant DNA Research Controversy, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1019 (1978). 
46. Korwek, The NIH Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research and the Authority of 
FDA to Require Compliance with the Guidelines, 21 JuRIMETRICS J. 264, 268 (1981) [hereinafter 
Korwek, The NIH Guidelines]. The Guidelines have been both praised and criticized as a tool 
for the regulation of R-DNA research. Numerous legal questions have been raised about their 
adequacy and scope. In particular, several authors have asked whether the NIH Guidelines 
should extend to industry, whether NIH's RAC is an appropriate regulatory body, whether the 
RAC has the authority to enforce the Guidelines, and whether the Guidelines constitute ad-
ministrative rules subject to the Administrative Procedure Act and to the National Environ-
mental Policy Act. Several authors have indicated that, because of its role as a promoter of 
biomedical research, the NIH cannot be expected to be an aggressive regulator. See, e.g., id. at 
267; Gore & Owens, supra note 15, at 346; Naumann, supra note 11, at 65-70; Novick, supra 
note 3, at § 18.03[2); Karny, Frankensteins, supra note 42, at 821, 840; Korwek, Recombinant 
DNA and the Law: Review of Some General Legal Considerations, 15 GENE. l-5 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter Korwek, Recombinant DNA and the Law); Hutt, supra note 42, at 1445. 
47. See Isakoff, supra note 42, at 24; Naumann, supra note 11, at 65. 
48. Guidelines, supra note 43, at 27,914-915. Other prohibited activities included: (l) the 
formation of recombinant DNA derived from certain pathogenic organisms; (2) the formation of 
R-DNA which contained genes that made vertebrate toxins; (3) the transfer of a drug resistant 
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tainment consisted of two types: physical and biological. These two types of 
containment were designed to prevent organisms from escaping from the 
laboratory and to prevent them from living long outside the lab if they did 
happen to escape. Varying levels of containment were required, depending 
on the level of risk associated with the activity.49 
In addition to this technical framework, the Guidelines set forth an ad-
ministrative framework for their implementation by specifying the roles and 
responsibilities of parties involved in the research.110 Primary responsibility 
for particular experiments lay with the Principal Investigator (PI), the sci-
entist receiving the funding. Specifically, the PI was responsible for deter-
mining the "real and potential biohazards of the proposed research" and for 
determining the appropriate level of biological and physical containment for 
the research.111 Furthermore, each institution receiving NIH funds for R-
trait to a microorganism that was not known to acquire it naturally if such acquisition could 
compromise the use of a drug to control disease agents in human or veterinary medicine or 
agriculture; (4) experiments using more than ten liters of culture unless the R-DNA was "rigor-
ously characterized and the absence of harmful sequences established." Id. 
49. The Guidelines specified four levels of physical containment designated PI, P2, P3, 
and P4. The lowest level (PI) coincided with the least risky situations and required the least 
restrictive laboratory practices and building designs. Korwek, The NIH Guidelines, supra note 
46, at 268. At the highest risk level (P4), a "facility was to be engineered with 'monolithic 
walls,' air locks, double-door autoclaves for the sterilization and removal of waste, a separate 
negative pressure (inward) ventilation system, and Class-III Biological Safety Cabinets (en-
closed cabinets with arm-length rubber gloves)." Barkstrom, supra note 42, at 90. The Guide-
lines further defined three levels of biological containment-EKI, EK2, and EK3-for different 
host-vector systems and different levels of risk. EK1 represented the lowest level of contain-
ment and EK3 the highest level. Most R-DNA experiments at the time were being performed 
with the bacterium Escherichia coli strain K-12, a generally benign bacterium. The use of this 
host bacterium, along with certain specified vectors, constituted the EK1 level of containment. 
The EK2 and EK3 levels required further modifications of the E. coli bacteria that made it 
more difficult for the bacteria to survive outside of the laboratory. For example, they might be 
modified so that they required certain nutrients which did not exist in significant concentra-
tions in nature or so that they could not survive in sunlight. See Talbot, Introduction to Re-
combinant DNA Research, Development and Evolution of the NIH Guidelines, and Proposed 
Legislation, i2 U. ToL. L. REv. 804, 809 (1981) [herinafter Talbot]. The weakness of the biologi-
cal containment system was that it applied exclusively to experiments performed on E. coli. 
Subsequently, the containment requirements were modified and renamed to reflect the fact 
that different organisms might be used in R-DNA experiments. Three levels-HV1, HV2, and 
HV3-were established specifically for experiments with host vectors other than E. coli, with 
HV1 providing for the least amount of restraint. Similarly, the physical containment categories 
were renamed and revised to reflect new knowledge regarding the risks of laboratory experi-
ments. The new levels have been termed Biosafety Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4 (BL 1, 2, 3, and 4). 
50. See Karny, Frankensteins, supra note 42, at 824; Barkstrom, supra note 42, at 89. 
51. Guidelines, supra note 43, at 27,920. In addition, the PI was responsible for: 
selecting the microbiological practices and laboratory techniques for handling recom-
binant DNA materials, (iv) preparing procedures for dealing with accidental spills 
and overt personnel contamination, (v) determining the applicability of various pre-
cautionary medical practices, serological monitoring, and immunization, when availa-
ble, (vi) securing approval of the proposed research prior to initiation of work, (vii) 
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DNA research was required to establish an institutional biosafety committee 
(IBC) to advise the institution on policies and ensure that the research was 
conducted in accordance with the Guidelines. The IBC was to provide a 
"quasi-independent review of [R-DNA] work done at the institution,"112 re-
viewing, approving, and registering all proposed R-DNA experiments before 
their initiation and certifying that the containment standards were ade-
quate.113 The IBC was to be composed of individuals from the grantee insti-
tution or consultants, "selected so as to provide a diversity of disciplines 
relevant to recombinant DNA technology, biological safety, and 
engineering. "11• 
The NIH was also responsible for making an independent evaluation of 
the real and potential biohazards of the proposed research and determining 
whether the proposed physical and biological containment safeguards certi-
fied by the IBC were appropriate to control the biohazards.1111 The approved 
safeguards were to be specified in a memorandum of understanding and 
agreement between NIH and the grantee.116 
B. Criticism of Early Guidelines 
Although, from a technical standpoint the Guidelines were thought to 
be a major achievement in the effort to control the physical and biological 
risks of R-DNA technology, from a legal standpoint the Guidelines were 
considered quite weak. Numerous authors felt that the only legal basis for 
I d. 
I d. 
submitting information on purported EK2 and EK3 systems to the NIH Recombi-
nant DNA Molecule Program Advisory Committee and making the strains available 
to others, (viii) reporting to the institutional biohazards committee and the NIH Of-
fice of Recombinant DNA Activities new information bearing on the guidelines, such 
as technical information relating to hazards and new safety procedures or innova-
tions, (ix) applying for approval from the NIH Recombinant DNA Molecule Program 
Advisory Committee for large scale experiments with recombinant DNAs known to 
make harmful products (i.e., more than 10 liters of culture), and (x) applying to NIH 
for approval to lower containment levels when a cloned DNA recombinant derived 
from a shotgun experiment [was] rigorously characterized and there [was] sufficient 
evidence that it [was] free of harmful genes. 
52. Karny, Frankensteins, supra note 42, at 825. 
53. Korwek, The NIH Guidelines, supra note 46, at 269. 
54. Guidelines, supra note 43, at 27,920. 
In addition to possessing the professional competence necessary to assess and review 
specific activities and facilities, the committee [was to] possess or have available to it, 
the competence to determine the acceptability of its findings in terms of applicable 
laws, regulations, standards of practices, community attitudes, and health and envi-
ronmental considerations .... The institution [was] responsible for reporting names 
of and relevant background information on the members of its biohazards committee 
to the NIH. 
55. Id. 
56. ld. at 27,921. 
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enforcement arose from contract law, that the Guidelines did not have the 
force of regulations.117 Only institutions which received funds from NIH were 
covered by the Guidelines, and the only sanction that could be levied on 
those who did not comply was the loss of funds. 118 
A report issued by the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight 
of the House Committee on Science and Technology recognized this limita-
tion of the Guidelines and cited others as well: 
Since their inception, the NIH Guidelines have been consistently criti-
cized for three shortcomings. First, they are mandatory only for federally 
funded research; compliance by private companies is voluntary. Second, 
they do not apply to organisms created by genetic engineering methods 
other than recombinant DNA techniques. Finally, the Guidelines do not 
adequately address the issue of planned releases. 59 
Attempts were made to address at least the first of these shortcomings 
as early as 1976. In that year Senators Javits and Kennedy urged President 
Ford to explore every possible measure "for assuring that the NIH Guide-
lines would be adhered to" in all sectors of the research community.80 In 
57. See, e.g., Barkstrom, supra note 42, at 90; Korwek, The NIH Guidelines, supra note 
46, at 267; Fogleman, supra note 42, at 205 and n. 119. The confusion over the legal basis of 
NIH's authority to enforce compliance with the Guidelines can be attributed to at least two 
factors: (1) when the original NIH Guidelines were promulgated, they did not include any stat-
utory reference for their authority (this was partially remedied by the Draft Environmental 
Impact Statement which accompanied the Guidelines); (2) the Guidelines were adopted in ac-
cordance with informal rulemaking procedures making them appear to be administrative rules, 
having the force of law, apart from any contract. The problem with the argument that the 
Guidelines are actually rules lies with trying to find statutory authority for them. In attempting 
to find such authority, most have relied upon § 361 of the Public Health Service Act. Although 
§ 361 authorizes the Department of Health and Human Services, NIH's umbrella agency, to 
"prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases," Korwek and 
others have argued that this provision is not likely to apply to most genetically engineered 
organisms because such organisms do not generally involve the spread of communicable disease. 
See Korwek, Recombinant DNA and the Law, supra note 46, at 2. Korwek cites more convinc-
ing evidence of contract law as a basis for enforcement of the Guidelines. For example, the fact 
that the Guidelines originally required a memorandum of understanding and agreement be-
tween NIH and a grantee supports the contract argument. Moreover, the Guidelines specify 
required terms of funding and provide that NIH may "suspend, terminate or place other condi-
tions upon the financing" of noncomplying projects. Karny, Frankensteins, supra note 42, at 
825. In addition, in Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, the D.C. Circuit held that 
"NIH approval of genetic engineering experiments is an explicit condition which must be satis-
fied before a scientist can receive federal funds for recombinant DNA research." Foundation on 
Economic Trends v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 753 (D.D.C. 1984) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 756 
F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Based on the case, Naumann asserts that the "courts may consider 
NIH's authority to be contractual in nature." Naumann, supra note 11, at 68. 
58. Barkstrom, supra note 42, at 90. 
59. SuBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 7. See also Novick, supra note 3, at § 
18.03[2]; McChesney & Adler, supra note 42, at 10,371. 
60. Talbot, supra note 49, at 810 (quoting letter from Senators Javits and Kennedy to 
President Gerald R. Ford (July 1976)). 
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1977 the Federal Interagency Advisory Committee on Recombinant DNA 
Research81 concluded that "none of the existing statutes completely an-
swered the specific problems posed by recombinant DNA research,"82 and 
recommended new national legislation to extend the NIH Guidelines by law 
to private industry.83 Several bills were introduced in Congress that year to 
address these issues, but none were passed.84 
C. Revisions to the Guidelines 
In December 1978 NIH issued revised Guidelines81 accompanied by an 
environmental impact assessment. The new Guidelines were a relaxation of 
the earlier standards. For example, "experiments were assigned lower levels 
of required containment; [and] classes of experiments deemed of the lowest 
potential hazard were exempted entirely from the Guidelines."68 The Guide-
lines were also revised to allow releases of genetically altered organisms into 
the environment on a case-by-case basis. Up until that time such releases 
had been prohibited.87 
In addition, the RAC was expanded from sixteen members, who were 
primarily scientists, to twenty-five members that included "persons knowl-
edgeable in applicable law, standards of professional conduct and practice, 
public attitudes, the environment, public health, occupational health, or re-
lated fields."88 The purpose of the expansion was to increase public partici-
pation in the decisionmaking process. 
Finally, the 1978 revisions incorporated a process for future changes to 
the Guidelines consisting of notice in the Federal Register and an opportu-
nity for public comment.89 Since that time the Guidelines have been incre-
mentally modified in this fashion on a regular basis. 
At least three significant revisions were made to the Guidelines in 1980. 
First, the Guidelines eliminated the need for a memorandum of understand-
ing and agreement (MUA) between the grantee and the NIH. The MUA had 
61. The advisory committee was created in 1976 and consisted of members from eighteen 
federal agencies that either funded or could potentially regulate R-DNA research. See Talbot, 
supra note 49, at 810. 
62. Barkstrom, supra note 42, at 92. 
63. Talbot, supra note 49, at 810. 
64. See id. and Barkstrom, supra note 42, at 92 for a detailed description of the congres-
sional activity. Some have speculated that the reason for the lack of congressional action was 
the accumulation of scientific evidence that R-DNA research was basically a safe activity. See 
Barkstrom, supra note 42, at 93. 
65. National Institutes of Health, Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA 
Molecules, 43 Fed. Reg. 60,080 (1978). 
66. Talbot, supra note 49, at 812. 
67. 43 Fed. Reg. 60,126 (1978). Deliberate releases remained in the prohibited category but 
the prohibition could be waived with RAC approval. 
68. ld. at 60,081. 
69. Id. at 60,080. 
HeinOnline -- 38 Drake L. Rev. 489 1988-1989
1988-89] Biotechnology Regulation 489 
provided detailed information about each experiment and "was the institu-
tion's certification to the NIH that the experiment had complied with the 
Guidelines."70 Under the revised Guidelines the only type of monitoring re-
quired was that "the institution, IBC or PI notify [the NIH] of any signifi-
cant violations, accidents, or problems with interpretation."71 Second, in 
1980 the NIH promulgated physical containment recommendations for large 
scale uses of organisms containing recombinant DNA molecules.72 These 
recommendations were intended to serve as a guide to private companies 
which engaged in large-scale R-DNA experiments.73 The recommendations 
categorized large-scale projects according to the expected level of risk. Just 
as they were able to ignore the Guidelines themselves, however, private 
companies were also able to ignore these recommendations.74 In order to en-
courage use of the Guidelines by industry, in 1980 the NIH also provided a 
means for voluntary compliance.7D In exchange for voluntary compliance, 
the NIH would protect all proprietary information voluntarily submitted.76 
In 1981 the NIH proposed a radical change that would have made com-
pliance with the Guidelines totally voluntary.77 Institutions would not be 
required to establish IBCs or to obtain IBC or RAC approval prior to initi-
ating R-DNA research.78 In response to significant criticism, the NIH re-
versed its position in the proposal and issued a second proposal that "ex-
empted many more activities from RAC scrutiny," but required that NIH 
funded institutions continue to establish IBCs and comply with the Guide-
lines.79 Deliberate release experiments were removed from the "prohibited" 
category and were permitted with RAC review and approval by the NIH and 
the institution's IBC.80 Also, in 1981 the RAC approved the first deliberate 
release experiment-a genetically engineered corn plant. In 1983 the RAC 
approved two additional field tests, "one involving recombinant DNA-de-
70. Karny, Frankensteins, supra note 42, at 834. 
71. ld. at 835. 
72. Recombinant DNA Research: Physical Containment Recommendations for Large-
Scale Uses of Organisms Combining Recombinant DNA Molecules, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,968 (1980). 
73. In the original Guidelines most large scale experiments, i.e., those involving more 
than ten liters of R-DNA bacteria culture, were prohibited. Although a number of companies, 
not covered by the Guidelines, wished to conduct large-scale research, there were no Guidelines 
available for large-scale work. 
74. See McGarity & Bayer, supra note 42, at 502. 
75. Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules: Guidelines, 45 Fed. Reg. 77,404 
(1980). 
76. ld. 
77. See J. GIBBS, I. COOPER & B. MACKLER, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT: INTER-
NATIONAL REGULATION 103 (1987) (hereinafter J. GIBBS]. 
78.. Recombinant DNA Research: Proposed Revised Guidelines, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,368 
(1981). 
79. J. GIBBS, supra note 77, at 103. 
80. Recombinant DNA Research: Proposed Actions Under Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 
33,462 (1985). 
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rived tomato and tobacco plants and one involving 'ice minus,' a microbe 
which inhibits frost formation."81 
The lifting of the ban against deliberate releases shifted the focus of the 
RAC from a monitor of laboratory safety to an evaluator of deliberate re-
lease experiments.81 The approval by NIH of the three deliberate release 
experiments "refueled public debate over r-DNA research and provoked the 
first court challenge to the administration of the NIH Guidelines . . . . "83 
In 1984 a complete revision of the Guidelines appeared in the Federal 
Register.84 The 1984 Guidelines were significantly less stringent than those 
initially published in 1976. There were no prohibited experiments; instead 
experiments fell into one of four categories: (1) those requiring both IBC 
and RAC approval; (2) those requiring only IBC approval; (3) those requir-
ing only IBC notification; and (4) those which were exempt.8~ By 1984 most 
experiments fell into categories (3) and (4) and only four types of experi-
ments required approval from both the IBC and the RAC.88 Deliberate re-
leases were numbered among the four types of experiments requiring dual 
approval. 87 
Despite the early criticisms, by 1984 there was considerable acceptance 
of the NIH Guidelines and revisions, primarily due to their flexibility and 
fluidity.88 At the same time, however, the NIH Guidelines were beginning to 
lose their role as the primary regulatory mechanism for biotechnology 
activity. 
81. See SuBCOMMI'ITEE REPoRT, supra note 14, at 5. 
82. See Gore & Owens, supra note 15, at 345. In 1984 there was a significant increase in 
the number and diversity of proposals submitted to NIH and other government agencies to 
release genetically engineered organisms into the environment. These proposals "included orga-
nisms ranging from plants genetically-engineered to be herbicides or disease-resistant, to genet-
ically-engineered microbial pesticides." SuBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 5. 
83. Note, Rutabaga, supra note 15, at 1537. In Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heck-
ler, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the plaintiffs, led by Jeremy Rifkin, sought an injunction 
against the approval of an experiment involving the spraying of ice inhibiting bacteria on a 
potato field. 
84. Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 49 Fed. Reg. 
46,266-91 (1984). 
85. J. GIBBS, supra note 77, at 104. 
86. /d. 
87. Other experiments requiring approval of both the RAC and the institution's IBC are: 
(1) "deliberate formation of rONA-containing genes for toxic molecules with an LD50 for 
vertebrates of less than 100 nanograms per kilogram of body weight"; (2) "deliberately transfer-
ring a drug resistance trait to microorganisms that naturally lack that trait, if the transfer could 
'compromise the use of the drug to control disease agents in human or veterinary medicine or 
agriculture' "; and (3) "deliberately transferring rDNA, or DNA or RNA derived from rDNA, 
into human beings." Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 16,960 (1986). 
88. See Novick, supra note 3, at § 18.03[2] ("[The NIH Guidelines] have been and re-
main enormously influential."); McGarity & Bayer, supra note 42, at 501 ("The Guidelines 
have received broad support and have served as a model for regulators throughout the world."). 
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IV. STATUTORY MECHANISMS FOR REGULATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 
Between 1977 and 1984 it became clear that a new statute specifically 
designed to regulate biotechnology was not forthcoming. During that time 
scientists, lawyers, and environmentalists debated whether existing public 
health, agriculture, and environmental statutes could sufficiently regulate 
biotechnology activity.88 Over a dozen statutes were cited as potentially ap-
plicable to commercial biotechnology activities, although no statute at the 
time explicitly mentioned biotechnology.90 This section discusses the pre-
1984 statutes, regulations, and agency practices that were relevant to bio-
technology and explores the adequacy of these statutes, regulations, and 
practices. 
A. Environmental Statutes 
1. FIFRA 
The Environmental Protection Agency has relied chiefly on two statutes 
as a basis for the regulation of biotechnology activities: the Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act91 (FIFRA) and the Toxic Substances 
Control Act92 (TSCA). 
FIFRA provides authority for the regulation of products such as chemi-
cals and microorganisms intended for use as pesticides. The statute was 
thought to be particularly relevant to the biotechnology industry, whose 
spokespersons predicted that "within the next 20 years, biotechnology prod-
ucts [would] capture the 'lion's share' of the agricultural and consumer pes-
ticides market."93 FIFRA defines a pesticide broadly as "any substance or 
89. See, e.g., McChesney & Adler, supra note 42. 
90. These statutes include: Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 
(1982); Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1982); Public 
Health Services Act (PHS), 42 U.S.C. §§ 262-63 (1982); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Ro-
denticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982); Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1982); Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 466-466g (1982); 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1982); Federal Clean 
Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982); Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA), 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 601-95 (1982); Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 1621-30 (1982); Virus, 
Serum and Toxin Act (VSTA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-58 (1982); National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (1982); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1982); Noxious Weed Act (NWA), 7 U.S.C. 
§§ 2801-13 (1988); Plant Pest and Plant Quarantine Acts (PPPQA), 7 U.S.C. §§ l50aa-150jj 
(1982); Plant Quarantine Act (PQA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (1982); Endangered Species Act (ESA), 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1982). Many authors pointed out the shortcomings of each of these stat-
utes for the regulation of biotechnology and the failure of the agencies involved to address 
biotechnology directly. 
91. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982). 
92. Toxic Control Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (1982). 
93. Kriz, Growing Biotechnology Industry Sparks Governmental Turf Battle over Fed-
HeinOnline -- 38 Drake L. Rev. 492 1988-1989
492 Drake Law Review [Vol. 38 
mixture of substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling or miti-
gating any pest or intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant or desic-
cant."94 Historically, most of the regulated pesticides have been chemical 
substances, but in the 1970s and early 1980s, microbial pesticides were be-
coming more commonplace. In 1979 the EPA established an official policy to 
regulate living organisms intended for use as pesticides on the basis that 
such organisms were "biological control agents" and as such were "sub-
stances" subject to regulation.911 In 1982 the EPA announced that some bio-
technology products, particularly genetically engineered microorganisms, 
would be covered under this policy,98 and in 1984 it published pesticide as-
sessment guidelines for microbial pesticides.97 Some authors speculated that 
because FIFRA defined "pesticide" as a "substance," EPA regulation of liv-
ing organisms might be subject to legal challenge, but no such challenge has 
yet taken place.98 
FIFRA requires all pesticide manufacturers to register their pesticides 
with the EPA before marketing them in interstate commerce, and condi-
tions registration on the performance of tests and submission of data con-
cerning the product's safety and efficacy.99 If the EPA determines that a 
pesticide might cause unreasonable adverse effects to the environment, in-
cluding injury to applicators, pesticide registrations may be restricted to 
particular uses. Prior to 1984 the data required to accompany an application 
for registration "primarily concerned direct toxicity effects upon various 
animal species."100 These limited requirements were criticized by some, as 
they left open the possibility of approval of organisms with a variety of indi-
rect effects that could be ecologically damaging.101 
In order to obtain the data necessary to complete a registration applica-
tion, manufacturers were often required to perform small and large scale 
field tests in addition to laboratory experiments. Prior to conducting such 
field tests, a manufacturer was frequently required to obtain an experimen-
eral Regulation of Potential Health and Environmental Risks, 8 CHEM. REG. REP. 393, 395 
(1984). 
94. 7 u.s.c. § 136 (1982). 
95. 44 Fed. Reg. 23,994 (1979). 
96. See Pesticides Registration: Proposed Data Requirements 47 Fed. Reg. 53,192, 53,203 
(1982). The EPA also recognized, however, that both the USDA and the Department of the 
Interior had regulatory jurisdiction over living organisms and, in deference to these agencies, 
exempted all living organisms from its oversight as pesticides except viruses, bacteria, protozoa, 
fungi, and certain unicellular plants. 40 C.F.R. § l62.5(c)(1)(i) & (ii), (c)(4)(i)-(v) (1988). 
97. The Guidelines specified the standards for conducting acceptable tests, and provided 
guidance on evaluation and reporting of data, further guidance on when data were required, 
and examples of recommended testing protocols. See Proposal for a Coordinated Framework 
for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed. Reg. 50,856, 50,882 (1984). 
98. See McChesney & Adler, supra note 42, at 10,374-75. 
99. Id. at 10,374. 
100. ld. at 10,375. 
101. Id. 
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tal use permit (EUP) from the EP A. 1011 The EUP allowed an applicant to 
bypass the lengthy delays and expense of registration in the early develop-
ment of a pesticide. In applying for an EUP, a manufacturer was required to 
describe "among other items, the objectives of the test, the proposed testing 
program, the amount of pesticide involved, the results of prior tests with the 
pesticide . . . and the proposed method of storage and disposition. "103 
Prior to 1984 an EUP was not needed for "small-scale" field tests-i.e., 
field tests conducted on no more than ten acres of land or no more than one 
surface acre of water1~H-"so long as the principal purpose of the test [was] 
to establish the pesticide's effectiveness, rather than to provide actual pest 
control."1011 This exemption prompted some criticism of FIFRA as failing to 
provide appropriate control over microorganisms-particularly genetically 
altered microorganisms. Critics argued that "with viable pesticides, the dif-
ference between 100 square feet and 10 acres is not really a matter of scale 
but a matter of time." A microbial pesticide may multiply to "ten acres in a 
few hours or days. "108 
2. Toxic Substances Control Act 
In addition to FIFRA, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)1°7 was 
frequently cited as a source of authority for the regulation of the release of 
genetically engineered organisms into the environment.108 TSCA was en-
acted by Congress in 1976 "to provide a comprehensive mechanism for gath-
ering data on the health and environmental effects of chemical substances, 
for assessing the risks of these substances, and for ensuring that the manu-
facture, distribution, use and disposal of toxic materials [did] not pose un-
reasonable risks to man and the environment. "~09 Experts cited three key 
mechanisms that could be used by the EPA to regulate genetically engi-
neered organisms under TSCA. These included the premanufacture notifica-
tion (PMN) provision, the significant new use rules (SNUR), and the data 
reporting requirements. The most important of these was the PMN 
provision. 
Under section 5 of the Act, any person who intends to manufacture or 
import a "new" chemical substance for commercial purposes into the United 
States must submit a PMN to the EPA at least 90 days prior to manufac-
ture. A "new" chemical substance is one that does not appear on the TSCA 
102. See i U.S.C. § 136c (1982). 
103. J. GmBs, supra note 77, at 14. 
104. 40 C.F.R. § 172.3 (1988). 
105. Note, Rutabaga, supra note 15, at 1545. 
106. Panem, supra note 3, at 5. 
107. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (1982). 
108. See 1984 Proposal for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed. Reg. 50,886 (1984). 
109. McGarity & Bayer, supra note 42, at 505. 
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Chemical Substance Inventory and that is not "naturally occurring."110 The 
notice, which consists of a form prepared by the EPA, must contain "certain 
descriptive information, test data that are in the manufacturer's possession, 
and any other data on health or environmental effects known to or reasona-
bly ascertainable by the manufacturer."m During the ninety-day period, the 
EPA staff first reviews the information to determine whether there is suffi-
cient data to make an adequate assessment of risk. If there is not, the 
agency may request additional information from the manufacturer. Once the 
EPA is satisfied that it has the data it needs, the agency begins its substan-
tive review. If the EPA has a reasonable basis to conclude that commercial 
use of the substance will present an unreasonable risk, it ca_'l prohibit its 
manufacture, but only by obtaining a court order under section 5(e) of the 
Act. If the EPA does not take action on a substance within the ninety-day 
review period, the substance is added to the Chemical Substance Inventory. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s several shortcomings of the PMN pro-
cess became evident which raised questions about the adequacy of TSCA to 
regulate genetically engineered organisms. For example, the process does not 
limit the uses of an "approved" chemical to those uses specified in the 
PMN. Thus, once a chemical substance is in the TSCA inventory, it can be 
used for any purpose. TSCA does, however, include a provision which allows 
the EPA to promulgate a significant new use rule. The rule typically re-
. quires that a manufacturer notify the EPA of a new use; it may require that 
the substance be subject to PMN review prior to the new use.112 
Finally, TSCA includes an information-gathering provision which nu-
merous authors referred to as a major strength in the regulation of the prod-
ucts of biotechnology.us Under section 8(a) of the Act, the EPA has the 
authority "to require the testing of chemicals, the retention of reports of 
significant allegations of adverse reactions to health or the environment, the 
report of available health studies on chemicals and the report of information 
which supports the conclusion that chemicals present substantial risks of 
injury to health or the environment."114 
110. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 720.25, 720.30(h) (1988). 
111. Novick, supra note 3, at § 18.03[5][d][ii)[a]. 
112. ld. at § 18.03[5][d][ii][c). 
113. See, e.g., McGarity & Bayer, supra note 42, at 510 (discussing the use of the data 
gathering provision of TSCA in regulating genetically engineered organisms). 
114. Novick, supra note 3, at § 18.03[5)[d][ii)[b]. In addition to these three key provi-
sions, under § 4 of TSCA, the EPA may require manufacturers or processors of chemicals to 
test the toxic effects of substances they produce if the agency finds that the chemical may 
present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment; that there are insufficient 
data available with which to reasonably determine or predict the effects of the chemical; and 
that testing is necessary to generate such data. See 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (1982). Also, § 6 of the 
Act permits the EPA to prohibit or limit the amount of a substance which may be manufac-
tured, processed, or distributed in commerce for a particular use; require labeling of or reten-
tion of records of the processes used to manufacture or process chemical substances; or impose 
quality control procedures. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1982). Regulation under § 6, however, re-
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The major debate with respect to the use of TSCA to regulate geneti-
cally engineered organisms was whether such organisms were covered under 
the statute. Several authors questioned the applicability of TSCA to live 
organisms. m Most remarked that whether TSCA covers intentional releases 
or commercial uses of genetically altered organisms depends on whether 
such organisms are "chemical substances" or "mixtures."116 Neither the 
statutory definitions nor the legislative history of these terms specifically 
mentioned living organisms. Moreover, when Congress passed the Act in 
1976, it probably "never considered the nascent biotechnology industry."117 
Yet some authors have argued that "the tendency of the courts to construe 
the environmental statutes broadly in order to achieve their remedial pur-
pose [might] allow extension of TSCA to biotechnology products."118 
The EPA has also changed its position on the applicability of TSCA to 
live organisms. Although at one time the EPA took the position that "genet-
ically engineered microorganisms were not within the ambit of TSCA's stat-
utory definition of chemical substances," it later reversed itself, stating that 
"TSCA's definition of chemical substances encompasses both naturally oc-
curring and genetically engineered living microorganisms, as well as the 
chemical products produced by such organisms."119 Several authors stated 
that the legal validity of this position was uncertain, and a congressional 
report concluded that it was "not unlikely that EPA's authority [in this re-
gard might] be challenged in court."~20 
The EPA argued that TSCA's legislative history provides evidence that 
quires the EPA to possess a reasonable basis for believing that a substance presents or will 
present an unreasonable risk of harm. See 40 C.F.R. § 750 (1987). 
115. See, e.g., McGarity & Bayer, supra note 42, at 505-06; McChesney & Adler, supra 
note 42, at 10,373; Note, Biotechnology Regulation Under the Toxic Substances Control Act, 3 
PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 57 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Biotechnology Regulation Under TSCA]; 
Shiflbauer, Regulating Genetically Engineered Microbial Products Under the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,279, 10,281 (1985); Barkstrom, supra note 42, at 93; 
Note, Rutabaga, supra note 15, at 1546; Gore & Owens, supra note 15, at 347; Harlow, The 
EPA and Biotechnology Regulation: Coping with Scientific Uncertainty, 95 YALE L.J. 563 
(1986); Naumann, supra note 11, at 74. 
116. See, e.g., McChesney & Adler, supra note 42, at 10,373; Note, Rutabaga, supra note 
15, at 1546. 
117. McChesney & Adler, supra note 42, at 10,374. 
118. /d. 
119. Note, Biotechnology Regulation Under TSCA, supra note 115, at 65 (quoting from a 
letter from Douglas M. Costle, EPA Administrator, to Senator Adlai E. Stevenson, ill, Chair-
man, Subt:omm. on Science, Technology, and Space, U.S. Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci-
ence, and Transportation (Dec. 9, 1977)). The term chemical substance is defined as: "any or-
ganic or inorganic substance of a particular molecular identity, including-(i) any combination 
of such substances occurring in whole or in part as a result of a chemical reaction or occurring 
in nature, and (ii) any element or uncombined radical." 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(8) (1982). 
120. See SuscoMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT, HousE CoMM. ON SciENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC 
ENGINEERING (Comm. Print 1984). 
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TSCA is a "gap-filling" statute-i.e., it was "intended to provide authority 
over substances not covered by other health and environmental laws" and 
therefore extends "jurisdiction of the Act to microbial products of biotech-
nology as a statute of last resort."121 At least one author argued that such an 
interpretation might be "overly-broad."122 
In addition to the question of whether TSCA could be used at all to 
regulate whole organisms, several other weaknesses of the statute as a basis 
for regulating genetically engineered organisms were pointed out prior to 
1984. Among the specific concerns raised were the following: 
1. The PMN only requires that a manufacturer submit health and 
safety data which he has in his possession or control.123 Environmentalists 
argued that the EPA might not have adequate information to assess the 
risks of a new genetically engineered organism. Although the EPA could re-
quire additional tests via its data gathering authority, it rarely invoked this 
authority .12' 
2. The PMN program is "not a permit system; it merely affords the 
EPA notice and opportunity for review."126 The EPA has the burden of re-
viewing and taking action to halt production of a chemical substance within 
a ninety-day period-"[u]nless EPA vigorously pursues its opportunities 
under [the PMN provision], products can legally go to the marketplace un-
121. Shiffbauer, supra note 115, at 10,282. 
122. Id. See also J. GIBBS, supra note 77, at 36. At least three congressmen were con-
cerned enough about the ability of the EPA to use TSCA to regulate genetically altered orga-
nisms that they introduced legislation to address the issue. Between 1983 and 1985 both Sena-
tor Durenberger and Representative Florio introduced legislation that would have explicitly 
allowed the EPA to regulate genetically engineered organisms under TSCA. See S. 1967, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (reprinted in 5 Biotech. L. Rep. 92 (Mar. 1986)); H.R. 4303 and H.R. 
4304, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The bills did not pass. 
123. See Novick, supra note 3, at § 18.03[5][d)[ii][a]. According to Korwek, criticism of 
PMN information requirements overlooks the fact that under § 5(e) of TSCA, the EPA may 
request additional data if: 
(1) the information available in a PMN submission or from other sources is insuffi-
cient to determine the health and environmental effects of a substance and; (2) the 
manufacture, processing, distribution, use or disposal of the substance, or any combi-
nation of such activities, may present an unreasonable risk of injury to the health of 
the environment; (3) the substance is produced in substantial quantities and may 
reasonably be anticipated to enter the environment in such quantities; or (4) there 
may be significant or substantial human exposure. 
Korwek, Implications of TSCA: Emerging Roles of NIH and EPA in the Regulation of rDNA 
Technology, 1 BIOTECHNOLOGY 757 (Nov. 1983) [hereinafter Korwek, Emerging Roles of NIH 
and EPA]. 
124. Environmentalists argued that historically the EPA rarely used the procedurally 
complex and. burdensome 5(e) order. Between July 1979 and March 1983, the EPA received 
2201 PMNs and issued 7 § 5(e) orders. During that time, however, the agency obtained 49 
voluntary control agreements and 9 PMNs were withdrawn in the face of 5(e) orders. See J. 
GIBBS, supra note 77, at 42. 
125. Novick, supra note 3, at § 18.03[5)[e]. 
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reviewed."u8 Furthermore, in order to prevent production, the EPA is re-
quired to obtain a court order under section 5(e) of the Act, a "procedurally 
complex and labor intensive" effort. 117 
3. Under most provisions of TSCA, the use of a chemical substance may 
be regulated only if its use presents an "unreasonable risk" of injury to 
health or the environment.128 Although "unreasonable risk" is not defined in 
the statute, the legislative history makes "it clear that the determination 
involves an analysis of the risk posed by a substance, which encompasses a 
consideration of the probability of harm based upon exposure and severity, 
and a balancing of the risks and benefits to society."129 
4. The PMN only applies to "new substances," and although the EPA 
can establish a SNUR for new "uses," it uses the SNUR provision 
sparingly.180 
5. There is a significant loophole in the PMN process: small quantities 
of chemicals used for research and development are generally exempt from 
PMN review.181 In addition, the PMN requirements do not apply to any 
non-commercial research and development, i.e., research sponsored and con-
ducted by an academic or other non-profit institution. The exemption does 
not apply, however, if the research is funded by industry or intended to 
culminate in a commercial product.182 
B. Other Statutes Under the EPA's Jurisdiction 
A number of other environmental statutes were also evaluated as a 
means of regulating biotechnology research and product development. For 
example, the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts were discussed as possible 
sources of authority for EPA regulation of release of genetically altered or-
ganisms into the environment.138 Of these two, the Clean Water Act (CWA) 
126. ld. 
127. ld. at § 18.03[5][d][iv]. See supra notes 123, 124 for a more detailed discussion of 
the use of § 5(e) orders. 
128. Barkstrom, supra note 42, at 93. 
129. KORWEK, 1988 BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATIONS HANDBOOK 121 (1988) (relying on legis-
lative history of TSCA) [hereinafter KoRWEK, 1988 BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATIONS]. 
130. According to Gibbs, as of 1986 the EPA had promulgated SNURs for only twelve 
chemicals. J. GIBBS, supra note 77, at 39-40. 
131. See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(h)(3) (1982). "Small quantities" has been defined by the EPA 
as amounts manufactured "solely for R&D that are not greater than reasonably necessary for 
such purposes." 40 C.F.R. § 720.3(cc) (1988). Korwek has argued that this is not a serious loop-
hole, but rather a desirable one, because the estimated cost of submitting a PMN is very high. 
In 1983 it ranged from $5,800 to $14,000. These costs, he argues, "could easily chill scientific 
research at university laboratories and inhibit technological innovation. Finally, and perhaps 
more importantly, genetic R&D is not excluded from regulation under other provisions of 
TSCA [specifically,§§ 4 and 6] and commercial applications are still subject to PMN." Korwek, 
Emerging Roles of NIH and EPA, supra note 123, at 757. 
132. See J. GIBBS, supra note 77, at 40. 
133. See Korwek & de la Cruz, supra note 42, at 376-80; Novick, supra note 3, at § 
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was thought to be the more useful for regulating bioengineered organisms. 
The CW A prohibits the discharge of pollutants, including biological materi-
als, 184 from point sources into the nation's surface waters without a federal 
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit or a 
comparable state permit. 1811 Most biotechnology companies, including those 
that manufacture foods, drugs, and biologics, generate wastes that could 
conceivably subject them to CW A.188 
The Clean Air Act (CAA), though mentioned as a possible source of 
regulatory authority, was thought to be a somewhat ineffective and cumber-
some mechanism for this purpose.187 Although the definition of "air pollu-
tants"188 is broad enough to encompass biotechnological substances,139 the 
structure and enforcement of CAA make it unlikely to apply to genetically 
altered organisms.140 
18.03[6); McChesney & Adler, supra note 42, at 10,375; McGarity & Bayer, supra note 42, at 
507. 
134. 33 u.s.c. § 1362(6) (1982). 
135. 33 u.s.c. § 1342(k) (1982). 
136. Although the CW A could provide useful authority for the regulation of genetically 
engineered organisms, it also has several shortcomings that would limit its effectiveness in this 
regard. For example, the NPDES permit requires compliance with national effluent limitations 
promulgated by the EPA for specified categories of industries, "based on the effectiveness and 
cost of control technologies available for those industries." McChesney & Adler, supra note 42, 
at 10,375. In addition to the technology-based standards, the CWA authorizes states to set 
effluent limitations as part of water quality standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(2) (1982). Although 
the CW A authorizes states to set water quality standards for biological pollutants, "the state-
administered water quality standards have not played a large role in controlling water pollu-
tion." Novick, supra note 3, at § 18.03[6)[b]. 
Korwek and de la Cruz pointed out that. the NPDES permit program was "designed to 
limit the release of pollutants from sources that discharge waste water on a regular or periodic 
basis. As such it would be ill-suited as a regulatory tool to govern deliberate releases." Korwek 
& de la Cruz, supra note 42, at 380. This criticism, however, appears to overlook the fact that 
there may be biotechnology companies, e.g., pharmaceutical companies or those that utilize 
fermentation techniques, that will generate waste water on a regular basis. These companies 
would be subject to the technology-based effiuent standards established for pharmaceutical 
companies and any relevant state water quality standards. 
137. Korwek & de la Cruz, supra note 42, at 348. 
138. "Air pollutants" is defined to mean "any air pollution or agent or combination of 
such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological . . . substance or matter which is emit-
ted into or otherwise enters the ambient air." 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (1982). 
139. Korwek & de la Cruz, supra note 42, at 329. 
140. /d. at 330. The Clean Air Act regulates two major categories of pollutant air emission 
from existing stationary sources: (1) so-called "criteria" pollutants-those that may reasonably 
be expected to endanger public health or welfare, and (2) hazardous pollutants. The currently 
listed criteria pollutants are sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, carbon monoxide, ozone, nitro-
gen dioxide, and lead. 40 C.F.R. § 50 (1988). The currently listed hazardous air pollutants are 
asbestos, benzene, beryllium, coke oven emissions, inorganic arsenic, mercury, radionuclides, 
and vinyl chloride. 40 C.F.R. § 61 (1988). 
The CAA regulates criteria pollutants by calling for the establishment of national ambient 
air quality standards (NAAQS) which are largely enforced through state implementation plans. 
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In addition to CAA and CW A, the statutes regulating hazardous waste 
were mentioned as possible sources of regulatory authority for controlling 
the release of genetically engineered organisms141-specifically, the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)Hll and the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)148 or 
Superfund. RCRA provides a comprehensive framework for the regulation 
of hazardous waste from generation to disposal. 144 Hazardous wastes are de-
fined as wastes which, because of their "quantity, concentration, or physical, 
chemical or infectious characteristics," are toxic or which "otherwise cause a 
substantial hazard to health or the environment when improperly man-
aged."14& The definition indicated that "hazards to the environment, as well 
as to health, [could] lead to regulation of wastes, and the inclusion of 'infec-
tious' characteristics plainly evidence[d] an intent to include living orga-
nisms .... "148 The EPA, however, has not included living organisms 
among the wastes to be regulated under RCRA.147 
The EPA also has the authority to set standards for new sources of pollutants (new source 
performance standards) and hazardous air pollutants under the National Emission Standards 
for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPS). 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1982). The NAAQS may be set to 
protect either the public health or welfare, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)-(2) (1982), "but practically 
speaking only the health-based ... standards are enforceable." Novick, supra note 3, at § 
18.03[6](a]. Several sources stated that bioengineered organisms would not be emitted in signif-
icant enough quantities to be the subject of NAAQS. Id. See also McGarity & Bayer, supra 
note 42, at 507, stating that "[i]n the normal operation of a fermentation plant or large-scale 
release process the chances are remote that significant emissions of current criteria (pollu-
tants] ... will result unless a laboratory decides to dry liquid wastes and incinerate them." Fur-
thermore, "organisms containing rONA molecules probably [would) not qualify as new criteria 
pollutants because plants [would] not release them from 'numerous or diverse mobile or statio-
nary sources'-a necessary precondition." Id. Nor was the NESHAPS program thought to be a 
likely regulatory tool "since very few, if any, of the organisms scheduled for deliberate release 
would be expected to have significant impacts on human health." Novick, supra note 3, at § 
18.03[6](a]. One possible exception cited was the release of human pathogens from a production 
facility, but according to Novick, "such releases were not likely to be of a large enough magni-
tude to justify imposition of a national standard." ld. 
141. See, e.g., McGarity & Bayer, supra note 42, at 508; Korwek & de Ia Cruz, supra note 
42, at 367; McChesney & Adler, supra note 42, at 10,378; Novick, supra note 3, at § 18.04. 
142. 42 u.s.c. §§ 6901-87 (1982). 
143. 42 u.s.c. §§ 9601-57 (1982). 
144. Novick, supra note 3, at § 18.04[2). 
145. Id. 
146. ld. 
147. Korwek and de Ia Cruz pointed out that the RCRA could come into play in the 
regulation of deliberate releases if genetically manipulated organisms were used to treat haz-
ardous waste. "If a facility intends to conduct biological treatment of hazardous waste, it must: 
obtain an identification number from [the) EPA; conduct a general waste analysis; provide for 
security, ground-water monitoring, and proper storage and treatment facilities; meet certain 
financial requirements; and develop contingency and emergency procedures." Korwek & de Ia 
Cruz, supra note 42, at 370. The authors commented that while genetically-manipulated orga-
nisms might not be deemed solid or hazardous waste, their use in hazardous waste treatment 
might subject them to RCRA regulation. Id. at 371. They concluded, however, that "[o]verall, 
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Others argued that CERCLA "could prove to be an important source of 
legal authority if releases of products of biotechnology posed health or envi-
ronmental threats warranting cleanup."148 CERCLA provides for the expedi-
tious cleanup of hazardous substances or pollutants that threaten the envi-
ronment. Specifically, the EPA is authorized to respond to a "release (or 
substantial threat of a release) of a 'hazardous substance' or to an imminent 
hazard posed by a 'pollutant or contaminant.' "149 Whether genetically-
manipulated products would qualify as "hazardous substances" or "pollu-
tants" was questioned.110 The term "hazardous substance" is defined by ref-
erence to lists of harmful substances specified in six statutes including CER-
CLA.m However, no organisms or by-products have been included in any of 
the specified statutes, 102 and some have argued that, because CERCLA fo-
cuses "to a significant degree on toxic and disease-producing substances," 
most genetically-engineered organisms which would be deliberately released 
into the environment would not be covered by the statute because they are 
not likely to pose such a threat.103 
C. Other Environmental Statutes 
In addition to those statutes under the EPA's jurisdiction, two other 
RCRA [did] not grant EPA significant authority to regulate deliberate releases." Id. 
148. McChesney & Adler, supra note 42, at 10,378. 
149. Novick, supra note 3, at § 18.04[3). 
150. See McChesney & Adler, supra note 42, at 10,379. 
151. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1986). These include: 
(a) substances designated under Section 311(b)(A) of the Clean Water Act, (b) any 
element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to Section 
102 of CERCLA, (c) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under 
or listed pursuant to Section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (RCRA), (d) any 
toxic pollutant listed under Section 307(a) of the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act, (e) any hazardous air pollutant listed under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, (0 
any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture for which EPA has taken 
action pursuant to Section 7 of the Toxic Substances Control Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601(14). 
152. Korwek & de la Cruz, supra note 42, at 374. 
153. McChesney & Adler, supra note 42, at 10,379. Under CERCLA the EPA is also au-
thorized to respond to a release or threatened release of a "pollutant or contaminant" which 
poses an imminent and substantial danger to public health or welfare. The term "pollutant or 
contaminant" specifically includes "disease-causing agents." See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(2) (1982). 
However, under CERCLA the EPA can only recover from liable parties for clean-up costs asso-
ciated with the release of hazardous substances, not pollutants or contaminants. See, e.g., 
McChesney & Adler, supra note 42, at 10,379. Private parties responsible for the release of 
pollutants or contaminants have no liability for the costs of response, or damages to natural 
resources. See Novick, supra note 3, at § 18.04[3]. · 
A further disadvantage of CERCLA as a regulatory tool for biotechnology is that it pro-
vides only for cleaning up past pollution "while the critical problem at [the early] stage of 
environmental regulation of biotechnology has been accurately assessing the potential for harm 
from proposed releases and controlling the releases to avoid the harm." McChesney & Adler, 
supra note 42, at 10,379. 
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environmental statutes were discussed early on as relevant to the regulation 
of biotechnology-the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA). NEPA, passed by Congress in 1969 in re-
sponse to reports of increasing harm to the environment, requires federal 
agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for all "major 
federal actions" which "significantly affect" the quality of the environ-
ment.1114 Major environmental actions include not only activities directly un-
dertaken by federal agencies, such as the passage of new regulations or the 
construction of a federal highway or dam, but also private actions that re-
quire federal funding, permits, licenses, or other approval. 
NEPA is primarily a procedural law, i.e., it requires federal agencies to 
comply with specific procedures before undertaking certain actions. Actions 
that are unlikely to affect the environment are categorically excluded from 
the Act's requirements, as are actions that are subject to a similar review 
process under another statute.11111 Before undertaking an action which is not 
categorically excluded, a federal agency must prepare an environmental as-
sessment (EA)-a brief document that sets forth the potential environmen-
tal impacts of a proposed federal action and possible alternatives to the ac-
tion. 1118 Based on the EA, the agency will determine whether the action will 
have a "significant environmental impact." If the agency finds that the ac-
tion will not have such an impact, the agency must issue a formal "finding of 
no significant impact."1117 Alternatively, if the agency determines that the 
action will have a significant environmental impact, a full blown environ-
mental impact statement must be prepared. The EIS is a very detailed re-
port of the potential environmental impacts of a proposed action and alter-
natives to the action. The report is typically several hundred pages long, 
sometimes thousands of pages, and is both costly and time-consuming to 
prepare.1118 
Environmental and citizens groups have frequently used NEPA as a ve-
hicle to delay or prevent federal actions or private actions requiring federal 
approval. They have accomplished this by bringing suits against federal 
154. 42 u.s.c. § 4332 (1982). 
155. This latter exemption, referred to as the doctrine of "functional equivalence," has 
been successfully invoked only by the EPA. See J. GIBBS, supra note 77, at 138. 
156. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b) (1988). 
157. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (1988). 
158. The statement must include a description of: 
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action; 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the propo-
sal be implemented; 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action; 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity; and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be 
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i-v) (1982). 
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agencies claiming, among other things, that: (1) NEPA was applicable when 
the agency determined that it was not, (2) the relevant agency did not pre-
pare an EA or EIS when one was necessary or, (3) if an EA or EIS was 
prepared, that it was not adequate or the appropriate procedural steps were 
not followed in its preparation. NEP A was used for the first time as a tool to 
delay R-DNA experimentation in 1978. In Mack v. Califano109 a child living 
near a federal cancer research institute brought suit against the Department 
of Health and Human Services asserting that a high risk R-DNA experiment 
proposed by the laboratory and permitted under the NIH Guidelines could 
have adverse environmental or public health consequences in the surround-
ing community if an organism were to escape from the laboratory. The 
plaintiff further alleged that the EIS prepared when the initial NIH Guide-
lines were promulgated did not adequately address the potential dangers of 
such an experiment. The federal district court, however, determined that 
the initial EIS was adequate and that the experiment could go forward. 180 
The Endangered Species Act (ESA)181 was also listed as a mechanism 
for the regulation of the release of genetically altered organisms into the 
environment. ESA, which calls for the establishment of a program to protect 
endangered and threatened species and their habitats, is administered by 
the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) within the Department of the Interior. 
It is similar to NEPA in that it "imposes affirmative requirements only upon 
federal agencies, not private companies."182 All federal agencies "must con-
sult with the FWS before authorizing or funding 'any action' that may jeop-
ardize any endangered species."183 All endangered or threatened species are 
listed by the FWS in the Federal Register. If the FWS concludes that an 
agency action may harm an endangered species, the agency is expected to 
utilize various techniques to eliminate the harm.184 
159. Mack v. Califano, 447 F. Supp. 668 (D.D.C. 1978). 
160. Subsequent cases brought under NEP A to delay biotechnology research are dis· 
cussed infra notes 358, 365, 366, 375. 
161. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1982). 
162. J. GIBBS, supra note 77, at 147. 
163. Id. 
164. Both EPA and USDA actions regarding deliberate releases may be subject to the 
ESA. The EPA has had a well-established procedure for consulting with FWS regarding the 
approval of new pesticides. According to one source, under FIFRA the EPA "assesses the po-
tential risk to endangered species for roughly 700 new pesticide uses annually. Between 1980 
and 1984, EPA requested approximately 40 consultations with FWS .... In two-thirds of 
these instances, FWS determined that an endangered species would be in jeopardy if the [ac-
tion] were approved without modification." J. GmBs, supra note 77, at 148. As of 1984 the EPA 
had no comparable program for FWS consultation under TSCA and the USDA had not devel-
oped a formalized review procedure under the ESA for deliberate releases which it may ap-
prove. Gibbs raises the possibility that ESA may not apply to TSCA as the consultation re-
quirement of ESA is only triggered by "any action authorized, funded, or carried out" by an 
agency, and that TSCA does not require permits, only notification of the EPA. However, the 
authors point out that the EPA is now considering whether an ESA review should be estab-
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Finally, although not a statute, Executive Order No. 11,9871811 was cited 
as a possible source of authority for the regulation of products developed 
through biotechnology. The order, signed by President Carter in 1977, pro-
vides in relevant part that executive agencies shall: (1) restrict the introduc-
tion of exotic species "into the natural ecosystems on lands and waters 
which they own, lease, or hold for purposes of administration; and shall en-
courage the States, local governments, and private citizens to prevent the 
introduction of exotic species into natural ecosystems of the United States" 
and (2) to the extent they have been authorized by statute, "restrict the 
introduction of exotic species into any natural ecosystem in the U.S." Exotic 
species are defined as "all species of plants and animals not naturally occur-
ring, either presently or historically, in any ecosystem of the United States." 
The order is of limited value in regulating deliberate releases of micro-
organisms, however, as the definition of exotic species is limited to plants 
and animals. Furthermore, the order is limited to species which do not occur 
naturally in any ecosystem of the United States. Thus, "if a plant or animal 
ever existed naturally, it would not be regulatable under the order even if it 
were no longer found in nature. Neither would the directive prevent the re-
lease of organisms into areas where they are not indigenous, since it applies 
only to those species not occurring naturally in any ecosystem of the United 
States. "~88 
D. Regulation of Genetically-Engineered Organisms by the FDA 
Prior to 1984 the FDA had not promulgated any regulations explicitly 
addressing. genetically engineered products. Thus, the Agency regulated 
such products under its existing regulatory framework. The FDA's regula-
tory authority, in general, stems from the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA),187 and sections of the Public Health Service Act.188 These statutes 
give the FDA the authority to regulate foods, human and animal drugs, 
human biologics (such as vaccines), and medical devices (such as human en-
zymes used in in vitro diagnostic systems).189 
The major issue underlying most of the early discussion of FDA regula-
tion of biotechnology-derived products was whether these products should 
be regulated on a product or process basis, i.e., whether they should be regu-
lished for TSCA-regulated products. ld. at 150. 
165. Executive Order No. 11,987, 3 C.F.R. § 116 (1977). 
166. Korwek & de la Cruz, supra note 42, at 355. In addition, the utility of the order for 
regulating deliberate releases is further restricted because the order only applies to executive 
agencies. This is particularly limiting because the EPA, which is the agency most able to regu-
late environmental harms, is not within the executive branch. See id. 
167. 21 u.s.c. §§ 301-92 (1982). 
168. 42 u.s.c. §§ 262-63 (1982). 
169. Karny, Frankensteins, supra note 42, at 842. 
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lated differently from similar products produced by conventional means.170 
The FDA was and is structured along product lines, with separate centers 
responsible "for all regulatory activities regarding specific classes of prod-
ucts" such as foods, drugs, biologics, and medical devices.171 From the outset 
the FDA took the approach that products manufactured by the new biotech-
nologies would not be handled by a separate biotechnology unit but would 
be regulated on a case-by-case basis in accordance with their product 
class.172 
1. Regulation of Foods 
FDA authority to regulate food products developed by biotechnology is 
grounded in its authority to ensure that the product is not adulterated or 
misbranded and, in some cases, its authority to require pre-market clearance 
of the product. The latter is the agency's most effective regulatory mecha-
nism. The regulatory system classifies food products into four groups: (1) 
food additives; (2) substances that are generally recognized as safe 
(GRAS);173 (3) prior-sanctioned ingredients;174 and (4) whole foods. 
Only new food additives require pre-market clearance. Such food addi-
tives, however, are broadly defined to include any substance that is not 
GRAS or prior-sanctioned, the "intended use of which results or may rea-
sonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a com-
ponent or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food."176 Pre-market 
clearance requires extensive animal and human testing to ensure that the 
additive is safe for human consumption. 
Food additives are regulated generically, i.e., once a food additive is ap-
170. See, e.g., Note, An Overview of FDA Regulation of Biotechnology Derived Products: 
Dealing with the Collision of Science and Society, 11 RuTGERS COMPUTER & TEcH. L.J. 501, 510 
(1985) [hereinafter Note, An Overview of FDA Regulation}; Korwek & Trinker, Perspectives on 
the FDA Status of Drug Products Manufactured by the Recombinant DNA Technique, 36 
FooD DRuG CosM. L.J. 517, 518 (1981) [hereinafter Korwek & Trinker]; Comment, Regulation 
of Genetically Engineered Foods Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 33 AM. 
U.L. REv. 899, 913 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Regulation of Genetically Engineered Foods]. 
171. McGarity & Bayer, supra note 42, at 504. 
172. Zoon, The Impact of New Biotechnology on the Regulation of Drugs and Biologics, 
41 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 429, 430 (1986). The FDA, however, has established its own Recombi-
nant-DNA Coordinating Committee, which provides an agency-wide vehicle for information ex-
change and discussion of policies regarding genetically engineered products. 
173. A GRAS substance is defined as a substance that is "generally recognized, among 
experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate its safety, as having been 
adequately shown through scientific procedures (or, in the case of a substance used in food 
prior to January 1, 1958, through either scientific procedures or experience based on common 
use in food) to be safe under the conditions of its intended use." 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1982). 
17 4. Prior sanctioned substances are those that received official approval by the FDA 
prior to the passage in 1958 of the Food Additive Amendment to the FDCA. 21 C.F.R. §§ 181.1, 
181.5 (1988). 
175. 21 u.s.c. § 321 (1982). 
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proved, the agency promulgates a food additive regulation that specifies the 
chemical structure (identity) and purity limitations on use of the additive. 
Any manufacturer can market the additive if its product meets the specified 
regulatory conditions. 178 At least one author argued that, because the food 
additive regulations only contain criteria for chemical structure, purity, and 
use, and do not include process standards, the manufacture via biotechnol-
ogy of food additives for which there are existing regulations should not re-
quire pre-market clearance unless the technology changes the chemical iden-
tity or creates impurities that adulterate the product.177 
Whether a substance that was GRAS would remain so if manufactured 
by biotechnology was also an open issue. To establish GRAS status for food 
additives used after 1958, the regulations provide that "safety must be 
proven through scientific procedures, i.e., scientific evidence of safety pub-
lished in the literature or otherwise widely disseminated so as to become 
common knowledge among scientists knowledgeable about the safety of food 
ingredients."178 The FDA had issued a list of substances which met the 
GRAS requirements, either for all uses or for specific uses. The regulations 
which listed substances as GRAS "usually include[d] general statements 
about [their] method of manufacture."179 In a 1982 article on the topic, 
Korwek concluded that many ingredients that were listed as GRAS but 
which were subsequently manufactured by biotechnology "would not meet 
the requirements of the regulation because conventional methods of manu-
facture were specified .... "18° Furthermore, Korwek predicted that, al-
though the FDA "had acknowledged that a change in manufacturing process 
[did] not necessarily alter the GRAS status of an ingredient," the FDA 
would probably still "view use of biotechnology as presumptively affecting 
GRAS status because it is not a generally recognized method of 
production. "181 
2. Adulteration and Misbranding 
In addition to its pre-market clearance authority, the FDA may regulate 
foods and food additives under FDCA adulteration and misbranding provi-
sions. A food may be considered adulterated under FDCA for several rea-
176. See Korwek, FDA Regulation of Biotechnology as a New Method of Manufacture, 
37 Fooo DRuG CosM. L.J. 289, 293 (1982) [hereinafter Korwek, FDA Regulation of Biotechnol-
ogy] (detailed description of the regulation of food additives). 
177. Id. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the additives are used in accor-
dance with good manufacturing practices. 
178. Id. at 295 (citing 21 C.F.R. §§ 170.3(h), 170.30(b) (1981)). 
179. Id. at 296. 
180. Id. 
181. ld. at 297. In contrast, Korwek pointed out that substances that were previously 
sanctioned would remain so even if manufactured by use of biotechnology because the approval 
went to the substance, "not to its method of manufacture." Id. at 296. 
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sons. Where foods contain an "added substance," the primary basis for a 
finding of adulteration is that the food "bears or contains [a] poisonous or 
deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health."182 If the 
food does not contain an added substance, however, it will not be considered 
adulterated "if the quantity of such substance in such food does not ordina-
rily render it injurious to health."183 What constitutes an "added substance" 
has been liberally defined by the courts to include anything incorporated 
into a food "as the result of any human intervention."184 The second princi-
pal basis for a finding of adulteration is that the food "bears or contains any 
added poisonous or added deleterious substance . . . which is unsafe within 
the meaning of [the statute]."1811 In this case the FDA has defined an added 
substance as one which "is not an inherent constituent of the food" or which 
is present in a food as a result of "human intervention."188 Under either 
definition it appears that a genetically altered food additive would be con-
sidered an added substance; a food produced by biotechnology, which in-
cluded additional genetic material or genetically modified organisms, would 
be considered to contain an added substance.187 As a result, the FDA would 
only have to show that the substance met the less stringent "may render" 
standard before taking enforcement action. 
At least one author has argued that the FDA should not use the "may 
render" standard in determining whether a genetically engineered food is 
adulterated because that standard is not applied to foods developed by hy-
bridization.188 Under this view genetically engineered foods and food addi-
tives should not be regulated any differently from foods produced by hy-
bridization if scientists are able to achieve the same product by both 
methods. However, foods treated with genetically modified microbes or ad-
ditional genetic material that might acquire toxicants from external sources 
should be regulated under the "may render standard for foods containing 
added toxicants rather than as foods containing endogenous toxicants under 
the ordinarily render standard."189 
Under the adulteration provisions of FDCA, the FDA has issued good 
manufacturing practice (GMP) regulations for both foods and drugs. The 
food regulations set forth guidelines for food manufacturers, "including per-
182. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1) (1982) (emphasis added). 
183. Id. 
184. Gibbs & Kahan, Federal Regulation of Food and Food Additive Biotechnology, 38 
ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 12 (1986) [hereinafter Gibbs & Kahan]. 
185. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(A) (1982). 
186. See Gibbs & Kahan, supra note 184, at 12. 
187. But see Jones, Food Safety Aspects of Gene Transfer in Plants and AnimalS: Pigs; 
Potatoes and PharmaceuticalS, 43 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 351 (1988) (the author subsequently 
raised a variety of ways of characterizing transplanted genes, some of which could lead to a 
determination that the genes were not added) [hereinafter Jones, Food Safety]. 
188. Comment, Regulation of Genetically Engineered Foods, supra note 170, at 916. 
189. Id. 
HeinOnline -- 38 Drake L. Rev. 507 1988-1989
1988-89] Biotechnology Regulation 507 
sonnel qualifications, process controls, the condition of facilities, and general 
principles for maintaining sanitation."190 These regulations provide addi-
tional authority for the FDA to assess the development of a product as well 
as the product itself. 
3. Regulation of Drugs 
As was the case in the area of new foods, the controversial issue with 
respect to the regulation of newly created drugs and devices was whether 
biotechnology-derived products, that have been previously approved when 
manufactured by conventional techniques, should be subject to extensive 
new testing requirements, or whether the final products are so similar in 
nature to conventionally-developed products that little, if any, new testing 
should be required. 
The FDA has two methods of ensuring that drugs are safe for human 
application: (1) all drugs must meet the adulteration and misbranding provi-
sions of FDCA; and (2) all new drugs must be pre-cleared prior to market-
ing. Pre-clearance requires that new drugs191 may not be marketed unless 
they have been approved as safe and effective on the basis of adequate and 
well-controlled clinical investigations. To conduct clinical trials on humans, 
a new drug developer must file a notice of claimed investigational exemption 
for a new drug (IND) containing results of acute, subacute, and chronic tox-
icity testing on animals to ensure safety.192 Once the animal and human 
testing is complete, the developer must file a new drug application (NDA) 
with the FDA for approval. An NDA contains the results of all the clinical 
and non-clinical tests performed on the drug, a full list of articles used as 
components of the drug, a full statement of the drug's composition, a full 
description of the methods used in manufacturing, samples of the drug com-
ponents, and specimens of the proposed labeling.193 This complete NDA 
procedure typically requires "many years of testing and large monetary 
expenditures. "194 
In certain cases a complete NDA is not required before a new drug is 
190. Gibbs & Kahan, supra note 184, at 23. In addition, the FDA could have some control 
over the manufacture of genetically engineered food additives by requiring the manufacturer to 
prepare an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement prior to approval of 
the additive. FDA decisions are subject to NEPA and the FDA has stated "that an environ-
mental assessment [would] be required for all food additive petitions, even if the food additive 
is naturally occurring." ld. at 21-22. If the agency determined that the manufacturing process 
could have a significant effect on the environment, it could require the manufacturer to prepare 
a detailed environmental impact statement. ld. at 21. 
191. A new drug is any drug that is not generally recognized as safe and effective 
(GRASE) for its intended use. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1982). 
192. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1982); 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 56, 312.1 (1988). See also Korwek & 
Trinker, supra note 170, at 521. 
193. Korwek & Trinker, supra note 170, at 521. 
194. ld. 
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marketed.1911 For example, an abbreviated NDA (ANDA) may be filed for 
generic drugs which are copies of pioneer drugs which have already been 
marketed. The ANDA requires the submission of bioavailability data and 
evidence of compliance with FDA good manufacturing practices (GMP) 
regulations.196 
If the NDA holder wishes to market an approved drug under conditions 
other than those approved in the NDA, it must submit a supplemental new 
drug application (SNDA) for FDA approval.197 The SNDA provides the 
most recent reports, superseding those submitted as part of the original 
application.198 
These abbreviated review procedures only apply to new drugs. Drugs 
that do not meet the definition of "new drugs"-i.e., drugs that are gener-
ally recognized as safe and effective (GRASE)-are statutorily exempted 
from pre-market clearance.199 However, such drugs are still subject to the 
adulteration and misbranding provisions of the Act. Thus, drugs cannot con-
tain harmful impurities as a result of the method of manufacture or other-
wise, and drug manufacturers must comply with good manufacturing prac-
tices and the relevant labeling requirements. 
The regulatory scheme raised the question whether a drug that had pre-
viously been approved as a new drug when produced by conventional means 
would also be approved if produced by biotechnology; the alternative would 
be an abbreviated or a complete NDA. The FDA stated explicitly in 1983 
that it would require new applications for all products obtained via R-DNA 
technology: 
The amount of data required [would] vary, [however], depending on: (1) 
the proposed use of the product; (2) whether the product [was] identical 
to a previously approved product; (3) how long an administration of the 
product to patients [was] planned; (4) the previous clinical experience 
with the conventionally produced product; and (5) the applicant's 
clinical experience with rDNA-derived substances. The new applications 
[would] be required even if the product [was] identical in molecular 
structure to a naturally occurring substance or a previously approved 
product produced in a conventional way.200 
195. Note, An Overview of FDA Regulation, supra note 170, at 516. 
196. /d. 
197. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(a) (1988). 
198. See Korwek & Trinker, supra note 170, at 522. 
199. Korwek & Trinker, supra note 170, at 524. 
200. Note, An Overview of FDA Regulation, supra note 170, at 522. See also OFFICE OF 
BIOLOGIC RESEARCH AND REVIEW, CENTER FOR DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS, FDA, POINTS TO CONSIDER 
IN THE PRODUCTION AND TESTING OF NEW DRUGS AND BIOLOGICALS PRODUCED BY RECOMBINANT 
DNA TEcHNOLOGY (Apr. 10, 1985). Prior to 1983 the FDA had argued that "new drug" referred 
to the entire drug product, not just its active ingredients. Korwek, FDA Regulation of Biotech-
nology, supra note 176, at 300. Thus, a new drug with an active ingredient identical to an 
already approved drug would still require an NDA. /d. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
Agency's position in United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453 (1983). The practical 
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The basis of the FDA's cautious approach to R-DNA manufactured drugs is 
similar to its cautious approach to other new drugs and includes ·the 
following: 
1) The molecular structure of some [R-DNA-derived] products is different 
from that of the active molecules in nature. 
2) Despite some experience with drugs derived from microorganisms there is 
meager, if any, experience with such substances employed as drugs in 
humans with continued administration over many months or years. 
3) [The FDA] will need to ensure that the quality assurance within the man-
ufacturing process is adequate to detect the occurrences of mutations in the 
coding sequence of the cloned gene during fermentation. 201 
4) The constellation of contaminants is often different when a new tech-
nique is used. 202 
·The FDA's approach, i.e., to "a priori classify all [R-DNA-derived] 
products as the type of new drugs that require full pre-clinical and clinical 
testing"-was considered inappropriate by some authors. 208 It was also bur-
densome on drug manufacturers since it "often requires a large amount of 
time, effort and funds, and usually results in a significant delay in reaching 
the marketplace."20" 
effect of this interpretation was to subject all drugs to pre-market clearances. Korwek, FDA 
Regulation of Biotechnology, supra note 176, at 301. The FDA took the same approach to the 
question of whether a drug manufactured by new techniques could be considered GRASE: the 
entire newly manufactured drug (its inactive ingredients, method of manufacture, and finished 
dosage form) must be identical to the GRASE product. 
201. Note, An Overview of FDA Regulation, supra note 170, at 524. See also Zoon, supra 
note 172, at 431. 
202. Telephone interview with Dr. Henry Miller, Special Assistant to the FDA Commis-
sioner for Biotechnology, in Rockville, Md. (Aug. 1988). 
203. Korwek & Trinker, supra note 170, at 534. 
204. Note, An Overview of FDA Regulation, supra note 170, at 524. Korwek and Trinker 
argued that R-ONA-derived drugs should be divided into three groups for purposes of regula-
tion. First, they asserted, where the R-ONA-derived active ingredient was chemically identical 
to its traditionally manufactured counterpart, an ANDA or SNDA "should be permitted, as if 
the product were manufactured by more conventional techniques." In support of this position, 
they argued that "[s]ince abbreviated review is typically available for such products made by 
more traditional methodology, there [was] no legal or scientific justification for automatically 
requiring full clinical testing when the R-ONA technique [was] used to prepare an identical 
ingredient." Second, they identified drugs where the R-ONA-derived active ingredient ap-
peared to have oniy insignificant chemical deviations from the drug entity manufactured by 
conventional means. For this group, the authors also argued that an ANDA, SNDA, or NDA 
with less than full clinicals should be permitted. A biological assay test could be used to deter-
mine if any changes would affect the safety or therapeutic equivalence of the drug. The third 
group were those drugs where biotechnology significantly altered the chemical identity of the 
active ingredient. For this group the authors agreed that full clinical testing was justified. 
Korwek & Trinker, supra note 170, at 532. 
HeinOnline -- 38 Drake L. Rev. 510 1988-1989
510 Drake Law Review [Vol. 38 
4. Biologics and Medical Devices 
The FDA also has the authority to regulate biologics and medical de-
vices for human use-two areas where biotechnology is making significant 
inroads. Biologics include "viruses, vaccines, serums, toxins, antitoxins, al-
lergenic products, blood and blood components."20G Although this descrip-
tion appears straightforward, biotechnology has created some confusion over 
whether certain products are biologics or drugs. The FDA has created a 
committee to determine which center-the Center for Medical Devices or 
the Center for Drugs-will review products not clearly fitting into one cate-
gory or another.206 
Biologics are regulated somewhat differently from other products under 
the jurisdiction of the FDA.207 Unapproved biological products are treated 
as new drugs during the investigational new drug application phase, but 
then are issued a license specifying the conditions of manufacture. Both the 
manufacturing facilities and the product must meet standards "designed to 
ensure safety, purity and potency."208 Biologics regulation includes no provi-
sion for abbreviated approval processes; thus all biologics whether or not 
made by R-ONA technology require a complete product license 
application. 209 
Medical devices, in contrast to biologics, are health care products which 
do not achieve any of their "principal intended purposes through chemical 
action within or on the body of man or other animals" and which are not 
"dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of any of [their] 
principal intended purposes."210 Medical devices include a variety of diag-
nostic aids such as "reagents (chemicals), antibiotic sensitivity discs (for de-
termining which antibiotic to use for a particular patient) and test kits for 
in vitro (outside the body) diagnosis of disease (e.g., diabetes, AIDS) and 
other conditions (e.g., pregnancy)."211 
The extent of FDA authority to regulate new methods of manufacturing 
of medical devices is based on the class of the device. The FDCA established 
three categories of medical devices, each with separate regulatory require-
205. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (1982). 
206. See KORWEK, 1988 BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATIONS, supra note 129, at 43. The differ-
ence between a biologic and a medical device may also be an area of some confusion. While the 
FDA has stated that "any monoclonal antibody product prepared by hybridoma technology 
that is intended for in vivo use or for in vitro testing of a licensed biological product is a 
biological product subject to licensure under the PHS Act," the vast majority of monoclonal 
products are regulated as medical devices. Id. (citing 48 Fed. Reg. 50,795 (1983)). 
207. Biological products for human use are regulated primarily under the Public Health 
Service Act. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (1982). 
208. Note, An Overview of FDA Regulation, supra note 170, at 511. See also 42 U.S.C. § 
262(d) (1982); 21 u.s.c. §§ 351-52 (1982). 
209. Note, An Overview of FDA Regulation, supra note 170, at 511. 
210. 21 u.s.c. § 321(h) (1976). 
211. Note, An Overview of FDA Regulation, supra note 170, at 511. 
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ments-those in Class I requiring relatively less regulation than those in 
Class III. 
Manufacturers of Class I and Class II devices must file a premarket noti-
fication [a 510(k) notification] with the FDA at least 90 days prior to 
commercial distribution. Premarket approval demonstrating that the de-
vice is safe and effective is not required as long as the new product is 
"substantially equivalent" in safety and effectiveness to [a previously ap-
proved device). 111 
In contrast, a Class III device must be approved on a product-by-product 
basis, even if the device is identical to a previously approved device. The 
manufacturer "must file a premarket approval application (PMAA) contain-
ing laboratory or clinical data to establish that the device is safe and 
effective. "218 
Use of biotechnology to prepare Class I or Class II medical devices does 
not automatically change their classification to Class III. The method of 
manufacture is only relevant to class insofar as it alters the safety and effec-
tiveness of the product.214 Thus, manufacturers of new Class I or Class II 
devices made by biotechnology "must demonstrate that such devices are 
substantially similar to products made by conventional techniques in order 
to avoid conducting the safety and efficacy studies typically required in 
premarket approval applications for Class III devices."210 Also, manufactur-
ers of devices in any of the three classes who previously prepared a device 
by conventional methods but who now use biotechnology must submit a 
510(k) notification to the FDA. 
In this respect, the 510(k) submission is much like a supplemental appli-
cation filed for a change in manufacturing process of an approved drug. 
If the FDA believes that use of biotechnology poses safety or efficacy 
problems, it [can] then delay marketing until adequate data are devel-
oped to prove otherwise, or [it can] reclassify the product as a new, Class 
III device that requires agency approval and extensive premarket 
testing.218 
Some have argued that the approach taken by the Center for Medical De-
vices is a more reasoned one than that taken by the Center for Drugs, under 
212. ld. In addition, "(m]anufacturers of a Class I device must satisfy the general provi-
sions of the Act relating to misbranding, adulteration, and compliance with . . . GMPs. Class II 
devices [must also] conform to performance standards, which can include specification as to 
construction, components, ingredients, and properties of the device, as well as to clinical testing 
and other studies relevant to technical characteristics." Korwek, FDA Regulation of Biotech-
nology, supra note 176, at 303. 
213. Note, An Overview of FDA Regulation, supra note 170, at 511. 
214. Id. 
215. Korwek, FDA Regulation of Biotechnology, supra note 176, at 304. 
216. I d. at 304-05. Korwek also points out that 510(k) submissions have been successfully 
used to market previously approved Class III devices. 
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which a complete NDA is required for all new drugs manufactured by 
biotechnology. 
5. Public Health Service Act 
The other potential legal authority for FDA regulation of biotechnol-
ogy-derived products is section 361 of the Public Health Service Act 
(PHSA),:117 which gives the agency authority "to promulgate regulations in 
cooperation with the Center for Disease Control 'to prevent the introduc-
tion, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases.' "218 Although this 
broad authority appears to provide a sufficient basis to control all biotech-
nology activities, the statutory language limits the application of the Act to 
the protection of human health.219 PHSA defines communicable disease as 
"illness due to an infectious agent ... which is transmitted directly or indi-
rectly to a well person from an affected person, animal or arthropod .... " 
Thus, as one author pointed out, a supportable finding of a connection be-
tween biotechnology products and human disease would be necessary to jus-
tify regulation of biotechnology activity under the Act.220 Since most con-
sider such a finding unlikely, the PHSA has not been relied upon by the 
FDA to regulate products developed by biotechnology. 
E. Regulation by the USDA 
Prior to 1984 the USDA had had significant involvement with biotech-
nology by virtue of the fact that it conducted and funded biotechnology re-
search as applied to plants and animals, and also regulated the use of animal 
biologics, plants, plant pests, non-human animal pests, and animals used for 
food. In 1979 the USDA endorsed and adopted the NIH Guidelines, requir-
ing compliance with the Guidelines in all research conducted by USDA de-
partments and grantees.221 Soon thereafter, the USDA established the Agri-
culture Recombinant DNA Research Committee (ARRC) to support the 
NIH RAC and to oversee and coordinate biotechnology matters among the 
217. 42 U.S.C. § 264 (1982). See also 21 C.F.R. § 5.10 (1988) (transferring authority under 
the Public Health Services Act from the Assistant Secretary for Health, DHHS, to the Com-
missioner of the FDA). 
218. McGarity & Bayer, supra note 42, at 505 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 264a (1982)). 
219. Karny, Frankensteins, supra note 42, at 852. The statute specifically states that 
"(f]or purposes of carrying out and enforcing such regulations, the [regulatory authority] may 
provide for such inspection, fumigation, disinfection, sanitation, pest extermination, destruction 
of animals or articles found to be so infected or contaminated as to be sources of dangerous 
infection to human beings .... " 42 U.S.C. § 264 (1982). 
220. Karny, Frankensteins, supra note 42, at 852. 
221. See Statement of Policy for Regulations, Biotechnology Processes and Products, 49 
Fed. Reg. 50,897-98 (1984) (citing Memorandum to Heads of Department Agencies: Guidelines 
for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules (Oct. 15, 1979)). 
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various agencies in the USDA and the NIH.222 
1. Regulation of Plant and Animal Pests 
With respect to the regulation of plant and animal pests, the USDA has 
a significant number of statutes at its disposal for regulating biotechnology-
derived products. The statutes include the Federal Plant Pest Act 
(FPPA) 223 and its precursor, the Plant Quarantine Act (PQA),22" the Federal 
Noxious Weed Act (FNWA),2211 the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act (VSTA),228 and 
the Act of February 2, 1903.227 Several of the statutes, however, have anum-
ber of limitations which reduce their effectiveness in this regard. 
For example, FPPA prohibits individuals from importing or transport-
ing in interstate commerce any "plant pest" without a USDA permit. A 
plant pest is broadly defined to include a variety of organisms and parts of 
organisms which "can directly or indirectly injure or cause disease or dam-
age in or to any plant or parts thereof."228 The definition includes "insects 
and other nonvertebrate animals as well as microorganisms and parasitic 
plants .... "229 Organisms that meet the definition are designated as plant 
pests and are listed in the Federal Register. Although the definition appears 
to cover a broad variety of organisms, a narrow reading of the statutory lan-
guage would exclude organisms for which there is not a reasonable certainty 
that the organisms would be harmful to plants-a showing of a risk of harm 
would not be enough. 230 
A second limitation of the FPPA is that it applies only to the sale, 
transportation, and release of organisms, not to their production.231 Nor 
does FPP A apply to intrastate movement; it covers only interstate transpor-
tation. Thus, the USDA would have difficulty reaching engineered organisms 
222. /d. 
223. Federal Plant Pest Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 150aa-150jj (1982). 
224. Plant Quarantine Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 151-64, 166-67 (1982). 
225. Federal Noxious Weed Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2801-13 (1982). 
226. Virus Serum Toxin Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-58 (1982). 
227. Act of Feb. 2, 1903, 21 U.S.C. § 111 (1982). Responsibility for implementing and 
administering these statutes rests with the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service within 
the Department. See id. 
228. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,354 
(1986). 
229. McChesney & Adler, supra note 42, at 10,376. The FPPA actually expanded the 
much older Plant Quarantine Act, which prohibited the importation of organisms defined as 
nursery stock into the United States unless a permit was obtained from the USDA. Novick, 
supra note 3, at § 18.03[3][c). The PQA authorized the USDA to institute a quarantine against 
plants of "any character whatsoever that [were] 'capable of carrying any dangerous plant dis-
ease or insect infestation.'" Gibbs & Kahan, supra note 184, at 29-30 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 161 
(1985)). See also Korwek & de Ia Cruz, supra note 42, at 357 (discussing the PQA as a means of 
regulating deliberate releases). 
230. See Novick, supra note 3, at 18-29; McChesney & Adler, supra note 42, at 10,376. 
231. McChesney & Adler, supra note 42, at 10,376. 
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that were produced and kept within the boundaries of a single state.281 
The Federal Noxious Weed Act, another potential source for authority 
to regulate some biotechnology-derived products, was enacted in 1974 to 
control noxious weeds that might have "adverse effects upon man or his en-
vironment."11188 FNWA is in many ways similar to FPPA. For example, "nox-
ious weeds" cannot lawfully be moved in interstate commerce or released 
under FNW A without a USDA permit. 
Although the term "noxious weed" is defined in a manner that could 
provide the USDA with broad regulatory authority over genetically engi-
neered plants,284 the statute has significant limitations as a vehicle for the 
regulation of genetically engineered plants or plant pests. For example, 
FNW A does not prohibit the interstate movement of a noxious weed until 
the weed is specifically listed as a noxious weed by the USDA after notice 
and opportunity for public comment,2311 and plants "can only be regulated as 
noxious weeds if they cause serious injury"-anything less is insufficient. 288 
Furthermore, the statute empowers the USDA to regulate only those weeds 
introduced from abroad, not those that originated within the United 
States.287 
A third alternative available to the USDA in the regulation of plant and 
animal pests is the Act of February 2, 1903. The Act allows the USDA to 
promulgate regulations "to prevent the introduction of contagious, infec-
tious, or communicable disease of animals and/or live poultry from a foreign 
country into any state of the United States or the District of Columbia, or 
from one state to another."288 Under the statute's regulations, individuals 
who wish to make interstate shipments of such organisms, or import them, 
must submit to the USDA a permit application which describes the orga-
nisms, their use, and the safeguards to be observed in their handling.289 
With respect to genetic engineering, according to one authority, "the 
statute provides USDA authority to prevent the introduction or halt the 
spread of genetically engineered organisms that manifest themselves as in-
232. Novick, supra note 3, at § 18.03[3][c]. In addition to these shortcomings, the Act 
excludes from its jurisdiction organisms considered beneficial to plants "such as lady bugs, de-
spite the potential for ecological disruption from such organisms." /d. 
233. Noxious Weeds Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2801 (1982). 
234. Noxious weed means "any living stage . . . of any parasitic or other plant of a kind 
... which is of foreign origin, is new to or not widely prevalent in the United States, and can 
directly or indirectly injure crops, other useful plants, livestock, or poultry or other interests of 
agriculture ... or the public health." 7 U.S.C. § 2801 (1982). 
235. Korwek & de la Cruz, supra note 42, at 349. 
236. /d. at 350. 
237. /d. In addition, Korwek and de la Cruz asserted that the statute limited USDA juris-
diction to plants that were "not new or not widely prevalent in the U.S." /d. They further 
argued that if a genetically engineered microbe also occurred in nature it would not necessarily 
be new and thus not subject to the Act. /d. 
238. Novick, supra note 3, at 18-28 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 111 (1982)). 
239. /d. 
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fectious agents of animal disease."240 Environmentalists have argued, how-
ever, that the statute would not "provide pre-release review or testing of 
organisms to determine if they are, or could be, infectious."241 
2. Regulation of Animal Biologics 
While the FDA has regulatory authority over human biologics, the 
USDA has the authority to regulate animal biologics. Under the Virus-Se-
rum-Toxin Act (VSTA), the Secretary of Agriculture may "issue, suspend, 
and revoke licenses for the maintenance of establishments for the prepara-
tion of viruses, serums, toxins, and analogous products used in the treat-
ment of domestic animals."242 In addition, VSTA authorizes the secretary to 
"promulgate regulations that [might] be necessary to prevent the prepara-
tion, shipment, and sale of worthless, contaminated, dangerous, or harmful 
viruses, serums, toxins, antitoxins, or analogous products used in the treat-
ment of domestic animals."143 Under the Act the USDA has required the 
licensing of animal biologics and has prohibited the importation or inter-
state shipment of veterinary biologics that are "worthless, contaminated, 
dangerous, or harmful."244 Prior to 1984 VSTA was limited in its effective-
ness, however, in that it did not apply to products shipped intrastate or to 
products that were exported. 
3. Use of Genetically-Altered Organisms in Animals Used for Food 
The USDA is also responsible for the inspection of animals used for 
human food. Once genetic material is successfully transferred into a host 
animal and becomes part of that animal, the animal may be subject to the 
Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA)24& or the Poultry Products Inspection 
Act (PPIA).246 
FMIA requires the USDA to inspect specified food animals prior to 
slaughter and after slaughter. The purpose of the pre-slaughter inspection 
"is to remove from human food channels animals that are obviously unfit for 
human food because of discernible diseases, abnormalities, chemical poison-
ing, and central nervous system disorders."247 The post-mortem inspection is 
240. /d. 
241. /d. In contradiction, Korwek points out that § 111 of the Act is very comprehensive 
and that the USDA could use it to require pre-release review. Telephone interview with Ed-
ward Korwek in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 1988). 
242. Jones, Genetic Engineering in Domestic Food Animals: Legal and Regulatory Con-




245. Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-95 (1982). 
246. Poultry Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-70 (1982). 
247. Jones, Genetic Engineering, supra note 242, at 274. 
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performed in order to remove from the human food channels meat that is 
"unfit for human food because of adulteration due to diseases or abnormali-
ties discernible upon examination of internal organs and tissues. "248 FMIA 
requires the inspection of only a limited number of species-cattle, sheep, 
swine, goats, horses, mules, and other equines. Other species, such as game 
animals, are not inspected under the mandatory program (although they 
may be inspected for a fee).248 Like FMIA, PPIA provides for pre- and post-
mortem inspection of poultry products. PPIA, however, has a much broader 
definition of species subject to inspection than does FMIA.2 &o 
The regulations implementing FMIA and PPIA provide that "no live-
stock used in any research investigation involving an experimental biological 
product, drug, or chemical shall be eligible for slaughter" unless certain spe-
cific conditions are met. 2&1 
Given the current regulatory scheme for inspection, the use of geneti-
cally altered organisms or genes in food animals could generate some 
problems for the USDA. For example, "some genetically engineered animals, 
such as chimerae and some hybrids, may differ substantially from animals 
that are currently inspected under the FMIA and PPIA."2&2 USDA policy 
has been to inspect animals if they physically resemble species listed under 
FMIA or PPIA.m This policy may discourage genetic engineers who want 
tax-supported government inspections from developing new varieties of hy-
brid livestock "that differ in appearance from cattle, sheep, swine, goats, 
horses, mules, and other equines."2M Furthermore, as Jones points out: 
The proliferation of genetically engineered food animals will place much 
greater strain on our current system of food safety, inspection, standards, 
and labeling than the breeding of [unique hybrids] did .... The social 
response to that strain will most certainly require new and innovative 
public policy making, rulemaking, and perhaps new legislation as well.265 
Thus, prior to 1984 the power of the USDA to regulate biotechnology-de-
rived organisms and plants for deliberate release or biotechnology-altered 
animals for human food under its statutory and regulatory schemes was 
248. !d. 
249. !d. at 274-75. 
250. /d. at 275. Under FPIA "poultry" means any domesticated bird. 21 U.S.C. § 453(e) 
(1982). 
251. Jones, Genetic Engineering, supra note 242, at 281. 
252. Gibbs & Kahan, supra note 184, at 31 (quoting 49 Fed. Reg. 50,856, 50,903 (1984)). 
253. See Jones, Genetic Engineering, supra note 242, at 279. 
254. /d. 
255. /d. at 287. Another problematic area in the use of gene transfer in domestic food 
animals is whether the transferred genes will be considered food additives, animal drugs, or 
animal biologics. If the process is considered to result in a drug or food additive, it will be 
regulated by the FDA. If it is considered to result in a biologic, it will be regulated by the 
USDA. See Jones, Genetic Engineering, supra note 242, for a more detailed discussion of this 
dilemma. 
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open to considerable debate. 
F. OSHA 
Prior to 1984 the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) 2116 was 
also cited as a potential source of statutory authority for regulating biotech-
nology in the area of worker safety. OSHA is aimed at protecting employees 
from workplace hazards and thus may be useful in controlling risks aSsoci-
ated with the manufacture of biotechnologically-produced organisms. Some 
have argued, however, that OSHA has little power to regulate such applica-
tions because "its regulatory authority is generally dependent upon a show-
ing of actual, palpable risk to worker health or safety."2117 Under OSHA 
three mechanisms are available to regulate workplace standards: (1) the gen-
eral duty clause; (2) authority under section 6(b); and (3) emergency stan-
dards. Yet none of these provisions may provide the agency with the author-
ity to regulate industrial applications of biotechnology. 
Under the general duty clause, the agency is limited to regulating "rec-
ognized" hazards that are likely to cause death or serious bodily injury.2118 
According to Korwek: 
Although it is arguable that a few applications of R-DNA techniques in-
volving pathogenic agents pose "recognized" hazards and that some ap-
plications are likely to "cause death or serious bodily injury" as well, it is 
doubtful whether most current industrial applications of the new tech-
nology meet either of these two elements, both of which are necessary to 
establish a duty clause violation.258 
Furthermore, even if biotechnology posed a hazard likely to cause serious 
harm, OSHA could not regulate the hazard unless there were "generally 
known and acceptable" tests to detect such a hazard.260 No such tests exist. 
Section 6(b)(5) of OSHA provides that the agency may promulgate 
standards applicable to toxic materials or harmful physical agents. Although 
theoretically this provision could provide the agency with the authority nec-
essary to regulate hazards associated with the biotechnology industry, two 
Supreme Court cases have limited the agency's rulemaking ability under 
this section to cases where the agency has substantial evidence of a signifi-
cant risk posed by the industrial practice.261 
256. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1982). 
257. Korwek, OSHA Regulation of Industrial Applications of Recombinant DNA Tech-
nology, 50 CINCINNATI L. REv. 284, 286 (1981) [hereinafter Korwek, OSHA Regulation]. 
258. /d. at 296. 
259. ld. at 297-98. This statement is based on the assumption that virtually all of the 
techniques used to manufacture R-DNA products use well-characterized systems such as E. 
coli. 
260. ld. at 298. 
261. See Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 
(1980); American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
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Finally, the authority available to the agency to promulgate emergency 
standards is limited to cases where employees are exposed to "grave dan-
ger."282 To meet this requirement, the agency must show "a risk of incur-
able, permanent or fatal consequences to workers, curable or temporary ef-
fects on health are not sufficient evidence that grave danger exists."283 Thus, 
OSHA (like several of the other sources cited) had limitations which made 
its application to biotechnology questionable. 
V. REGULATION FROM 1984 TO 1986 
In the early 1980s Congress became concerned about the fragmented 
and piecemeal nature of the federal regulatory structure for commercializa-
tion of biotechnology.284 Specifically, the regulatory scheme was criticized by 
Senator Albert Gore as a "balkanized" regime of oversight.283 Gore further 
cited the limited expertise of the agencies involved as grounds for a new 
approach to the problem.288 Biotechnology companies were also concerned 
about the regulatory maze and jurisdictional disputes among agencies and 
were reportedly hesitant to invest in new product development.287 
In response to these concerns, in April 1984 the administration, under 
the auspices of the White House Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and 
the Environment (now the Domestic Policy Council), established a working 
group on biotechnology, which operated through the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP). The task of the working group was to "deter-
mine whether the existing regulatory apparatus was adequate to consider 
the safety and health and environmental effects of modern biotechnology as 
its products and processes move[d] from contained research laboratories to 
the marketplace."268 In December 1984 the working group published its re-
sults and concluded: "At the present time, existing statutes seem adequate 
to deal with the emerging processes and products of modern biotechnol-
ogy."269 The group went on to say, however, that "[t]he current scientific 
review apparatus is . . . not designed to respond to all the scientific issues 
surrounding commercialization of biotechnology including the health and 
broad environmental effects of new commercial processes and products."270 
The working group proposed a new framework for the regulation of biotech-
262. Korwek, OSHA Regulation, supra note 257, at 311. 
263. ld. at 312. 
264. Gore & Owens, supra note 15, at 343. These concerns were set forth in a report 
prepared by the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the House Committee on 
Science and Technology in June 1983. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. 
267. Note, Rutabaga, supra note 15, at 1541. 
268. ld. 
269. Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed. 
Reg. 50,858 (1984). 
270. ld. at 50,904. 
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nology. The proposal included a "scientific advisory mechanism for the as-
sessment of important issues and interagency coordination."271 The mecha-
nism consisted of a two-tiered structure composed of a biotechnology 
science board at the first level and five agency-based scientific advisory com-
mittees at the second: 
The Advisory Committees were to provide a detailed, scientific review of 
specific applications submitted to them by any federal agency. The Com-
mittees chartered by the FDA, EPA, and USDA were to concern them-
selves mainly with commercial applications. The NIH RAC was to con-
tinue to advise on research involving recombinant DNA, and The 
National Science Foundation was to charter a Committee to examine po-
tential effects of environmentally related basic research. 272 
The biotechnology science board was to consist of members from each 
agency-based advisory committee and was to "evaluate the review proce-
dures established by those committees, conduct analyses of issues of broad 
concern regarding rDNA, rRNA and cell fusion," and develop guidelines and 
provide a forum for public comment. 273 The board was to report to the Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services; it had substantial power to ensure 
interagency cooperation and consistency through its review of regulatory 
procedures in the individual agencies. 274 
In addition, the proposal contained draft policy statements for the regu-
lation of biotechnology by the FDA, the EPA, and the USDA. These policy 
statements did not describe regulatory requirements "but rather the general 
policy framework within which regulatory decisions" would be made by each 
of the agencies. 2711 
In its policy statement the FDA noted its extensive experience with the 
application of its regulations to the products of biotechnological processes, 
both new and old. Thus, the agency proposed no new procedures or require-
ments for biotechnology products under its jurisdiction. The FDA's overrid-
ing policy was that regulation must be based on a case-by-case scientific 
evaluation of products and not on assumptions about certain technological 
processes. 278 
The EPA's policy statement addressed the regulation of genetically-en-
gineered organisms under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenti-
cide Act (FIFRA) and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). The EPA 
re-articulated its intent to apply TSCA to genetically engineered orga-
271. Isakoff, supra note 42, at 25. 
272. /d. 
273. /d. 
274. Note, Rutabaga, supra note 15, at 1542. 
275. Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed. 
Reg. 50,856 (1984). 
276. See SuBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 14, at 12. 
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nisms277 and began to develop a regulatory policy directed to that goal and 
to address some of the weaknesses of the regulatory system described ear-
lier. For example, the EPA recognized that information required in a PMN 
for non-microbial chemical substances might not be adequate for genetically 
engineered microorganisms, and stated its plan to set forth the PMN re-
quirements for these microorganisms on a case-by-case basis. The EPA also 
stated its intent to eliminate the small quantity research and development 
exemption for field tests of genetically altered microorganisms and to con-
sider the adoption of new SNURs and reporting requirements for microor-
ganisms not subject to the PMN requirements if such organisms posed a 
risk to human health or the environment. 
One of the most difficult issues the EPA faced early on in developing its 
regulatory policy under TSCA was how to apply the definition of a "new" 
chemical substance to genetically engineered organisms. Under TSCA a 
chemical substance manufactured for commercial purposes that is not either 
listed by name on the chemical substances inventory or "naturally occur-
ring" is "new" and subject to the PMN requirements prior to manufactur-
ing.278 The difficulty arises in distinguishing certain biotechnology-derived 
substances from naturally occurring substances. In its 1984 policy state-
ment, the EPA attempted to distinguish between a "new" substance and a 
"naturally occurring" one by means of the degree of "human intervention" 
involved in creating the substance. Naturally occurring substances were 
those that existed as a result of natural events or processes, or as a result of 
"limited manipulation of natural processes."279 Substances created by R-
DNA, R-RNA or cell fusion were considered non-naturally occurring and 
subject to PMN, while those created by selection were considered naturally 
occurring and exempt from the PMN requirements. 
Under FIFRA the EPA also responded to earlier criticisms of its regula-
tory framework. For example, the EPA adopted a "process-based" review of 
new pesticides, imposing different testing requirements for registration of 
non-indigenous and genetically-engineered microbial pesticides than for re-
gistration of indigenous microbial pesticides.280 In addition, once an applica-
tion for registration of such a pesticide was received, additional data re-
quirements would be determined on a case-by-case basis, "depending on the 
particular microorganism, its parent microorganism, the pesticide use pat-
tern, and the manner and extent to which the microorganism has been al-
tered/manipulated."281 Supplementary data requirements could include in-
formation on the "control region of the genes being altered in the 
277. Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed. 
Reg. 50,886 (1984). 
278. /d. at 50,887. 
279. Id. at 50,888. 
280. Id. at 50,884. 
281. /d. 
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biotechnology process, a description of the new traits or characteristics the 
genetic manipulation was intended to cause, tests to evaluate genetic stabil-
ity and exchange, and selected environmental and toxicology tests."m Fur-
thermore, the EPA adopted the "interim" policy that an experimental use 
permit would be required for all field tests of non-indigenous and geneti-
cally-engineered microbial pesticides.288 In its 1984 statement the EPA did 
not mention any other environmental statutes as bases for its regulation of 
biotechnology. 
The USDA expressed its view that its existing regulatory framework 
combined with the NIH Guidelines was adequate for the regulation of agri-
culture-related biotechnology research and product development. Further-
more, the USDA stated that it had "endorsed and adopted the NIH Guide-
lines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA molecules for coordinating 
interagency research review, and established an internal policy requiring 
compliance with these guidelines as a condition for receiving funds for 
research. "284 
The OSTP received numerous comments on the proposed framework 
most of which attacked the two-tiered review process as "cumbersome and 
unnecessary."28& Industry representatives, in particular, feared that a review 
board would add an additional hurdle to the regulatory process.286 In re-
sponse, the OSTP issued a revised version of the coordinated framework on 
November 14, 1985,287 replacing the BSB with the Biotechnology Science 
Coordinating Committee (BSCC). The BSCC, consisting of representatives 
from the NIH, the EPA, the NSF, the FDA, and the USDA, was to have 
four functions: 
to coordinate scientific information sharing and problem solving; to pro-
mote the development of consistent review procedures and assessment 
techniques by affected agencies; to foster agency cooperation on new sci-
entific issues; and to identify important gaps in scientific understanding 
of rDNA. In short, the BSCC [would] not oversee the individual agen-
282. Kriz, supra note 93, at 395. 
283. See Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed. 
Reg. 50,880 (1984). In taking this action the 
EPA cited the possibility that microbial pesticides might replicate and spread beyond 
the site of application. The agency also said that there may not be natural control or 
dissipation mechanisms to which the non-indigenous and genetically engineered mi-
crobial pesticides would be subject. Therefore, the agency believed that small-scale 
tests with microbial pesticides could raise potential environmental issues comparable 
to those of large-scale tests of conventional chemicals. 
J. GIBBS, supra note 77, at 15. 
284. Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed. 
Reg. 50,898 (1984). 
285. Note, Rutabaga, supra note 15, at 1542. 
286. ld. at 1542 n.86. 
287. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology: Establishment of the 
Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,174 (1985). 
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cies, but [would] operate solely in an advisory capacity.288 
The BSCC would not have the supervisory powers or reviewing authority of 
the BSB but would instead coordinate interagency activities. Thus, the 
BSCC was to be a less powerful body than the BSB. 
VI. REGULATION SINCE 1986 
Between 1984 and 1986 the EPA, the USDA, and the FDA also received 
comments on their proposed policies in the coordinated framework. With a 
few minor exceptions, no new relevant regulations were promulgated by the 
agencies during that time. · 
On June 26, 1986, the OSTP published the final version of the Coordi-
nated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology.289 The final framework 
contained policy statements not only from the FDA, the EPA, and the 
USDA, but also from the OSHA, the NIH, and the newly established BSCC. 
The document included a substantial amount of new information not pro-
vided in the initial version. Of most significance were "two new USDA regu-
latory programs, additional elements of EPA's TSCA and FIFRA programs, 
and a controversial set of definitions issued by the BSCC."290 The BSCC 
statement included definitions of two classes of organisms considered appro-
priate for regulation: pathogens and "intergeneric" organisms.291 The defini-
tions were adopted by the various regulatory agencies consistent with their 
authorizing legislation but were, and continue to be, controversial because 
they exempt certain organisms, considered to fall outside the definition of 
pathogens and intergeneric organisms, from any regulatory scrutiny.292 
A. EPA Regulation Since 1986 
In its 1986 policy statement, the EPA abandoned its 1984 "process-
based" approach to regulating genetically engineered organisms under 
288. Note, Rutabaga, supra note 15, at 1542. 
289. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 
(1986). 
290. Novick, supra note 3, at § 18.03[7J[a). 
291. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,306 
(1986). Pathogens were defined as viruses or microorganisms that have the ability to cause 
disease in other living organisms. Intergeneric organisms were those deliberately formed to con-
tain genetic material from source organisms in different genera. /d. at 23,307. 
292. Exempt from the definition of pathogen are organisms belonging to "generally-recog-
nized non-pathogenic strains of species commonly used for laboratory research or commercial 
purposes." Exempt from both the definition of pathogen and intergeneric organism are "engi-
neered organisms that are created by the transfer from . . . source organisms of only well char-
acterized, non-coding regulatory sequences such as origins of replication, ribosome binding 
sites, promoters, operators and terminators." Novick, supra note 3, at § 18.03[7][a). Thus, ex-
empt from the definitions are those organisms formed by "deletion or rearrangement of an 
organism's own genetic material, or by transfer to recipient organisms of genetic material from 
sources from within the same genera." /d. 
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FIFRA and established a two-level review system under which microbial 
pesticides that pose less risk to the environment receive an abbreviated re-
view and may be field tested without an experimental use permit.298 Specifi-
cally, under the two-tier review, if the pesticide is "intergeneric" and 
nonpathogenic, it need only comply with Level I reporting requirements. 
These requirements include submission of information regarding the iden-
tity of the organism, its natural habitat and environmental competitiveness, 
the methods used to genetically engineer the organism, and the proposed 
testing program.294 If the EPA determines, from the information submitted, 
that the organisms may present a risk to human health or the environment, 
the applicant must apply for an EUP or comply with the more stringent 
Level II reporting requirements.296 Level II requirements also apply to orga-
nisms that are intergeneric-i.e., those containing genetic material from dis-
similar source organisms-and those that are "pathogenic." 
In its 1986 policy statement, the EPA also clarified the applicability of 
TSCA to genetically engineered organisms, stating that the law would not 
apply to genetically altered plants or animals nor to organisms that are 
foods, food additives, drugs, cosmetics, medical devices, or pesticides. In ad-
dition, the EPA took a new and different approach to the definition of "new 
chemical substance." The statement defined new chemical substances as 
those that "through deliberate human intervention contain genetic material 
from dissimilar source organisms. "296 Organisms are considered dissimilar 
"if they are from different genera."297 However, organisms created by certain 
intergeneric combinations-those in which the "genetic material added to 
the recipient microorganisms consists only of well characterized, non-coding 
regulatory regions"-were exempted from PMN requirements.298 The basis 
for this exclusion was that the resulting organisms "do not possess new com-
binations of traits but rather exhibit quantitative changes in preexisting 
traits."299 Intrageneric and non-engineered microbes were considered natu-
rally occurring. 
293. SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 14, at 12. 
294. Statement of Policy: Microbic Products Subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
cide, Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,321 (1986). 
295. The Level II requirements provide that an applicant must submit all the data re-
quired under Level I, plus information concerning the means by which the organism is to be 
contained at the test site and the means of controlling the organism if it escapes from the test 
site. /d. at 23,321-22. 
296. /d. at 23,325. 
297. Id. 
298. This exclusion only applies if the producer of the microorganism can document 
"three elements: i) the exact nucleotide base sequences of the regulatory region and any in-
serted flanking nucleotides; ii) the regulatory region and any inserted flanking nucleotides do 
not code for protein, peptide, or functional RNA molecules; iii) the regulatory region solely 
controls the activity of other regions that code for protein or peptide molecules or act as recog-
nition sites for the initiation of nucleic acid or protein synthesis." Id. at 23,332 (1986). 
299. /d. 
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The 1986 policy statement also reiterated that the standard PMN form 
would not be applicable to microbial products. Instead, the applicant and 
the EPA would discuss the "level and types of information appropriate for 
the notice during pre-notice consultations."800 Although the EPA is follow-
ing a case-by-case approach to the specific information it will require in a 
PMN, the policy statement set forth the types of information the EPA ex-
pects to see in a PMN on a new microorganism. This includes identifying 
information-e.g., taxonomy, source, reproductive cycle, and capacity forge-
netic transfer-methods used to manipulate source organisms genetically to 
obtain the resulting product and the special functions obtained, and risk 
assessment information. The risk assessment information should include 
production processes, workplace exposure, worker practices, provisions for 
containment, and releases. Additional information is required for small scale 
field tests, such as numbers of microorganisms and methods of application, 
site of application and surroundings, containment, mitigation measures and 
monitoring procedures, and data on "environmental fate and effects."801 
Finally, the 1986 policy statement reconfirmed the EPA's earlier intent 
to: (1) eliminate the small quantity PMN exemption for research and devel-
opment using genetically engineered microorganisms, (2) issue a SNUR for 
organisms falling outside of the PMN requirement that could pose a risk to 
public health or the environment-specifically for pathogens, and (3) impose 
additional reporting requirements under section 8(a) on companies that re-
lease microorganisms into the environment without review under the PMN 
or SNUR procedures. As of November 1989, however, the EPA had not 
promulgated rules implementing any of these policy objectives and contin-
ued to request that companies voluntarily comply with the EPA's policy 
guidelines in these areas.302 
300. /d. at 23,326. 
301. In a "Points to Consider" document, the EPA stated that submitters of a PMN for 
such organisms should "describe the microorganism's growth characteristics in simulated envi-
ronments; the environmental conditions that would affect survival; the physical or biological 
containment features present at the site; contact of engineered organisms with other popula-
tions; and possible undesirable effects." J. GIBBS, supra note 77, at 49. Information about the 
source organism and the method by which the organism has been altered would also be re-
quested. In addition, the agency may request "data regarding the human health and environ-
mental effects of release, e.g., pathogenicity, and effects on competitors and prey." /d. 
302. Karny, Regulation of the Environmental Application of Biotechnology, 7 BIOTECH. 
L. REP. 328, 342 (July-Aug. 1988). In May of 1988 the EPA distributed proposed rules address-
ing some of these issues for interagency review but as of November 1989 they had not been 
published for public review. Comments on the proposed rules reveal that they vary considera-
bly from those contemplated by the EPA in its 1986 policy statement. 
On the legislative front, Representative Fuqua introduced a bill in 1986 that would have 
amended TSCA to "prohibit the use of a genetically-engineered organism in commerce, manu-
facturing, or the environment without a permit." See J. GIBBS, supra note 77, at 57 (summariz-
ing H.R. 4452, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)). The bill did not achieve significant progress in 
Congress and new legislation does not appear forthcoming. Id. Although it is not anticipated 
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In February 1987 the EPA's Office of Toxic Substances received the 
first PMN for a genetically engineered microorganism. Biotechnica Interna-
tional informed the EPA that it planned to field test a genetically altered 
bacterium for use in improving nitrogen fixation in alfalfa. In March 1988 
the EPA approved the PMN, and in the summer of 1988 Biotechnica Inter-
national began to conduct its field test in Pepin County, Wisconsin. As of 
May 1988 the EPA had received a total of sixteen PMNs for biotechnology 
products. These included twelve for testing of genetically engineered micro-
organisms in the environment and four for closed system uses. Four of those 
received for environmental testing and three of the four proposed for closed 
system testing were permitted to proceed with restrictions. All those re-
viewed required additional information. All four of those approved for envi-
ronmental release agreed to proceed on the basis of a section 5(e) consent 
order. No application was denied.808 
Realizing the need for some assistance in its review of biotechnology-
derived substances under TSCA and FIFRA, in 1986 the EPA also stated 
that it was establishing a science advisory committee for biotechnology.804 
The committee's primary function would be to "provide peer review of spe-
cific product submissions under TSCA, FIFRA, and other EPA statutes and 
scientific oversight of the Agency's biotechnology programs."8011 The commit-
tee, formed in 1987, consists of ten independent scientists and members of 
the lay public. The committee first met in April 1987. It continues to meet 
on a regular basis to review biotechnology related proposals for agency 
approval. 
Recently, the EPA has proposed to decentralize its review process con-
cerning the release of genetically engineered organisms into the environment 
by creating "institutional-level environmental biosafety committees (EBCs) 
patterned after the IBCs created by the NIH Guidelines. "806 Such EBCs, 
rather than the EPA, would review field tests involving low-risk microorga-
nisms. 807 The EPA is currently setting up model EBCs in certain areas of 
the country. 
that it will gain significant support, Representative Baucus of Montana has drafted the Novel 
and Exotic Organism Release Act. The Act, which was introduced in Congress in the fall of 
1988, preempts APHIS and FIFRA regulation of environmental releases, placing all EPA re-
sponsibility for such regulation under the Toxic Substances Control Act. See Association of 
Biotechnology Companies, Summary of Congressional Activities Impacting Biotechnology In-
dustry, 7 BIOTECH. L. REP. 244 (May-June 1988). 
303. Statement of John A. Moore, Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Sub-
stances, EPA, Hearings before the Comm. on Science, Space and Technology, Subcomm. on 
Natural Resources, Agriculture and the Environment (May 5, 1988). 
304. Statement of Policy: Microbic Products Subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
cide, Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,318 (1986). 
305. Id. 
306. Karny, Regulation of the Environmental Application of Biotechnology, supra note 
302, at 343. 
307. Jd. 
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B. FDA Regulation Since 1986 
In its 1986 policy statement, the FDA maintained its position that no 
new regulations or administrative procedures were necessary to "deal with 
generic concerns about biotechnology."308 However, the FDA did attempt to 
respond to some of the comments it received and to clarify its position on 
several issues. For example, the FDA received a number of comments re-
garding its general requirements for approving biotechnology products that 
were animal drugs, human foods, or food additives. In response, the FDA 
added a new section concerning its policies on human foods and food addi-
tives and clarified its policies with regard to animal drugs. In its new food 
section, the FDA suggests that a new food additive petition may not be nec-
essary when a previously approved product covered by an existing food ad-
ditive regulation is subsequently produced using R-DNA techniques. Al-
though in general the FDA stated that new marketing applications will be 
required for most products manufactured using new biotechnology, in some 
instances "complete new applications may not be required" and "(a]s a gen-
eral rule, the extent of testing required on a food product produced by bio-
technology will depend upon many factors, including the novelty of the sub-
stances used to produce the food, the purity of the resulting product, and 
the estimated consumption of the product."309 With respect to GRAS sub-
stances subsequently produced via biotechnology, however, the FDA clearly 
stated that a GRAS substance could lose its GRAS status "solely because it 
was produced or modified by new technology."310 
The FDA also responded to the question of whether an original applica-
tion for a biotechnology product identical to an approved animal drug would 
be necessary. The FDA responded that the "Center for Veterinary Medicine 
has determined that, when the new substance produced by biotechnology is 
identical or virtually identical to an approved substance produced by con-
ventional technology, only a supplemental application is necessary" if the 
sponsor of the biotechnology product is also the sponsor of the convention-
ally produced product. In all other cases an original application is 
necessary. 311 
As regards new human drugs developed via biotechnology, the FDA's 
1986 policy statement did little more than reiterate that in evaluating these 
drugs it would use the general process it adheres to in the regulation of all 
new drugs. Yet in other documents, called "Points to Consider" documents, 
the FDA has taken the position that new drug applications will be necessary 
for all R-DNA-derived products.3lll Although the FDA "has indicated that 
308. FDA Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,309 (1986). 
309. /d. at 23,313. 
310. /d. 
311. /d. at 23,311. 
312. Points to Consider in the Production and Testing of New Drugs and Biologicals 
Produced by Recombinant DNA Technology, 49 Fed. Reg. 1138 (1984) (revised and updated 
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the contents of these documents are not guidelines but represent something 
less developed and less certain than guidelines,"313 their practical effect is to 
require companies to submit a complete new drug application on all R-
DNA-derived drugs in virtually all cases. The FDA argues that the length of 
the NDA and the number of tests required can vary significantly and, in 
some cases, will in effect be comparable to an abbreviated submission.314 
Since 1986 new questions regarding the regulation of biotechnology-de-
rived foods and drugs have arisen. For example, the use of the "may render" 
and "ordinarily render" standards to regulate foods produced by biotechnol-
ogy has come under scrutiny. At least one author has suggested that the 
agency consider using an approach similar to the one it uses for unavoidable 
contaminants. For such contaminants the FDA "has determined administra-
tively what level of contamination renders a food adulterated based on a 
scientific evaluation of the health risks posed by the contaminant. "m Such 
an approach makes sense, as the "question of whether a substance in food is 
added or naturally occurring per se is not as significant as whether it is 
present at levels that might be considered in some sense abnormal."316 
Others have questioned how the FDA, under the adulteration provision, 
will be able to determine whether a genetically engineered food product con-
stitutes a health risk. 317 The potential hazards of genetically engineered 
foods include the following: (1) the technique may introduce a new toxicant 
into the food; (2) it may increase the toxicant naturally present in insignifi-
cant quantities in the food; and (3) it may cause the food to lack certain 
valuable nutrients on which consumers rely.318 Some have asserted that the 
FDA does not have good baseline toxicant data for many conventional foods 
and that, as a result of this data gap, the "FDA could have trouble estab-
lishing that a toxicant is new, is present in abnormally large quantities, or is 
possibly dangerous."319 
Apr. 10, 1985); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERvs, FooD & DRUG ADMIN., TALK PAPER (Pub. 
No. T83-2) (Jan. 7, 1983). 
313. Note, An Overview of FDA Regulation, supra note 170, at 523. 
314. Telephone interview with Dr. Henry Miller, Special Assistant to the FDA Commis-
sioner for Biotechnology, in Rockville, Md. (July 7, 1988). 
315. Jones, Food Safety, supra note 187, at 359. 
316. Id. 
317. In its 1986 policy statement, the FDA stated that when determining the safety of 
food produced by R-DNA techniques, the agency will take into consideration whether: 
1. The cloned DNA as well as the vector used are properly identified; 2. The details of 
the construction of the production organism are available; 3. There is information 
documenting that the inserted DNA is well characterized and free from sequences 
that code for harmful products; and 4. The food produced is purified, characterized, 
and standardized. 
FDA Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,313 (1986). 
318. Comment, Regulation of Genetically Engineered Foods Under the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, supra note 170, at 911. 
319. Gibbs & Kahan, supra note 184, at 18. A further problem involved in the use of the 
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Questions regarding the application of the misbranding provisions of 
FDCA to genetically engineered products have also been raised. Generally, a 
product is considered misbranded if "its labeling is false or misleading in 
any particular"320 or if it is a food governed by a standard of identity321 and 
it does not conform to the standard.322 The labeling requirements for geneti-
cally engineered foods may present one of the most challenging regulatory 
issues for the FDA. 323 The problem lies in determining when an organism 
has been "altered sufficiently so that it can no longer accurately be identi-
fied by the same name as the species from which it derived the bulk of its 
genes."324 For example, will a tomato less one tomato gene still be a tomato? 
As biotechnology advances, new tomatoes may not be anatomically or 
morphologically classifiable as new species, but may still differ from ordi-
nary tomatoes in one or more essential attributes. Identifying the 
point(s) at which genetically modified products might need new or sup-
plementary names to avoid misleading consumers has received little 
attention. 326 
Another potential problem is jurisdictional. According to one author, 
some aspects of gene transfer in animals may bear a resemblance to both 
animal drugs and food additives. Some gene products are capable of affect-
ing both the functions of the food producing animal (the identifying charac-
teristic of a drug) and the quality or nature of the resulting food product 
(the characteristic of a food additive). Because animal drugs are regulated 
by the FDA while food additives used in meats and poultry are regulated by 
the USDA, some mechanism will be required to determine which agency has 
primary regulatory authority in such cases. 328 
Another jurisdictional controversy involves the regulation of human 
gene therapy. The FDA "has stated that DNA used for human gene therapy 
trials will be considered a biological drug and subject to FDA requirements 
adulteration provision is that it focuses on the addition of substances to a food when an omis-
sion could also result in adulteration. Thus, a food that is produced via the deletion of a certain 
gene might be adulterated if, for example, the deletion resulted in a reduction in the nutritional 
value of the food. This was the case in a tomato that was developed to aid mechanical harvest-
ing. The tomato had approximately fifteen percent less vitamin C than conventional tomatoes. 
See id. at 19. Whether a food product produced by gene deletion would be considered one with 
an "added substance" is open to debate. Because the process of gene deletion consists of re-
moving and then reinserting a gene from the original food or plant, however, one could argue 
that it is actually an added substance. 
320. 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1) (1982). 
321. FDA has promulgated standards of identity which set forth the composition of cer-
tain food products. For example, a product cannot be called milk if it does not contain a certain 
percentage of fat. 
322. See Gibbs & Kahan, supra note 184, at 15. 
323. Jd. 
324. ld. at 20. 
325. Jd. 
326. See Jones, Food Safety, supra note 187, at 353-54. 
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even if [also] reviewed by the NIH's RAC."827 According to one author, 
"[t]his may cause an overlap of jurisdiction between the FDA and the NIH, 
and a power struggle over which agency will regulate human gene ther-
apy."828 In most cases, however, the issue will probably depend on whether 
the reviewee is an industry or an NIH grantee. 
C. USDA Regulation Since 1986 
Until 1986 the USDA steadfastly maintained that its existing regulatory 
framework, combined with the NIH Guidelines, was "adequate and appro-
priate for regulating research, development, testing and evaluation, produc-
tion and application" of biotechnology products.829 This position evoked sig-
nificant criticism on the part of the public and Congress.880 In addition, the 
General Accounting Office issued a study which strongly criticized the 
USDA's regulatory system for biotechnology.881 As a result, in 1986 the 
USDA issued a policy statement detailing two new regulatory programs for 
bioengineered organisms. One program would regulate such organisms under 
the Plant Pest Act. The other would cover organisms used in research. 882 
Under the jurisdiction of the Plant Pest Act, the USDA proposed Regu-
lations on the Introduction of Organisms and Products Altered or Produced 
Through Genetic Engineering Which Are Plant Pests or Which There Is 
Reason to Believe are Plant Pests.888 The regulations, adopted in June 1987, 
allow APHIS to regulate an organism under the Act if there is reason to 
believe that it is a plant pest.884 The regulations thus significantly stretch 
the statutory "can injure" test. The USDA believes the "reason to believe" 
standard "is necessary to regulate genetically engineered organisms where 
the plant pest status is unknown because traits conferred by genetic engi-
neering may be new to the organism or to the environment into which it is 
released."88~ Industry and environmental group representatives have criti-
cized the new definition as overly broad. 886 According to one source, this 
327. Jaffe, Inadequacies in the Federal Regulation of Biotechnology, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 491, 518 (1987). 
328. Culliton, New Biotech Review Board Planned, 229 SCIENCE 736-37 (1985). 
329. See Statement of Policy for Regulations, Biotechnology Processes and Products, 49 
Fed. Reg. 50,898 (1984). 
330. See Fogleman, supra note 42, at 246. 
331. The study considered the USDA's regulatory procedures poorly coordinated and con-
fusing, particularly those concerning direct release experiments, and the agency's emphasis on 
biotechnology's benefits lacking in sensitivity to potential risks. The study noted that continu-
ing battles with the EPA over regulation were also a cause for concern. /d. 
332. Novick, supra note 3, at § 18.03[7][d). 
333. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,352 
(1986). 
334. See 52 Fed. Reg. 22,892 (1987). 
335. J. GIBBS, supra note 77, at 96. 
336. /d. 
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effort to regulate genetically engineered organisms under the Plant Pest Act 
"is a bold attempt to fashion a biotechnology regulatory program from the 
elements of a statute clearly intended for other purposes," and the expan-
sion of the definition of "plant pest" to include organisms that have not 
manifested themselves as plant pests is an interpretation that "severely 
strains the jurisdictional limits of the ... Act."337 
In order to strengthen its regulatory capability under the FPP A, 
APHIS also established the Biotechnology Environmental Coordination 
Staff (BECS). The BECS is intended to ensure that an environmental as-
sessment is prepared prior to the issuance of a plant pest permit for the 
deliberate release of a biotechnology derived plant pest. This effort has been 
criticized by the regulated community, which sees the requirement as dupli-
cative of the review of deliberate release experiments involving R-DNA con-
ducted historically by the ARRC and more recently by the Agricultural Bio-
technology Research Advisory Committee (ABRAC). 
Also in 1986 VSTA was amended by the Food Security Act338 to allow 
the USDA to regulate products which are shipped intrastate or imported, 
and to regulate the exportation of animal biologics.339 The 1986 policy state-
ment included a brief discussion about proposed regulations implementing 
the provisions of the amendments. As Gibbs pointed out, the amendments 
will have "significant implications for the field testing of new animal bio-
logics, since field testing often involves only intrastate shipment."3"° Fur-
thermore, Gibbs noted that the amendments would prevent manufacturers 
of animal biologics from avoiding the restrictions of VSTA by exporting 
their products for testing abroad. Theoretically, at least, manufacturers who 
attempted to conduct field tests of their domestically produced animal bio-
logics abroad would be subject to VSTA. 
In 1986 APHIS awarded the first license to produce and sell a geneti-
cally engineered vaccine to Biologics Corporation. The vaccine, called 
Omnivac, was to combat a pseudorabies virus. The review process under 
VSTA, however, was fraught with problems. Initially, APHIS did not clas-
sify the product as derived from R-DNA technology and reviewed the prod-
uct as if it were a conventionally derived vaccine. Subsequently, the vaccine 
was reclassified as recombinant and additional tests specific to R-DNA-de-
rived organisms were required. 3" 1 
The Omnivac case also raised the question of whether compliance with 
the NIH Guidelines would be a prerequisite to receipt of a license under 
VST A. Although APHIS did not require compliance with the Guidelines 
nor preparation of an EA or EIS prior to issuing the license, subsequent 
337. Novick, supra note 3, at § 18.03[7J[d]. 
338. 21 U.S.C. § 154a (Supp. IV 1986). 
339. J. GmBs, supra note 77, at 91. 
340. ld. 
341. ld. at 92. 
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criticisms led the agency to suspend the license while it prepared a formal 
EA. The major issue in the environmental review was whether the testing of 
the vaccine would result in a "release" into the environment. The agency 
concluded that it would not and found that its action in licensing the vac-
cine "would not have a significant impact on the environment."3u Shortly 
thereafter, APHIS lifted its suspension of the license and Biologics Corpora-
tion was permitted to proceed with the sale and marketing of Omnivac. 
D. The USDA Research Program 
The new regulatory program for research activities set forth in the 1986 
policy statement consisted of several components. These included the estab-
lishment of the Agriculture Biotechnology Research Advisory Committee 
(ABRAC) and of two new biotechnology offices: the Office of Agriculture 
Biotechnology (OAB) and the Committee on Biotechnology in Agriculture 
(CBA).343 
The ABRAC was modeled after NIH's RAC and was to take the place 
of the existing ARRC. As initially envisioned it was to oversee "research 
projects on genetically engineered agricultural organisms and the evaluation 
of the adequacy of draft environmental assessments for these research 
projects."3·u More recently, however, a charter for the ABRAC was drafted 
which significantly expanded the committee's tasks. In addition to its initial 
function, the committee will also be responsible for "recommending addi-
tions and alterations to research guidelines and protocols as necessary; pro-
viding advice to other federal and state agencies on agriculture related re-
search projects; and providing information to and maintaining cognizance of 
the Institutional Biosafety Committee to assure the availability of essential 
personnel to carry out oversight of agricultural related biotechnology 
functions. "346 
The OAB was established to "coordinate oversight over all facets of ag-
ricultural biotechnology" within the USDA,846 while the CBA was estab-
lished to serve as a link between the research and regulatory agencies within 
the USDA and to provide the agencies with advice on biotechnology issues 
and policy matters.347 The roles of the two offices vis-a-vis one another have 
342. ld. at 93. 
343. In-house biotechnology research is primarily conducted by the Agricultural Research 
Service (ARS) and grants for external biotechnology research are administered by the Coopera-
tive State Research Service (CSRS) and the Office of Grants and Program Systems. Each of 
these services reports to the Assistant Secretary for Science and Education, who is responsible 
"for coordination and oversight of all matters relating to research in biotechnology" within the 
USDA. J. GIBBS, supra note 77, at 81-82. 
344. ld. at 83. 
345. See ABRAC Charter, USDA Dept. Reg. 1042-87 (Mar. 29, 1988). 
346. J. GIBBS, supra note 77, at 83. 
347. ld. at 85. 
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not been clearly set forth in writing. According to one source, however, the 
CBA is a policy-making body, while the OAB is responsible for implement-
ing and coordinating the "policies established by the CBA and by agencies 
within the Department."348 
In addition to the establishment of these new offices in 1986, the USDA 
stated its intent to issue its own set of guidelines for biotechnology research 
involving agricultural products under the authority of the Food Security 
Act. 349 The guidelines are being modeled after NIH's Guidelines, but also 
include containment provisions for non-microscopic animals.3110 As initially 
envisioned, the scope of the guidelines was to be somewhat broader than 
those of NIH, extending to "agricultural research on plants, animals, and 
microorgansims, and provid[ing] guidance for laboratory research and field 
testing of organisms derived from recombinant DNA, specific molecular 
gene vectors, cell fusion, or other nonclassical genetic manipulation of orga-
nisms conducted at the cellular or molecular level."3111 A more recent version 
of the guidelines, however, limits their application to research outside the 
laboratory. Like the NIH Guidelines, the USDA guidelines will not be bind-
ing on private industry and will only apply to USDA in-house research and 
USDA-funded research.3112 
Thus far, the USDA's new regulatory programs have not functioned as 
well as the regulated community hoped that they would. For example, the 
OAB has been only partially successful in coordinating oversight of USDA 
biotechnology activities. Although the OAB has been able to oversee the re-
view of requests for research and deliberate release approvals, its ability to 
oversee requests for licenses, permits, or approvals for products falling 
under the jurisdiction of USDA agencies has been undermined by agencies 
such as APHIS that have established their own internal office for coordinat-
ing the regulation of biotechnology products. As a result, if a manufacturer 
seeks approval of both APHIS and ABRAC, a dual submission may be nee-
348. ld. 
349. The Food Security Act, 7 U.S.C. § 3121 (1988), amended the National Agricultural 
Research, Extension, and Teaching Policy Act and gave the Secretary of Agriculture the au-
thority to establish "appropriate controls with respect to the development and use of the appli-
cation of biotechnology to agriculture." I d. (emphasis added). This was the first and is the only 
federal statute to expressly mention biotechnology. The language of the statute would appear 
to give the agency broad authority to regulate biotechnology activities in the agricultural area 
and even to create a new regulatory structure. The agency, however, has not yet made full use 
of the significant regulatory potential of the statute. 
350. J. GIBBS, supra note 77, at 86. 
351. Id. 
352. In its 1986 policy statement, the USDA also proposed the establishment of the Na-
tional Biological Impact Assessment Program (NBIAP). Under the program the ABRAC will 
utilize scientists affiliated with state and federal agricultural research centers in its own review 
process. Where ABRAC review "is required by the USDA Guidelines, the ABRAC will request 
a scientific review from the NBIAP system before making its decision." ld. 
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essary, thus defeating the purpose of a coordinated review.863 
E. The OSHA Statement 
In a notice published in the April 12, 1985, Federal Register, OSHA 
(the agency) said that "it would consider promulgating specific regulations 
(aimed at protecting individuals who work in biotechnology research institu-
tions or manufacturing plants) in the event that new biotechnology 
processes presented a significant hazard that could not be accommodated 
under present standards."3 M At the time, however, the agency did not be-
lieve such regulations were necessary. In 1986 the agency reiterated its ear-
lier position that "no additional regulation of biotechnology workplaces is 
. . . needed because no hazards from biotechnology per se have been 
identified. "31111 
F. The NIH Statement 
In its 1986 policy statement, the NIH stated its intention to continue to 
revise and oversee its Guidelines "and to continue the NIH Recombinant 
DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) and the NIH Office of [R-DNA] Activities 
(ORDA)." In February 1987 the RAC adopted a proposal eliminating the 
NIH notification requirement for R-DNA experiments reviewed and ap-
proved by another federal agency. 3118 Because many deliberate release exper-
iments now require review either by the EPA or the USDA, the RAC cur-
rently reviews very few deliberate release proposals. Today, the RAC spends 
much of its time debating definitional issues, such as the meanings of "de-
liberate release" and "recombinant DNA," and making revisions to the 
Guidelines. In June 1988 the RAC considered proposed amendments to the 
Guidelines to cover certain transgenic animals that do not contain R-DNA 
and therefore were not covered under the Guidelines. 3117 The RAC is also 
devoting its time to the development of public information documents re-
garding human gene therapy. 
VII. BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE CouRTs 
While the federal agencies were formulating their policies regarding the 
regulation of biotechnology activities, the federal courts had several oppor-
tunities to comment upon and influence this policy development. Most of 
the judicial activity in this area has been under the rubric of NEPA. How-
353. See J. Gmas, supra note 77, at 84 for an expanded discusson of this problem. 
354. Isakoff, supra note 42, at 25. See also 50 Fed. Reg. 14,483 (1985). 
355. Agency Guidelines on Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,348 (1986) (emphasis added). 
356. See Recombinant DNA Research: Actions Under Guidelines, 51 Fed. Reg. 45,650-51 
(1986); Recombinant DNA Research: Actions Under Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. 31,848-50 (1987). 
357. Recombinant DNA Research: Proposed Action Under Guidelines, 53 Fed. Reg. 
12,752 (1988). 
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ever, a few other statutes have also been utilized to challenge federal agency 
action regarding biotechnology. In 1983 NEPA was used for the first time by 
the Foundation on Economic Trends, a public interest group headed by Jer-
emy Rifkin, to halt R-DNA field testing. The foundation sued the NIH for 
its failure to comply with NEPA when it amended its Guidelines in 1978 
and when it approved several deliberate release experiments.3118 Specifically, 
the foundation asserted that the NIH should have prepared: (1) an EIS 
when it modified its Guidelines in 1978 to allow the deliberate release of 
genetically altered organisms into the environment on a case-by-case ba-
sis;3119 (2) a "programmatic" EIS in 1982 "when NIH began to generally re-
view and approve deliberate release experiments";360 and (3) an EA or an 
EIS when it approved a deliberate release experiment involving the applica-
tion of genetically altered bacteria to a crop of potatoes to help make them 
frost resistant (the "ice minus" bacteria). 
In 1984 the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
preliminarily enjoined both experiments approved by the NIH and all fu-
ture deliberate release experimentation until a final judgment on the merits 
of the alleged NEPA violations could be reached.361 
On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit upheld the injunction against the ice minus experiment, "but 
vacated the injunction against future NIH approval of any other deliberate 
releases as overly broad."362 In upholding the injunction of the ice minus 
experiment, "the District of Columbia Circuit found the NIH's review of the 
possible environmental consequences of the experiment insufficient to sat-
isfy the requirements of NEPA"363 and severely criticized the NIH for "not 
having fully considered the environmental impact of possible dissemination 
of the ice-minus bacteria."364 
NEPA has continued to be used, primarily by the Foundation on Eco-
nomic Trends, as a vehicle to halt and delay biotechnology activities. In 
358. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
359. NIH had prepared an EA for the amendment but determined that the action would 
not pose a significant environmental impact and therefore preparation of an EIS was not 
necessary. 
360. Note, Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler: Genetic Engineering and 
NEPA's EIS Requirement, 2 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 138, 139 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Foundation 
on Economic Trends v. Heckler]. 
361. ld. at 144. 
362. Note, Rutabaga, supra note 15, at 1539. 
363. Id. 
364. See J. Gmss, supra note 77, at 142. As a result of the decision of the court of ap-
peals, the NIH prepared a very detailed EA for the ice-minus experiment. Although notice of 
the availability of the EA was published by the NIH in the Federal Register, only fifteen com-
ments were received, and only one comment, from the Foundation on Economic Trends, was 
negative. The NIH rejected the points made by the foundation and determined that the EA 
was adequate and that the preparation of an EIS was not necessary. Id. 
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spite of its success in Heckler, however, with the exception of a few cases,386 
the foundation has been unsuccessful in the other anti-biotechnology cases 
which it has brought. In Foundation on Economic Trends v. Block,888 the 
foundation brought suit against the USDA claiming that an EIS should have 
been prepared prior to the agency's use of R-DNA techniques to exchange 
genetic material between species in order to enhance animal productivity.387 
The court determined that the USDA's animal research activities did not 
constitute a "major federal action" under NEPA and therefore neither an 
EIS nor an EA was required. Furthermore, the court concluded that, be-
cause the animals in the experiments were contained in a locked and 
guarded barn, there could be no significant environmental impact.388 
The foundation also filed suit against the USDA, claiming that its ap-
proval of the Omnivac pseudorabies vaccine had violated the Virus-Serum-
Toxin Act (VSTA) and NEPA.389 The district court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the USDA. With respect to the NEP A claim, the court 
upheld the USDA review of the environmental issues and deferred to the 
agency's expertise. Specifically, the opinion states that "the Court is not in 
the same position as the agency in its review of the scientific data submit-
ted, and cannot replace the agency's judgment with its own."370 With re-
spect to the VST A claim, the court also found for the defendants holding 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the issuance of the license 
under VSTA. 
365. See, e.g., Foundation on Economic Trends v. Weinberger, 610 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 
1985). In Weinberger the foundation alleged that the Department of Defense intended to util-
ize a new facility in Dugway, Utah, to conduct R-DNA research related to biological warfare, 
and that an EIS was therefore needed. The Army denied that any work with pathogens was 
planned. Although the court ruled that "mere contemplation" of a future action did not trigger 
NEPA's requirements, the court found that NEPA had been violated for another reason: the 
EA that had been prepared was totally inadequate. See J. GIBBS, supra note 77, at 143. The 
court prohibited any further construction of the facility until an adequate EA had been com-
pleted. Subsequently, the Army "made a policy decision to prepare an EIS." ld. See also Foun-
dation on Economic Trends v. Weinberger, No. 86-2436 (D.D.C., stipulation of dismissal filed 
1987). In this case the plaintiff alleged that the Biological Defense Research Program of the 
Department of Defense was in violation of NEPA for failure to prepare an EIS. Prior to u court 
decision, the suit was settled. The Department of Defense agreed both to prepare an EIS and to 
conduct all activities under the program in compliance with the NIH Guidelines. J. GIBBS, 
supra note 77, at 144. 
366. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Block, No. 84-3045, slip op. (D.D.C. April 29, 
1986) (Memorandum Opinion). 
367. The experiments involved the insertion of human growth hormone in pigs to make 
them larger and leaner. On similar grounds the foundation petitioned the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration to prepare an EIS before approving bovine growth hormone, an R-DNA derived 
animal drug which increases animal size and productivity. The FDA rejected the petition. See 
J. GIBBS, supra note 77, at 144. 
368. Id. at 88. 
369. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 680 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1988). 
370. Id. at 16. 
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The foundation was also unsuccessful in Foundation on Economic 
Trends v. Johnson.871 In that case the foundation brought suit alleging, first, 
that the definitions and exemptions proposed by the BSCC in the 1986 coor-
dinated framework were "procedurally deficient because they appeared for 
the first time in the final framework and thus lacked notice and com-
ment,"872 and second, that "the environmental risk posed by the Framework 
was so substantial that an environmental impact statement was required 
prior to its implementation."878 In December 1986 the federal district court 
dismissed the case for lack of a case or controversy and on the grounds that 
the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had no more than a " 'hypotheti-
cal interest' in the outcome of the litigation."374 According to Gibbs, 
this decision may hamper lawsuits under NEPA resting on highly specu-
lative allegations that agency action involving a specific biotechnology-
derived product may cause environmental harm. Disagreement with the 
government's policy will not be enough. Future complaints will need to 
allege a more concrete causal link between the government's conduct and 
the asserted injury.375 
In spite of these more recent decisions, Heckler made it clear to federal 
agencies that NEPA is not a statute to be ignored in preparing biotechnol-
ogy regulations or approving biotechnology experiments. 876 
At least one author has questioned the appropriateness of applying 
NEPA toR-DNA research. According to Fogleman, NEPA was enacted to 
ensure full decision-making on the impact of technology on the environ-
ment, not on the conduct of scientific research.877 She argues that at the 
scientific experimentation stage, "there are no guarantees that an approved 
experiment will even succeed, much less that it will evolve into a new tech-
nology that significantly affects the environment."876 The court in Heckler 
disagreed with Fogleman's view, but just how far the courts will go in apply-
ing NEP A to scientific research remains to be seen. 
371. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Johnson, 661 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C. 1986). 
372. Novick, supra note 3, at § 18.03[7][a]. 
373. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Johnson, 661 F. Supp. at 108. 
374. J. GIBBS, supra note 77, at 144. 
375. ld. at 145. The suit, however, has not hampered the foundation's litigiousness. In 
December 1987 the foundation sued the NIH claiming that it violated NEP A by funding cer-
tain AIDS and cancer research projects. The case is still pending. Foundation on Economic 
Trends v. Bowen, No. 87-3393, slip op. (D.D.C. Dec. 28, 1987). 
376. For a more detailed discussion of the Heckler case and application of NEPA to R-
DNA research see McChesney & Adler, supra note 42, at 10371-73; Note, Foundation on Eco-
nomic Trends v. Heckler, supra note 360, at 139; Comment, Regulating the Environmental 
Release of Genetically Engineered Organisms: Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 12 
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 891 (1985); Korwek & de la Cruz, supra note 42, at 316-28. 
377. Gibbs also points out that there has been a "long-held belief by those in the research 
community that basic research is exempt from NEPA requirements." J. GIBBS, supra note 77, 
at 87. 
378. Fogleman, supra note 42,· at 218-19. 
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The foundation has also filed suit under FIFRA. In May of 1986 the 
foundation petitioned the EPA, seeking to force the agency to promulgate 
regulations under FIFRA establishing "minimum financial responsibility 
standards" for applicants for experimental use permits for microbial pesti-
cides. The foundation stated that the risks posed by the release of geneti-
cally engineered pesticides "although still unquantified, are of potentially 
devastating proportions" and that financial responsibility standards are nec-
essary because the EPA "currently does not have an adequate program for 
assessing, controlling, and assuring remedial actions and accountability for 
the environmental risks presented by the deUberate releases of recombinant 
organisms. "879 The EPA denied the petition on the grounds that it did not 
have the authority to issue such a regulation. The foundation then brought 
suit against the EPA, challenging its denial and seeking a court order re-
quiring the agency to promulgate financial responsibility standards.880 The 
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia denied the request for 
the order on the grounds that the foundation did not have standing to bring 
the suit. The merits of the issue were not addressed. 
VIII. REGULATION AT THE STATE AND LOCAL LEVEL 
The early vacuum in biotechnology regulation, and continued concerns 
about gaps in the federal regulatory system, have caused several state and 
local governments to enact ordinances and statutes regulating biotechnology 
research and commercialization within their borders. Between 1977 and 
1982 approximately one dozen local governments passed such laws. One of 
the first localities to act was Cambridge, Massachusetts. In the summer of 
1976, the Cambridge City Council imposed a three-week moratorium on all 
R-DNA research and began to draft an ordinance to regulate all DNA ex-
perimentation in the city.881 The moratorium was targeted at research being 
conducted at Harvard and MIT.882 
In February 1977, the city council passed the ordinance making the 
NIH Guidelines for government-sponsored research applicable to any 
projects conducted in the city.888 The ordinance also imposed additional 
safety requirements and banned deliberate releases of genetically altered or-
ganisms as well as "BL4" experiments, "those involving dangerous or conta-
gious organisms. "884 
Following the example of Cambridge, a number of other localities 
passed ordinances regulating R-DNA research: Princeton, New Jersey; Am-
379. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Thomas, 661 F. Supp. 713, 715 (D.D.C. 1986). 
380. ld. at 714. 
381. Rosenblatt, The Regulation of Recombinant DNA Research: The Alternative of Lo-
cal Control, 10 ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 37, 67 (1982). 
382. ld. Harvard was planning to build a P3 lab for R-DNA experiments. 
383. Huber, Biotechnology and the Regulation Hydra, TEcH. REv. 1957 (Nov.-Dec. 1987). 
384. Id. 
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herst, Massachusetts; Waltham, Massachusetts; Berkeley, California; Em-
eryville, California; and Newton, Somerville, and Boston, Massachusetts.8811 
For the most part these ordinances adopted the NIH Guidelines with a few 
modifications. Often, a license or permit was required to conduct R-DNA 
research. The ordinance adopted by Waltham, Massachusetts, was unique in 
that it was the only ordinance to restrict the use of R-DNA for other than 
biosafety reasons.888 In addition to requiring adherence to the NIH Guide-
lines, the Waltham ordinance prohibited the use of humans as experimental 
subjects. According to Krimsky, the ban "resulted from concern of one 
member of the [city] Council that the cloning of people might be considered 
in the future."387 
During the late 1970s two states-New York and Maryland-also en-
acted legislation regulating biotechnology. Both statutes made compliance 
with the NIH Guidelines mandatory for all research, public and private, 
conducted within the state. The Maryland statute was enacted in 1977 with 
a five-year sunset clause. Thus, the statute expired in 1982. No subsequent 
legislation has been enacted. 
Between 1982 and 1985 there was little activity on the local level re-
garding R-DNA regulation.388 With the move of R-DNA research from the 
laboratory to the field, however, communities targeted for deliberate re-
leases took action to delay or prohibit the field tests. For example, in 1985 
county officials in Monterey, California blocked experiments by Advanced 
Genetic Sciences to test its frost-suppressant bacteria,889 and in June 1986 
the Board of Supervisors of Modoc County, California, passed a resolution 
requesting that the University of California and Dr. Steven Lindow delay 
their research with ice minus bacteria in Tule Lake, California. 390 Also in 
1986 city officials in St. Charles, Missouri, passed a resolution opposing ef-
forts by Monsanto Corporation to test a microbial pesticide in a neighboring 
county.391 More recently, two townships in New Jersey passed ordinances 
placing strict regulations on any outdoor testing of genetically engineered 
385. See S. KRIMSKY, A. BAECK & J. BOLDUC, MUNICIPAL AND STATE RECOMBINANT DNA 
LAws: HISTORY AND AssEssMENT (1982). 
386. I d. at 26. 
387. /d. 
388. One exception was the passage by the California legislature of a resolution "to pro-
mote the biotechnology industry, while at the same time protecting public health and safety 
and the environment." Assembly Concurrent Res. 170. In response to the resolution a special 
interagency task force was established to evaluate the adequacy of federal and state regulation 
and to coordinate the development of state policies in this area. See J. GIBBS, supra note 77, at 
169. In 1982 the California legislature passed the California R-DNA Safety Act, requiring that 
any research conducted under the auspices of a California state agency comply with the NIH 
Guidelines. The bill never became law, however, as it was vetoed by the governor. 
389. Huber, supra note 383, at 60. 
390. See J. GIBBS, supra note 77, at 161. The Modoc County resolution was not legally 
binding, however, as the local government did not have jurisdiction over the research site. 
391. /d. at 162. 
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organisms within their boundaries.391 
New Jersey is one of a handful of states that has considered legislation 
aimed at deliberate releases. Specifically, New Jersey has debated the estab-
lishment of a commission on the release of genetically engineered microorga-
nisms which would monitor compliance with federal regulations and review 
the adequacy of existing state law.893 A bill that would create such a com-
mission passed the New Jersey Senate in 1986, but did not reach the floor of 
the State Assembly.384 The Texas legislature has considered legislation simi-
lar to that proposed in New Jersey but has not taken any action on it. Cali-
fornia has also considered a number of bills on this topic, but so far "the 
state legislature and a special task force have concluded that the existing 
matrix of environmental regulation suffices."386 
The Wisconsin legislature recently passed a bill that requires companies 
and university researchers to notify a state agency of their plans for any 
deliberate release experiments and to submit to the state copies of all docu-
ments submitted to federal government agencies relating to the release. The 
bill was motivated by the release by Biotechnica International in Pepin 
County, Wisconsin, of three different genetically engineered varieties of Rhi-
zobium meliloti, a bacterium intended to improve nitrogen fixation in 
alfalfa. 
IX. THE REGULATORY BALANCE 
As a recent GAO report pointed out, government regulators appear to 
be following a "step-by-step" approach to the regulation of biotechnology. 
These steps have paralleled the progression of the technology as it has 
moved from the laboratory to the field for testing. At each step regulators 
have started out with a cautious approach and fairly stringent standards. 
Then, as experience is gained, the rules are relaxed. 
The first step in the regulation of biotechnology consisted of rules gov-
erning laboratory experimentation-the NIH Guidelines. Initially, these 
Guidelines called for very stringent review and containment procedures to 
be applied to work with R-DNA organisms in the laboratory. They prohib-
ited any sort of deliberate release experiments. Not until the RAC was con-
392. The New Jersey ordinances, passed by Estelle Manor and Shamong Townships, are 
virtually identical, and require any firm that wishes to conduct a deliberate release experiment 
within the towns to carry $5 million in liability insurance, prove the organism's safety to the 
town council, hold a public hearing, post a bond, obtain a permit, and agree to suspend any 
experiment if the township deems it unsafe. See Gladwell, Towns Restricting Tests of Altered 
Organisms, The Washington Post, Mar. 20, 1988, at H5, col. 1. The ordinances were not a 
response to any particular deliberate release proposal, but rather a response to a model town 
ordinance distributed by State Senator John Dorsey, who is also attempting to push a bill 
through the New Jersey legislature regulating deliberate releases on a state level. /d. 
393. J. GIBBS, supra note 77, at 170. 
394. See id. 
395. ld. at 169. See discussion of California legislative activity, supra note 388. 
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vinced that laboratory experiments with these organisms did not pose a risk 
to workers or the general public were the Guidelines relaxed. As more expe-
rience was gained, the Guidelines reduced the review requirements and per-
mitted deliberate release experiments on a case-by-case basis. Similarly, at 
the local level a number of ordinances restricting R-ONA research were 
passed at the early stages of the technology's development. This was fol-
lowed by a peri'od of inactivity as more experience was gained with R-ONA 
in the laboratory and no significant adverse consequences came to light. 
Recently we have moved to the second step of the regulation of biotech-
nology. In the environmental and agricultural area, this second step consists 
of regulations governing small-scale deliberate release experiments. In this 
phase regulators started out cautiously, requiring significantly more data 
when reviewing these products than when reviewing other conventionally 
produced products and taking a case-by-case approach, rather than a cate-
gorical approach, to their review. Thus, data requirements and controls have 
been individually determined based on the potential risks of the activity. 
Similarly, communities have become active again in attempting to regulate 
or prevent deliberate release experiments in their back yards. 
In the food and drug area, biotechnology has also moved out of the lab-
oratory and into clinical trials and marketing. Additionally, clinical trials 
have moved from using microorganisms to using animals for the production 
of new drugs and foods. In this area the FDA and the USDA have also taken 
a cautious case-by-case approach to reviewing and regulating biotechnology-
derived products. 
More recently, however, the agencies have begun to relax their stringent 
standards ever so slightly. The USDA and the EPA, for example, have 
moved toward a modified categorical approach to regulating deliberate re-
lease experiments, setting levels of review on the basis of the biological fea-
tures of the source organisms from which the genetically engineered orga-
nisms were made. The move, however, has been both applauded and 
criticized. Scientists and industry representatives have been highly critical 
of the government's case-by-case regulatory approach, arguing that it is 
overly burdensome and that it requires too much unnecessary information, 
especially in light of the benefits of the technology. The result, it is argued, 
may be "higher costs to the manufacturer and delays in bringing products to 
market."398 
396. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 37. As evidence of what some would describe as a 
ridiculously overcautious approach to the regulation of the release of a genetically engineered 
organism, Baskin cites the experience of Steven Lindow, one of the first researchers to seek 
approval for the release of a genetically engineered microorganism, who planned to spray po-
tato plants with "ice minus" bacteria to make them resistant to frost. Lindow's proposals for a 
field study were subject to detailed and repetitive scrutiny over the course of five years. In 
addition, he endured two federal court suits and was required to prepare at least 1,300 pages of 
formal paperwork. "This included his original 98-page proposal to the National Institutes of 
Health Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee; an SO-page revision; a 67-page federal Envi-
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Scientists point to the trouble-free results of the few small-scale tests 
that have been done to date as further evidence that the regulatory agencies 
are being overly cautious. At the First International Conference on the Re-
lease of Genetically Engineered Microorganisms held in Cardiff, Wales, in 
April 1988, there appeared to be a consensus that it is now reasonable to 
relax the stringency of the regulatory review process for deliberate release 
experiments. Edward Adelberg, a geneticist (from Yale University) who at-
tended the meeting, provided evidence of the trend in scientific thinking on 
the subject: 
At some point we must rely on scientific principles to tell us whether we 
have enough data. Then, if the experiments suggest that most genetically 
engineered microorganisms won't compete [with native microbes] or 
won't do harm, the burden of proof is on the opponents of deliberate 
release to produce plausible scenarios of harm.887 
According to Adelberg, "very few scenarios for harm are now plausible; 
hence, there should be a 'presumption of safety rather than of harm.' "398 
In spite of this view, there are those who think that the regulatory pro-
gram is not stringent enough and that at the very least it should not be 
relaxed. The recent GAO report on biotechnology reflects this view. The re-
port concludes that the federal agencies should continue to pursue the 
"case-by-case" approach to regulating genetically engineered organisms that 
are intended for release, given our limited experience in the area. The report 
characterizes the approach as a preventive one which requires that permis-
sion be sought before field tests are conducted instead of allowing tests and 
dealing with the problems after the fact. 399 
The report was severely criticized by the Department of Health and 
Human Services for its "unsupportable conclusions and recommendations," 
but it was praised by the USDA for being "ambitious and comprehen-
sive. "400 These comments reveal the different perspectives of the agencies 
themselves with regard to the risks and regulation of genetically engineered 
organisms. 
ronmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact; a 312-page Environmental Use 
Permit (EUP) application to the Environmental Protection Agency; and a three volume, 725-
page California Environmental Impact Report." Baskin, Genetically Engineered Microbes: The 
Nation Is Not Ready, 76 AMERICAN SciENTIST 338 (1988). Furthermore, in order to obtain the 
EUP from the EPA, Lindow was required "to test ice-minus for pathogenicity on 75 species of 
plants, from buttercup to pigweed, in the greenhouse. He also had to test 67 species of plant to 
determine the range of possible hosts and run an extensive battery of 'product identity' tests to 
define the characteristics of his microbes." Id. at 338-39. 
397. Fox, supra note 25, at 536. 
398. ld. 
399. GAO REPORT, supra note 5. The report specifically recommends that the EPA and 
the USDA discontinue their current policies subjecting certain genetically engineered organisiDS 
to no or little scrutiny. 
400. ld. at 91, 97. 
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In all likelihood, regulators will continue to relax the regulations regard-
ing the small-scale deliberate release of R-DNA organisms as more informa-
tion is gained. However, as biotechnology moves into new phases-i.e., 
large-scale field testing and application of R-DNA technology to higher 
animal life and humans-a new round of more stringent regulations can be 
anticipated. Because the stakes are higher and the potential harms greater, 
it may take a longer time for regulators to relax the relevant regulations. 
In light of the controversy over the risks of biotechnology, it appears 
that the regulatory agencies have achieved the correct balance in regulating 
biotechnology research and product development. Although scientists resent 
the numerous and seemingly unnecessary data requests piled on them by 
the regulatory agencies, given the relative lack of experience in the area and 
the lack of data regarding the risks of the technology, it makes sense for the 
agencies to proceed slowly.401 Existing regulations generally provide ade-
quate· coverage of health and safety risks, and newly enacted or proposed 
regulations are filling in the few gaps that do exist by allowing the agencies 
to gather the data necessary to assess the risks of the technology prior to 
proceeding to the next phase of experimentation. 
Thus, the major problems with the regulatory process do not appear to 
lie with its ability to protect society from the current health, safety, or envi-
ronmental risks of the technology. Rather, the problems include the confu-
sion, duplication, and jurisdictional overlaps inherent in the system, the lack 
of focus on future uses and future regulatory needs, and the inattention to 
the social risks of the technology. 
A 1987 article argues that the "gravest regulatory threat to the develop-
ment of biotechnology lies not in the stringency of regulation, but in its pon-
derous disorder."402 The article provides several examples of jurisdictional 
disputes and regulatory overlap that add to the delays in product and re-
search approval: 
Genentech reportedly encountered needless delays and expenses while 
USDA and FDA argued for more than a year over which agency should 
regulate the company's new bovine interferon. The agencies were unable 
to decide whether the product was a "veterinary biologic" under USDA's 
jurisdiction or a "new animal drug" under FDA's control. 
Advanced Genetic Systems complied with all of NIH's testing re-
quirements in order to inject a genetically engineered bacterium that 
would reduce the risk of frost into the bark of fruit trees . . . in Oakland, 
California only to find that EPA approval was required instead. 
After two years of review and field tests, USDA's Animal and Plant 
401. According to the recent Harris poll on public perceptions of biotechnology, "more 
than three-fourths of the public (77 percent) say they agree with the statement that 'the poten-
tial danger from genetically altered cells and microbes is so great that strict regulations are 
necessary.'" OTA, REPORT ON PuBLIC PERCEPTIONS, supra note 31, at 81. 
402. Huber, supra note 383. 
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Health Inspection Service licensed Biologic Corp's pseudorabies swine 
vaccine for commercial use. Because the vaccine was not reviewed 
through the department's Recombinant Advisory Committee, however, 
its license was withdrawn and it required additional testing.403 
543 
Many of the jurisdictional differences can be attributed to the fact that 
the regulatory scheme relies on statutes that were enacted prior to the ad-
vent of recombinant DNA technology. Thus, none of the statutes were ini-
tially designed to address biotechnology. Moreover, the agencies that en-
force these statutes have different missions and goals, which sometimes 
conflict. Furthermore, although each agency attempts to reduce risk, each 
has a different approach to risk assessment and risk management. Finally, 
agency inexperience in dealing with this new technology has caused delays 
in regulatory review. 404 
A second problem with the current regulatory system is its failure to 
anticipate future uses of biotechnology products and the need for corre-
sponding new regulations. For example, researchers are now experimenting 
with using genetically engineered microbes to clean up toxic chemical spills. 
These microbes may create their own hazardous byproducts, yet the EPA 
has yet to consider policies or regulations to address this possibility. Trans-
genic animals are now being developed for purposes of drug and food pro-
duction. These animals are currently being regulated under existing statutes 
focused on animal drugs and food products. Soon, however, scientists and 
industries may create transgenic animals that are not food producing-e.g., 
pets, sport animals, and animals that produce hides, furs, or wool. Although 
these animals may be regulated by the FDA under the animal drug regula-
tions,400 the use of the drug regulations for this purpose is questionable. We 
may need additional regulations under FDCA, or we may need to use other 
statutes such as the Consumer Product Safety Act, to regulate the use of 
these transgenic animals. "08 
The third major shortcoming of the existing regulatory structure is its 
inattention to the perceived social risks of the technology. This is the area 
that is least adequately addressed. Yet, at the same time it is the area where 
the risks are perhaps of most concern to the general population. Although 
virtually every new technology imposes social risks-i.e., has an effect on 
our social fabric and the way we live-biotechnology is unique in its ability 
to change our lives so directly, to modify animals, plants, and human beings 
403. Id. 
404. See von Oehsen, Regulating Genetic Engineering in an Era of Increased Judicial 
Deference: A Proper Balance of the Federal Powers, 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 303 (1988), for further 
discussion of these problems. 
405. The definition of drug includes "articles (other than food) intended to affect the 
structure or any function of the body of man or other animals." 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (1982). 
406. Although the Consumer Product Safety Commission has interpreted the Act so that 
it does not apply to animals, this interpretation could be revised. 
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in ways that may be highly beneficial but at the same time pose troubling 
questions. 
One of the most significant concerns in the social risk area concerns the 
ability of biotechnology to greatly expedite the evolutionary process and 
change its course. Historically species have evolved slowly, by a process of 
adaptation, in response to changes in the environment. Soon, we may be 
able to create plants and animals that can survive in extreme climates such 
as the desert or Antarctica. We also may be able to create animals that can 
survive in polluted waters and lands. Certainly there would be benefits to 
such adaptability, but on the other hand, this type of adaptive capability 
raises concerns. For example, it may lead to devoting resources to the crea-
tion of new species rather than to the clean up of the environment. How 
should we evaluate or think about this possibility? Is there a role for the 
legal or regulatory system here? 
A second concern voiced by at least one author is the modification of 
animals in ways that may be harmful or cruel to them.407 The author poses 
as an example the creation of a chicken that is an extremely efficient egg 
layer. Although this is not a bad outcome in and of itself, the genes that 
allow this result also produce a chicken that is legless, featherless, and wing-
less.408 Is such a result justifiable? 
The author suggests that, if we are worried about cruelty to animals, we 
simply create species with less brain function so that they will not be able to 
suffer or feel pain. 409 Is this the answer? The issue of creating animals with 
less brain function or of lesser intelligence is at least as socially troubling as 
the creation of animals with greater intelligence. Such a possibility elicits 
numerous fears. 
An additional problem that we may have to confront in this area is the 
creation of animals that are closer and closer to humans in terms of intelli-
gence and functional ability. How will we determine who is human and who 
is not?410 Moreover, how should we deal with parents who want to use "gene 
therapy" or genetic engineering to create their ideal child? Reproduction 
407. Tomorrow's Animals, THE EcoNOMIST 11 (Aug. 15, 1987). 
408. The example is not far from reality. Scientists at the USDA have created a pig that 
will produce leaner meat. These pigs, however, develop arthritis at a very young age and are 
listless and inactive. See OFFICE OF TEcHNOLOGY AssESSMENT, FEDERAL REGULATION AND ANIMAL 
PATENTS STAFF PAPER, at 6 (Feb. 1988). 
409. Alternatively, we could create animals or entities with no brain function at all. An 
example might be Jive tissue cultures from which we could continuously cut off steaks. Such an 
organism would be an extremely efficient food producer and would resolve the concern regard-
ing cruelty to animals. 
410. This issue may initially require resolution in the patent area where the patenting of 
higher animal forms has begun. The patent office has stated that "claims directed to or includ-
ing within [their] scope a human being will not be considered to be patentable subject matter 
under [the patent law]" as "[t]he grant of a limited, but exclusive, property right in a human 
being is prohibited by the Constitution." The Patent Office has not defined what constitutes a 
human being, however. 
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and childrearing has been one of the few areas that has been protected by 
the constitutional right of privacy. But would this right protect the decision 
to engineer the type of child one will have? Even if the decision is protected, 
is there a legitimate state interest in preserving the gene pool that outweighs 
this right? One can imagine scenarios that would seriously threaten the exis-
tence of the human race. These might include the creation of a significant 
majority of female children as opposed to males (or vice versa), or the crea-
tion of intelligent, attractive children that are vulnerable to certain diseases 
or viruses. 
Finally, the availability of this new technology will inevitably involve 
questions of accessibility. Who will have access to these special genes and at 
what cost? Will these be public goods or private ones? If private, will we 
exacerbate the rift between the haves and have nots by allowing those who 
can pay to have the most attractive and intelligent children at birth? If pub-
lic, how will these genes be allocated? 
X. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
In order to address the problem of regulatory confusion, overlap, dupli-
cation, and delays there is a need for a mechanism and a body that has the 
authority to resolve disputes between existing agencies and has the mandate 
to anticipate new problems. It was the goal of the OSTP to meet this need 
via the Coordinated Framework and the BSCC. Neither, however, has thus 
far been successful at achieving this objective, nor are they likely to be. 
The Coordinated Framework attempted to address the issue of overlap-
ping jurisdiction by establishing a "lead agency" when two or more agencies 
have the task of regulating a single product and by establishing a "consoli-
dated or coordinated review." Although in theory the coordinated review 
could work well, the Framework includes "no description of how the coordi-
nation will occur or how two independent agencies using different statutes 
could have an integrated review."411 This shortcoming could easily be over-
come by setting forth in detail protocols for coordinated review. However, 
the assignment of this task to the BSCC would be unwise for a number of 
reasons. 
The BSCC has been fraught with problems since its inception. As ini-
tially envisioned, the BSCC was only to exist for two years-its charter in-
cluded a "sunset" provision that automatically disbanded the organization 
in October 1987, unless the White House chose to extend its life.412 During 
its early years, the BSCC's activities were shrouded by a Justice Department 
investigation of its director for an alleged conflict of interest, and much of 
411. J. GIBBS, supra note 77, at 130. 
412. See Crawford, Wyngaarden to Chair Biotech Council, 238 SciENCE 1504, 1505 (Dec. 
11, 1987). 
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its work was not completed;us 
In the summer of 1987, the White House elected to extend the life of 
the BSCC, but there was controversy within the White House about 
whether the composition and duties of the committee should be expanded to 
include policy issues.u• Ultimately, the White House decided not to expand 
the committee's responsibilities, but instead established the Life Sciences 
Committee (LSC) to handle interagency policy issues.4111 
It is unlikely that either the LSC or the BSCC will be able to ade-
quately address the complaints of duplication and confusion that have been 
hurled at the biotechnology regulatory system. Neither the BSCC nor the 
LSC has the power to take away the authority of a regulatory agency to 
review an application for a license, permit, or other approval. 
Furthermore, the composition of the BSCC is fatally flawed if the com-
mittee is to handle interagency conflicts. An organization composed totally 
of representatives from numerous agencies, each with its own mission and 
its own piece of the regulatory pie, with no one having a clear leadership 
role, is not likely to reach agreement on important issues. Even if it could 
reach a consensus, the fact that the committee cannot make binding deci-
sions (only recommendations which can too easily be ignored) further limits 
its effectiveness.u6 
This problem could be addressed by legislation that gives the BSCC the 
authority to promulgate regulations that would be binding on the relevant 
agencies, or alternatively, by the creation of a new body, headed by someone 
413. During its lifetime the BSCC has devoted its attention to the following activities: 
developing definitions of terms common to the agencies regulating biotechnology, evaluating 
risk assessment methods used by the agencies that review biotechnology products, developing 
standards for greenhouse containment, and reviewing proposed regulations and guidelines put 
forth by the regulatory agencies. The committee has also established two task forces-one to 
develop a position paper on the scientific basis for submitting a paper description of patented 
items as an alternative to the deposit requirement under the United States patent laws and the 
other to review the adequacy of current regulations to address newly developed genetically en-
gineered animals. Telephone interview with Janet Dorrigan, BSCC staff, in Washington, D.C. 
(July 7, 1988). 
414. Crawford, supra note 412, at 1505. 
415. The LSC will include most cabinet departments and key independent agen-
cies-EPA, NASA, and NSF- as well as the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of 
Policy Development, the Council of Economic Advisors, the Council on Environmental Quality, 
and the Office of the United States Trade Representative. The LSC will be responsible for "all 
science and policy development issues related to life science." Fox, OSTP Sets New Biology 
Panel: BSCC Reprieved, 6 BID/TECHNOLOGY 19 (Jan. 1988). 
416. An example of the BSCC's inability to resolve differences among the different agen-
cies involved in the regulation of biotechnology is its abandonment of its effort to define such 
terms as "deliberate release" and "containment." After several months of attempting to de-
velop general definitions of these terms that would apply to all of the relevant regulatory agen-
cies, the committee abandoned the effort when it was unable to produce a consensus among the 
agencies involved. Thus, it continues to be possible that different agencies may have different 
definitions of key regulatory terms. 
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who does not represent another agency, with authority to resolve agency dis-
putes and select a "lead" agency when two or more agencies have authority 
to regulate an area of research or a new product. The new body need not 
have licensing and permitting authority, but must have clear authority to 
make binding decisions when interagency conflict arises. Regulatees w~uld 
have access to the conflict resolution agency only when two agencies dis-
agreed as to the appropriate regulatory requirements with which the regu-
latee had to comply. Such a body should also have as its charge the task of 
identifying areas where new regulations or legislation may be necessary and 
appointing the correct agency to begin working on those regulations or begin 
drafting legislation to be submitted to Congress. 
Second, if biotechnology is an area that the government wants to pro-
mote, it could develop a separate agency with the sole purpose of assisting 
biotechnology researchers and product developers in obtaining the approvals 
and licenses necessary to proceed with their work. Such an assistance func-
tion could expedite the regulatory review process. By pointing researchers 
and developers to the correct doors, assisting them in the application pro-
cess, and foreseeing potential jurisdictional conflicts, such an agency could 
serve an invaluable function. The service could be financed by fees from the 
researchers or companies, similar to the fees which are charged for process-
ing licensing applications. 
Both types of agencies would greatly contribute to reducing the confu-
sion and delays that now characterize the regulatory system without creat-
ing another level of approvals. 
The third major issue we must confront in developing a sound and sup-
portable regulatory policy regarding biotechnology is the perceived social 
risks associated with the technology. Public perceptions of these risks will 
continue to delay developments in this area and continue to push regulators 
to impose stringent controls, perhaps more stringent than necessary, on the 
technology. 
Although in general our regulatory system is not suited to dealing with 
highly controversial moral and ethical issues such as those associated with 
biotechnology, there are non-regulatory mechanisms the government can 
utilize to assist in improving the quality of the debate on these risks and in 
developing a greater consensus regarding them. The first and most impor-
tant of these mechanisms is education. As Maxine Singer, a molecular biolo-
gist, pointed out in a recent speech entitled "Public Perception of Genetics," 
there is considerable distance between scientists' views of biotechnology and 
public perceptions: 
The disparity is troubling because the public is ultimately [the scien-
tists'] source of support, both financial and intellectual. It is not only 
public money that is required to advance science. In our democratic soci-
ety, it is also a common view of what is worth knowing and what are the 
HeinOnline -- 38 Drake L. Rev. 548 1988-1989
548 Drake Law Review [Vol. 38 
relative social costs of knowing it .... 417 
Furthermore, "the general scientific ignorance of even our most highly edu-
cated citizens" and the "deep anti-intellectual strain in our population 
makes informed discussion about biotechnology extremely difficult."418 Gov-
ernment can begin to combat this ignorance by developing or funding pro-
grams to educate citizens about biotechnology and its enormous potential 
benefits. These programs might consist of television documentaries, 
brochures and books that explain the technology in lay terms, museum ex-
hibits, school programs for children, and adult education courses. 
A second mechanism that government could utilize to improve the de-
bate regarding the social risks of biotechnology would be to require the 
preparation of social impact reports (SIRs) by regulatory agencies that ap-
prove various biotechnology activities. These SIRs would be developed by 
the regulatory agencies, not the researchers or biotechnology companies. 
They would be generic in nature-i.e., prepared for a certain class of activi-
ties rather than for each license granted-and would specify the potential 
social risks of a given activity. The public would be notified of the availabil-
ity of these SIRs and have an opportunity to comment on them.419 The 
preparation of these generic SIRs would not delay the issuance of any ap-
provals or licenses but would require the agencies to consider the social, eth-
ical, and moral issues that might arise as a result of their approval of a 
certain type of research or product. 
A third recommendation for dealing with the perceived social risks of 
biotechnology is the creation of an overarching non-regulatory body that is 
provided funding to assess the potential social and ethical issues associated 
with new developments in biotechnology. The body would be composed of 
paid staff with expertise in the areas of economics, anthropology, psychol-
ogy, law, philosophy, sociology, religion, ecology, and microbiology. The task 
of the body would be to solicit public opinion on the social and ethical issues 
that will arise as we begin to utilize biotechnology more fully, to prepare 
reports setting forth the risks and the benefits of the new technology, to 
solicit public comment on the reports, and to recommend the drafting of 
new regulations or legislation necessary to address the social risks of the 
technology. The advantages of such a body would be its outreach to the 
public and its broad focus: it would not have the narrow focus of existing 
regulatory bodies. 
The idea is not a new one. In 1985 Congress created a Biomedical Eth-
ics Board to advise it on ethical issues in the delivery of health care and 
417. Biology Frontiers Pose Ethics Questions, News Report (1988) at 20. 
418. ld. 
419. Such SIRs are not a totally new idea. Some states require social impact analyses in 
conjuction with an environmental impact analysis; e.g., Massachusetts, under Mass. Gen. L. 
21D, requires a socioeconomic impact report for the siting of hazardous waste treatment facili· 
ties. Similarly, the Wisconsin equivalent of NEPA requires such a socioeconomic impact report. 
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biomedical research, including human gene therapy.420 The board was em-
powered to select an advisory committee whose members would be responsi-
ble for conducting studies, preparing reports, and holding public hearings. 
Due to political problems, the committee was not established until Septem-
ber 1988, and its continuing viability has been questioned.421 The use of this 
committee or one similar to it to deal with the new ethical issues being in-
troduced by biotechnology would provide society, regulators, and Congress 
with an understanding of the ethical conflicts inherent in the application of 
the technology. 
Our society needs alternative mechanisms to deal with the controversial 
and value-laden issues posed by new technologies. Our regulatory system 
does not deal well with "highly technical questions of science and technol-
ogy that also involve value judgments."422 We need mechanisms that allow 
for education regarding technical issues, discussion of the values inherent in 
our regulatory programs, and the impact those value judgments will have on 
our society. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
There continues to be considerable controversy over the adequacy and 
onerousness of the current biotechnology regulatory system. For the most 
part, environmentalists and a small number of "antibiotechnologists" con-
sider the system inadequate, while scientists and industry representatives 
have described the system as "scientifically indefensible," confusing, and 
fraught with jurisdictional conflicts and delays. Given this controversy and 
our relatively limited experience with biotechnology processes and products, 
the cautious approach being taken by the regulatory agencies with authority 
in the area seems warranted. The process can be improved, however, and 
the delays and conflicts addressed by creating an agency that has the au-
thority to address interagency conflicts and to appoint a lead agency when 
two or more agencies have the responsibility for regulating the same process 
or product. Moreover, a non-regulatory agency assigned the task of assisting 
researchers and developers through the regulatory maze and identifying po-
tential jurisdictional conflicts could significantly reduce delays in the regula-
tory system. 
Of perhaps most concern from the point of view of the general public 
420. A Once and Future Biomedical Ethics Board, HASTINGS CENTER REPoRT 2 (Apr.-
May 1988). 
421. Another, very successful, example of a similar committee was the President's Com-
mission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Re-
search. The commission published a series of books on ethical problems in medicine, including 
one volume entitled The Social and Ethical Issues of Genetic Engineering with Human Be-
ings. See 42 U.S.C. § 300(v) (1982) for a description of the commission. 
422. Ramo, The Regulation of Technological Activities: A New Approach, 67 A.B.A J. 
1456 (1981). 
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are the moral and ethical issues created by the new biotechnology, i.e., the 
technology's perceived social risks. The current regulatory system does not 
address these concerns, nor is it adequately equipped to do so. However, 
biotechnology researchers and developers will continue to encounter delays 
and a stringent regulatory climate unless and until some of these social risks 
are confronted. Several mechanisms are available to increase the quality of 
public debate regarding biotechnology processes and products. First and 
foremost is an educational program aimed at increasing the public's under-
standing of the science and the numerous current and potential benefits of 
the technology along with the difficult ethical issues that it invites. Second, 
regulatory agencies can assist in educating the public by preparing generic 
social impact reports on the possible ethical and moral issues raised by their 
approval or licensure of new biotechnology products. Third, there is a need 
for a separate, non-regulatory body that is assigned the responsibility of as-
sessing the social impacts of biotechnology from a broader perspective than 
is possible within the limits of any of the existing agencies. This body should 
be required to gather public opinion on various social and ethical issues in-
volved in the application of biotechnology, prepare reports on the topic, so-
licit public input on the reports, and propose new legislation for areas that 
require additional regulation. 
Additional public input on these matters is essential for public accept-
ance of the applications of this new technology. The pace of scientific re-
search must not preempt public debate and an outcome consistent with so-
cietal values. 
